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4Abstract
Testing often enhances memory, but memory can be harmed by interference from
similar or competing items. This thesis examines two situations in which it has been proposed
that testing can be harmful to memory because the test itself increases susceptibility to
interference. Experiments 1-8 investigate the effect of generating errors during new learning.
Participants learned definitions for unfamiliar English words, or translations for foreign
vocabulary, either by generating a response and being given corrective feedback, by reading
the word and its definition, or by selecting from a choice of definitions followed by feedback.
In a final test of all words, generating errors followed by feedback led to significantly better
memory for the correct definition than either reading or making incorrect choices, suggesting
that the benefits of generation are not restricted to correctly generated items. Even when
information to be learned is novel, errorful generation may play a powerful role in
potentiating encoding of corrective feedback. Metacognitive judgments of learning revealed
that participants were strikingly unaware of this benefit, judging errorful generation to be a
less effective encoding method than reading or incorrect choosing, when in fact it was better.
Predictions reflected participants’ subjective experience during learning.
A second series of experiments (Experiments 9-10) examines the claim that
reactivating a consolidated memory destabilizes it, making it more susceptible to interference
from new learning. Participants learned English-Swahili word pairs (List 1) on Day 1 with a
final test on Day 3. When memory of List 1 was reactivated in the form of a reminder test
immediately before learning Finnish words (List 2) on Day 2, testing, far from impairing List
1 memory, enhanced it, revealing a testing effect. Furthermore, List 2 learning disrupted List
1 memory when there was no reminder test, but reminder testing immunized the memory
against interference.
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9CHAPTER ONE: TESTING AND INTERFERENCE
It is well established that taking a memory test can lead to enhanced memory for the
tested items, a phenomenon known as the testing effect (see Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a, for
a review). On the other hand, incorrect or irrelevant information can often be detrimental to
memory, causing interference. This thesis examines whether the benefits of testing are
sufficient to outweigh the negative effects of interference, in two situations in which it has
been proposed that taking a test can be harmful to memory precisely because the test itself
increases the opportunity for incorrect information to interfere with memory for correct
information.
The first of these is a situation in which the test involves the production of many
errors. If errors are made on a test, are these errors reinforced, making it more difficult to
remember correct answers? A large body of literature advocating “errorless learning” claims
that this is so, but there is also evidence contradicting this claim. In Experiments 1–8 I
examine whether generating errors during learning is helpful or harmful to memory.
In the second situation, it has been proposed that reactivating memories which have
already been consolidated can return them to a labile or malleable state, similar to the state
they are in when they are first acquired, and that they then need to go through a
reconsolidation process in order to persist in their original form. During the reconsolidation
period, however, memories are particularly susceptible to interference, which may cause the
original memory to be modified or even unlearned. Experiments 9 and 10 examine this claim
and ask whether the well-known benefits of testing are counterbalanced by a tendency for
testing to make memory more susceptible to interference.
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The testing effect
A central question for educators concerns how to maximize students’ retention of
learned information. One technique which has been shown to be highly effective is the use of
testing: A robust and highly replicated finding from both laboratory and classroom studies is
that the very act of retrieving items from memory enhances memory for the tested items, the
“testing effect” (e.g., Allen, Mahler, & Estes, 1969; Karpicke & Roediger, 2008). In a typical
testing effect experiment, participants may study a list of, for example, paired associates, and
then take an initial test of half of the items. Later, on a final test of all of the items, recall is
often higher for the tested items than the untested ones. The effect remains when testing is
compared with a restudy condition (e.g., Carpenter, Pashler, Wixted, & Vul, 2008; Cull,
2000) so it cannot be attributed to additional exposure to the materials occurring as a result of
retrieval on the initial test, and it occurs when no corrective feedback is given on the initial
test (Allen et al., 1969; Carpenter & DeLosh, 2005, 2006; Kuo & Hirshman, 1996; Roediger
& Karpicke, 2006b), so it cannot be solely due to more efficient processing of feedback in the
test condition. However, feedback may enhance the benefits of tests, both by enabling errors
to be corrected and also by confirming the accuracy of correct responses (Butler, Karpicke, &
Roediger, 2008; Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2005). Moreover, it has been found that
the harder the test, and the greater the effort required for retrieval, the greater the benefit to
subsequent memory (e.g., Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Pyc & Rawson, 2009).
Theoretical accounts of the testing effect
Most of the testing effect literature has been empirical rather than theoretical and
there is no consensus as to why testing is beneficial. Among the explanations offered for the
effect are that testing strengthens retrieval routes between the cue and the target (Bjork,
1975), or that it increases the retrieval strength, or accessibility, of successfully retrieved
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items more than studying increases the strength of studied items. The more difficult the
retrieval, and the lower retrieval strength is at the time of retrieval, the greater the boost to
retrieval strength (Bjork & Bjork, 1992). Bjork and colleagues (Halamish & Bjork, 2011;
Kornell, Bjork, & Garcia, 2011) have also recently proposed a distribution-based model to
explain why testing is sometimes beneficial to memory and sometimes not. The model
assumes that testing increases memory strength more than studying does. When there is no
feedback at initial test, testing results in a bifurcated distribution of items, in that a subset of
tested items (those that were successfully retrieved) undergoes a large increase in strength
while the strength of unretrieved tested items is left unchanged. Meanwhile, all restudied
items are strengthened, but to a lesser degree than the successfully retrieved items. Since final
test performance is measured in terms of the number of items recalled, rather than the
strength of those items, a benefit for testing over restudying would be predicted when the
final test is difficult, for example when there is a long interval between initial test/restudy and
final test. This is because, when the threshold for retrieval is high, only those items highest in
memory strength will exceed it and be recalled, and these will tend to be the items which
were successfully retrieved at initial test and whose strength has therefore been boosted the
most. When the final test is easy, for example at a short retention interval, and the threshold
for retrieval is low, an advantage for restudied over tested items is predicted, since all of the
restudied items have been strengthened but only a subset of the tested ones has. The model
can therefore explain the test-delay interaction which has been found, whereby the testing
effect sometimes emerges only after a delay when no feedback is given at initial test (e.g.,
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b; Toppino & Cohen, 2009).
Another proposal is that initial testing is beneficial because it engages the same
processes which are required at final test, a transfer-appropriate-processing effect. Evidence
consistent with this viewpoint was found by A. K. Thomas and McDaniel (2007), but S. H.
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K. Kang, McDermott, and Roediger (2007) observed a testing benefit even when initial and
final tests were in different formats, suggesting that the transfer-appropriate processing
account cannot be the whole story. Testing may also enhance memory by suppressing
competing responses which come to mind during the initial test (R. C. Thomas & McDaniel,
2013; see also Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Alternatively, activation of many concepts
during initial retrieval may elaborate the memory trace and create multiple retrieval routes to
the target, maximizing its retrieval on a subsequent occasion (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006;
Glover, 1989; McDaniel & Masson, 1985). Some routes created during initial testing may
lead to incorrect responses, so another proposal is that monitoring processes are engaged at
final test to distinguish the target from these incorrect responses (R. C. Thomas & McDaniel,
2013).
The generation effect
Related to the testing effect is the generation effect (e.g., Slamecka & Graf, 1978)
whereby items generated by participants in response to a cue (e.g. “opposite of hot: c___”)
are better remembered than the same items when they are simply read. It has been interpreted
as a testing effect for semantic memory: When the participant is asked to generate the
opposite of hot, the association hot-cold already exists in memory and the act of generating
the target from the cue strengthens the memory in the same way as it does for studied
material in a typical testing effect situation. The finding that there is no generation benefit
when the response terms are nonwords (McElroy & Slamecka, 1982) also suggests that the
effect may be the result of enhanced elaborative processing.
Direct and indirect effects of testing
There are at least two ways in which testing can benefit memory. A direct effect of
testing refers to memory enhancement that occurs as a result of taking the test itself, whether
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or not corrective feedback is given on the test. However, testing can also benefit memory
indirectly. For example, Izawa (1970) provided evidence that a retrieval attempt (i.e., a test)
may potentiate subsequent encoding of the correct response, and Bahrick and Hall (2005)
proposed that even retrieval failures benefit long term recall by allowing participants to
identify items which were inadequately encoded and therefore to focus more time and
attention on encoding corrective feedback. Testing can therefore enhance memory directly,
by strengthening the generated or retrieved memory, or indirectly, by making the processing
of subsequent feedback more effective, or by some combination of the two (see Arnold &
McDermott, 2013, for a useful discussion of this point).
Testing and interference
The testing effect and the generation effect are both highly replicated findings and
suggest that there is something about the active process of recalling or generating which leads
to memory enhancement for the recalled or generated items. Despite widespread evidence of
the benefits of testing, however, there are situations in which it can be harmful to memory,
for example when incorrect information is retrieved or generated on the test. McDermott
(2006) found that testing increased false memory as well as memory for correct information,
and Schooler, Foster, and Loftus (1988) found that forcing participants to choose between
two alternatives, both of which were incorrect, at initial test, led to impaired memory for the
studied material on a subsequent final multiple choice (MCQ) test, compared with taking no
initial test.
Given that testing can enhance memory for incorrect as well as correct information,
educators may be deterred from making optimal use of testing as a learning tool – for
example, by setting difficult tests, which have the potential to enhance memory to a greater
extent than easier ones – because of a concern that many errors will be made and that these
errors will be reinforced by the act of testing, and interfere with students’ ability to remember
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the correct information. Certainly, there is evidence that errors are best avoided during
learning. For example, Baddeley and Wilson (1994), in a typical “errorless learning” study,
gave participants the first two letters of a word with many possible completions, e.g., “QU”,
and encouraged them to generate up to four guesses as to what the word might be, before
giving them the target (“errorful” condition). They ensured that participants made at least one
error for each item, by using a back-up target if the participant happened to produce the
designated target on the first guess. In the “errorless” condition, the participant was given the
stem, followed immediately by the correct answer. After each list of words had been
presented once, the procedure was repeated twice more, so there was potential for many
errors to be produced in the errorful condition. At a final free recall test, more targets were
recalled in the errorless than the errorful condition.
On the other hand, there is also evidence that generating responses can be beneficial
even when many errors are produced, as long as corrective feedback is given. Kornell, Hays
and Bjork (2009), in a study which is described more fully below, found that participants
remembered more weakly associated word pairs when they had generated incorrect guesses
for the targets at study, before receiving corrective feedback, than when they had read the
pairs intact. A worthwhile goal, then, is to identify the conditions in which errorful generation
may be either helpful or harmful to subsequent retention. This thesis seeks to contribute
towards achieving this goal. In this scenario, the test itself produces the erroneous material
and the question is whether the act of generation, despite producing errors, can potentiate the
encoding of subsequent feedback sufficiently to outweigh any negative effect of the errors.
The perpetuation of errors on a test is not the only way that testing could be harmful
to memory. Although memory for the tested material is typically enhanced by testing there is
evidence that it can be modified in other ways. Research in neurobiology, mainly involving
non-human animals, has suggested that consolidated memories become “labilized” (made
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fragile) on reactivation and need to be reconsolidated (see Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010,
for a review). Indeed, it may be through a reconsolidation process that memories become
strengthened, leading to better subsequent recall (Finn & Roediger, 2011, Sara, 2000).
However, during the reconsolidation period memories are particularly susceptible to
interference which, far from strengthening them, may cause them to undergo modification or
even unlearning.
So far few studies have investigated whether reconsolidation occurs in humans. Rubin
(1976) found that electroconvulsive shock (ECS) could cure patients of their compulsive
thoughts. ECS was only successful if applied when patients were focusing on their
compulsions, and not when they were anaesthetised, consistent with the notion that
reactivating these memories made them labile and susceptible to disruption by ECS. More
recently, a handful of studies have investigated the issue of reconsolidation in human memory
using new learning as the interfering agent (e.g., Walker, Brakefield, Hobson, & Stickgold,
2003; Forcato, Burgos, Argibay, Molina, Pedreira, & Maldonado, 2007; Forcato, Argibay,
Pedreira, & Maldonado, 2009; Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, & Nadel, 2007, Hupbach, Hardt,
Gomez, & Nadel, 2008; Hupbach, Gomez, & Nadel, 2009). It is well-established, from
studies of retroactive interference, that new learning can disrupt memory for recently
acquired information (e.g., Barnes & Underwood, 1959). If reactivating a memory returns it
to a labile state similar to when it was first acquired, will it again be sensitive to disruption
from new learning? In this scenario, it is proposed that information learned after a test can
disrupt memory for the tested material itself. This literature is reviewed more thoroughly in
Chapter 8, so the remainder of this chapter will focus on the issue of error generation.
The effect of making errors during learning
What happens when we generate errors on a test? Are those errors strengthened by
generation, leading to impaired memory for correct information? Or can the active process of
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generation, even when it produces an error, lead to better retention as long as corrective
feedback is given? There are two scenarios in which learners may guess incorrectly in
response to a test question. First, they may know the answer but either be temporarily unable
to retrieve it or may retrieve the wrong answer. For example, when asked for the capital of
Canada, they may know that the correct answer is “Ottawa” but mistakenly respond with
“Montreal”. In this case there is a pre-existing association between the question and the
correct answer (Canada - Ottawa) at the time of initial retrieval, and corrective feedback may
be used to reinforce this association, to maximize the chance of successful retrieval on future
occasions. In this thesis this scenario is referred to as “unsuccessful retrieval” (following
Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009) and it has been the focus of several recent studies (Grimaldi &
Karpicke, 2012; Hays, Kornell, & Bjork, 2013; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Knight, Ball,
Brewer, DeWitt, & Marsh, 2012; Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009). In the second scenario,
learners do not know the answer because the test material is completely new to them. For
example, they may be asked for the capital of Mali, but never have come across that piece of
information before. In this scenario they may generate a guess which is more or less plausible
depending on the constraints provided by the available context, such as the test question itself
(e.g., “Jamestown” for the capital of Mali). In this case, to learn the correct answer, the
individual has to learn a novel association between the unfamiliar cue material (Mali) and the
corrective feedback provided (Bamako) – there is no pre-existing association to be
reinforced. This scenario, which will be referred to as “errorful generation”, has received less
attention and is the focus of Experiments 1-8 of this thesis. These experiments examined the
effect of making errors in a vocabulary learning task in a situation in which learners make
incorrect guesses not because they cannot remember the answer but because they have never
learned it in the first place.
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Is generating errors during learning helpful or harmful to memory?
Kay (1955) noted the difficulty his participants had in “amending the mistakes which
they themselves had introduced into their learning” (p.81). Indeed, a large body of literature
on “errorless” learning has proposed that errors generated during learning can be harmful to
subsequent memory. In a typical errorless learning study, as noted above, a condition in
which participants are encouraged to generate many erroneous responses to a test cue leads to
worse subsequent memory performance than a condition in which they are presented with the
correct answer intact. Although the avoidance of errors has been particularly advocated for
people with memory impairments (Baddeley & Wilson, 1994), an advantage for errorless
over errorful learning has frequently also been observed in healthy young people, with a
variety of materials (e.g., Hammer, Kordon, Heldmann, Zurowski, & Munte, 2009, for verbal
materials; Haslam, Moss, & Hodder, 2010, for greeble-name associations; Haslam, Hodder,
& Yates, 2011, for face-name associations; Kessels, Boekhorst, & Postma, 2005, for spatial
locations). Participants often remember their own erroneous responses rather than the correct
responses provided by the experimenter. Errorful learning is thought to be detrimental to
memory because errors can prove remarkably resistant to correction even when there are
multiple opportunities to review the correct information (e.g., Fritz, Morris, Bjork, Gelman,
& Wickens, 2000).
Unsuccessful retrieval
Despite these claims, there is also evidence that even tests which yield errors can
benefit later retention, as long as corrective feedback is given. A study by Kane and
Anderson (1978) found a benefit of generating errors over reading when participants were
instructed to generate the last word of a sentence or to read the sentence intact. For
determined sentences (e.g., “The dove is a symbol of __” [answer: peace]), the correct
answer was obvious from the sentence, whereas for undetermined sentences (e.g., “The
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physician asked the patient if he had a ____” [answer: watch]), it was not. Even in the
undetermined condition, where participants nearly always produced an error, generating led
to better final test performance than reading. Kane and Anderson suggested that the benefit of
errorful generation was due to the requirement to process the sentence meaningfully, which
was unnecessary in the Read condition.
Whereas in the typical generation effect paradigm there is only one answer which fits
the cue, Kane and Anderson’s task made it possible to respond with many plausible
completions. In their study, therefore, the goal was not to retrieve a sole valid correct answer
but, rather, to guess which of many possible responses the experimenter happened to have in
mind. This design has been adopted in a handful of recent studies (Grimaldi & Karpicke,
2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009) as a means of simulating the
processes involved in unsuccessful retrieval, that is, the situation where a student has learned
the right answer but retrieves the wrong one. Typically, studies investigating the effect of
errors in this type of situation have had participants study the material before being tested on
it (e.g., Pashler, Zarow, & Triplett, 2003; S. H. K. Kang et al., 2011). Following study,
participants take an initial test with feedback and, later, a final test. Final test performance
can then be analysed conditional upon the making of an error at initial test. However, as
Pashler et al. (2003) have noted, this design incurs item-selection problems. If an error is
made on an initial test, and it is made again on a later test, this could be either because the
original error had a deleterious effect on later memory or because the item was intrinsically
difficult to learn. While it is possible to examine later test performance for just the subset of
items which were incorrect at initial test, it is not possible to compare this with performance
for items which were not tested but which would have been incorrect had they been tested,
since there is no way of determining which these are.
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In order to overcome this item-selection problem, Kornell et al. (2009) eliminated the
usual study phase in which to-be-learned associations are studied, starting instead with the
initial test, and they selected materials (weakly-associated word pairs, e.g., pond - frog) for
which the cues would have strong pre-existing associations with items other than the target.
This method was designed to encourage participants to attempt retrieval of an existing
association while ensuring that many “errors” (i.e., responses different from the target) would
be produced. Thus the terms “unsuccessful retrieval” and “retrieval failures” used by Kornell
et al. refer not to a failure to retrieve an episodic association between cue and target formed
during an earlier study phase, since there was no study phase, but rather to the retrieval by
participants of a pre-existing semantic association which differed from the one designated as
“correct” by the experimenter. In this way Kornell et al. aimed to simulate a situation in
which students retrieve, during a test, an answer which is incorrect but which is related to the
correct one, such as might occur when a student has studied something but has not learned it
with sufficient thoroughness.
In the first phase of Kornell, Hays, and Bjork’s procedure (2009, Exps. 4 - 6),
participants were shown a cue word (e.g., pond) and were instructed to produce an associate.
Typically, participants would produce a strong associate to the cue (e.g., water) and were
then told the particular associate that the experimenter had in mind (frog) and were instructed
to remember that item for a later test. Because the correct targets were only weakly associated
to the cue, participants typically failed to guess them, thus ensuring that many “errors” were
produced. These “test” trials were interleaved with “read-only” trials in which intact cue-
target pairs were presented. At final test participants were again given the cue pond but this
time their task was to recall the particular associate they had been instructed to study in the
first phase (frog). Kornell et al. found that the test condition led to better final test
performance than the read-only condition. In their experiments, the instruction to produce an
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associate constrained guesses to items likely to be highly related to both cue and target. Use
of associated pairs ensured there was a pre-existing association between cue and target (pond
– frog) which could be strengthened by corrective feedback.
The semantic relatedness hypothesis
Two subsequent studies using the same weak-associate paradigm (Grimaldi &
Karpicke, 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012) came to the conclusion that a benefit of
generating errors could only be observed when there was such a pre-existing semantic
association between cue and target and not when the cue was unrelated to the target. Grimaldi
and Karpicke proposed that this was because, for related pairs, participants not only retrieved,
at study, the associate they gave as their guess (e.g., water) but also covertly retrieved other
associates, including the target (frog). This covert retrieval or activation of the target
facilitated its encoding when it was presented as feedback. In other words this was a classic
testing effect reinforced by feedback: the relevant cue-target association already existed in the
participant’s memory and was retrieved as part of the search set, along with other
associations to the same cue, when the participant was prompted with the cue and asked to
guess the target. The corrective feedback simply confirmed that this was the cue-target pair
required, rather than any of the others activated at the same time. Since retrieval strengthens
memory more than reading, and feedback enhances the benefits of testing (Butler &
Roediger, 2008; Pashler et al., 2005), this led to an advantage for targets studied in the
Generate condition. A related proposal was made by Slamecka and Fevreiski (1983) who
suggested that generation could be beneficial even when participants failed to produce the
target at initial study, if they had partially retrieved it by activating some of its semantic
attributes but not its surface features. This study is described in more detail in Chapter 3.
Huelser and Metcalfe (2012) similarly proposed that pre-existing semantic relatedness
between cue and target was essential for the benefit of generating errors to be observed. They
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proposed that the benefit occurred because the error generated by the participant would also
have a pre-existing semantic association with the cue. In a case where the cue and target were
related, the error was also likely to be related to the target and could therefore enhance
memory by functioning either as an elaborator or as a mediator. The error could function as
an elaborator because retrieval of a word that was semantically related to the cue could lead
to activation of other concepts associated with the cue which would also be associated with
the target, thus creating a more elaborate memory trace, and providing more information
which could be used as retrieval cues for the target at final test. Alternatively it could
function as a mediator by acting as a link between the cue and the target which could benefit
memory as long as participants were able to remember their own incorrect guess and use it to
link to the correct target (see Pyc & Rawson, 2010, for an account of the mediator
effectiveness hypothesis).
Hays et al. (2013) offered an account similar to the elaboration hypothesis described
above, proposing that generating a response primed knowledge related to the cue, activating a
network of semantically related information, which facilitated the mapping of the cue to the
target. This of course would only apply when the cue was also related to the target. Likewise,
Kornell et al. (2009) proposed three “retrieval based” explanations of the effect. These
explanations all assume that material activated during an incorrect guess undergoes memory
enhancement and this can benefit the encoding of corrective feedback if the guess is also
related to the target.
The prevailing view, then, is that errors can only be beneficial when there is a pre-
existing semantic relationship between cue and target. In all of these studies, however, the
pre-existing relatedness between cue and target is confounded with the fact that the cues all
have strong pre-existing associations, so there is also a pre-existing relationship between the
cue and the generated error. Since retrieval confers a direct benefit on the retrieved item, the
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generation of an error related to the cue may be helpful to memory when it is also related to
the target (as in the case of related word pairs), for the reasons proposed above, but it may be
detrimental to memory when the error is unrelated to the target (as in the case of unrelated
word pairs) since it may interfere, at test, with retrieval of the correct answer. In this case
there may still be an indirect benefit of generation to the subsequent feedback (e.g., by
causing more attention to be focused on the feedback) but this may be obscured by
interference from the error related to the cue which has been strengthened by generation or
retrieval. In order to identify whether a failed test can benefit memory purely by potentiating
encoding of feedback, it is necessary to examine a situation in which errors are unrelated to
either cue or target.
Furthermore, the weak-associate paradigm used in these three studies is rather unlike
any real life testing situation, where there is typically only one valid answer to the question
that has been set and the task is to recall that answer, not to guess which of many valid
answers the experimenter or instructor happens to have in mind. For example, one would not
normally expect to be asked “Name one of Marilyn Monroe’s husbands” and then, having
given the (valid) answer “Joe DiMaggio”, be told that that was incorrect and the answer
required was “Arthur Miller”. Instead, a more realistic question would be, “Name Marilyn
Monroe’s third husband”. In this instance, retrieving “Joe DiMaggio” would indeed be
incorrect, not just for the purposes of this test but always. The weak-associate paradigm is
used, however, because of its potential to generate many “errors” – or, at least, responses at
study which will be different from those required at test, though it is not clear whether it does
in fact involve the same processes as are involved in making and correcting genuine retrieval
errors.
Errorful generation
The focus of Experiments 1-8 of this thesis is the related but different scenario,
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errorful generation, in which students make incorrect guesses because the test material is
completely new to them. The learning of novel vocabulary represents a rather more realistic
learning scenario in which there is a one-to-one relationship between the cue and the target.
Thus, the rare but real English word “menald” means “spotty” and will always mean
“spotty”; it does not also mean “brainy”, “helpful” or “drowsy”, either for the purposes of the
experiment or at any time in the future. If a participant says it means “helpful” they are
making a genuine error, not simply failing to guess what was in the experimenter’s mind at
the time. Neither the cue nor the task instructions constrain guessing, so the incorrectly
generated item is unlikely to be related to either cue or target. Unlike the Slamecka and
Fevreiski design the cue-target pair is not already known and so has no potential to be even
partially retrieved. There is no pre-existing association to be reinforced and participants have
to learn a completely novel association. Kornell et al. (2009) came closer to this scenario in
their first two experiments by using fictional trivia questions, to which participants could not
possibly know the answer. They interspersed fictional questions with real ones in order to
encourage participants to attempt retrieval, even though there was no memory to be retrieved,
and the fictional questions were all based on real ones so participants might have retrieved
details related to the real counterparts, but Kornell et al. found no advantage of generating
over reading when total trial time was equated. However, participants tended to produce no
answer rather than an incorrect one, so it was not possible to test the hypothesis that
producing incorrect answers impairs subsequent memory for correct ones (Baddeley &
Wilson, 1994; Roediger & Marsh, 2005).
Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012) argued that the reason they did not observe a generate
advantage for unrelated word pairs (pairs with no pre-existing association), e.g., pillow-leaf,
in their paradigm was because, for a generate advantage to occur, the target had to be
retrieved as part of the “search set” along with the incorrect guess. However, this conclusion
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may be premature. In both Grimaldi and Karpicke’s (2012) and Huelser and Metcalfe’s
(2012) studies, participants generated guesses which were highly related to the cues in both
the related and unrelated conditions (e.g., sleep for the cue pillow). At final test, presentation
of the cue (pillow) is likely to have brought to mind the same (related) response which was
given at study (sleep), along with all the other related responses activated at the same time
(e.g., bed, head, feather, cushion etc). Howard and Kahana (2002) showed that participants
tend to recall items which are semantically related to the item just recalled. This would be
helpful in the related case, where the target is in fact related to the participant’s incorrect
guess, but unhelpful in the unrelated case, where retrieval at test of all the related associates
of the cue would be likely to interfere with the participant’s ability to remember the unrelated
target leaf.
Moreover, when related and unrelated items appear in a mixed list at study, as in
Grimaldi and Karpicke’s (2012) study, participants may not remember, at test, which cues
were matched with related targets and which with unrelated ones, so might search for the
correct answer exclusively among the related associates. Therefore, Grimaldi and Karpicke’s
proposal that errorful generation is only beneficial for related items (because they are
covertly retrieved at study and thus benefit from a classic testing effect) and not for unrelated
items (because they are not retrieved at study), may not be the only possible explanation for
their findings. Errorful generation may benefit subsequent encoding even when the target is
not retrieved at study and is not therefore among the “search set”, and the failure to observe a
generation benefit in the unrelated case may be simply because the benefits of generation
were outweighed by interference at test from a strong but incorrect associate to the cue. This
would also apply to the explanations offered by Huelser and Metcalfe (2012) and Hays et al.
(2013).
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Indeed, in Huelser and Metcalfe’s (2012) study it was significantly more common for
an error made at study to be repeated at test in the unrelated than the related condition,
whether the design was between subjects (Experiment 1) or within subjects (Experiment 2).
Hays, Kornell, and Bjork (2013) also found evidence of interference from incorrect answers
generated at study. Furthermore, it is difficult to explain Kane and Anderson’s (1978)
findings by Grimaldi and Karpicke’s account, since in their undetermined condition the
targets were unrelated to the most obvious, incorrect, completions so it is highly unlikely that
they would have been retrieved along with them.
Why might errorful generation benefit memory?
There are reasons why errorful generation could be helpful even when the incorrect
response is unrelated to the correct one. Making an incorrect guess in response to a test
question may arouse curiosity about the correct answer, leading to more attention being paid
to that answer. Berlyne and Normore (1972) found that inducing, then satisfying, curiosity by
presenting a blurred picture immediately before a clear picture of the same object, led to
better memory for the objects than presenting the clear picture for twice as long. M. J. Kang,
Hsu, Krajbich, Loewenstein, McClure, Wang, and Camerer (2009) found that the higher
participants rated their curiosity about a question answered incorrectly, the more likely they
were to recall the correct answer on a surprise test two weeks later. There is also evidence
that greater attention is given to feedback that does not match expectations (e.g., Butterfield
& Metcalfe, 2001; Fazio & Marsh, 2009), and much research shows that discrepancies
between what is expected and what occurs drive learning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). It
is possible, then, that the discrepancy between a generated error and subsequent corrective
feedback may capture attention, enhancing encoding of the correct answer. Some support for
this notion comes from studies in which students attempt to answer questions before studying
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a text, leading to better memory for the material than simply reading the questions (e.g.,
Pressley, Tanenbaum, McDaniel, & Wood, 1990; Richland, Kornell & Kao, 2009).
A handful of previous studies have examined guessing during vocabulary learning but
have produced mixed results. Forlano and Hoffman (1937) found that “telling” was better
than “guessing” when schoolgirls learned Hebrew-English word pairs. Although total
learning time was equated for the two conditions, it is not clear how time was allocated for
each item. Berlyne, Carey, Lazare, Parlow, and Tiberius (1968) obtained similar findings for
intentional learning of Turkish-English word pairs in adults. However, they did find an
advantage of generating under incidental learning conditions, again proposing that memory
was reinforced by the satisfaction of curiosity.
Overview of thesis
Experiments 1-8 of this thesis examine whether it is, in fact, possible to observe a
benefit of incorrect guessing even when the cue is unrelated to the target, in a scenario in
which there are no pre-existing associations between cue and target because the materials,
novel vocabulary items, have never previously been encountered. The cues in these
experiments are very obscure English or foreign language words which do not already exist
in participants’ mental lexicons and which therefore have no pre-existing associations to
retrieve. Can making an incorrect guess in response to cues which have never been seen
before lead to more effective encoding of subsequent feedback than passively studying
correct answers?
Chapter 1 establishes the basic procedure used for the errorful generation experiments
described in Chapters 2 to 7. Participants learned definitions of rare English words, e.g., roke
– mist (or translations of foreign language words in Experiments 2B and 8), each in one of
three different ways. Previous studies examining the effect of error generation (e.g., Grimaldi
& Karpicke, 2012; Hays, Kornell & Bjork, 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Kane &
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Anderson, 1978; Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009; Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983) have typically
compared a condition in which a cue and target are presented together for study (Read
condition) with a condition in which the cue alone is presented and the participant’s task is to
guess the target before being shown the correct answer as feedback (Generate condition).
Subsequently, participants take a final test of all the items. Our experiments also used Read
and Generate conditions, and we added a novel third condition, in which participants were
given a choice of definitions at study, from which they were to select the one they thought
was correct (Choice).
Experiment 1, described in Chapter 2, demonstrates an advantage for generating
errors over both reading and choosing during the learning of unusual English words, even
though the correct answers are displayed for a much shorter time in the Generate condition.
In Chapter 3 the effect is replicated both with unusual English words (Experiment 2A) and
with foreign vocabulary (Experiment 2B) as stimuli. In addition, participants’ metacognitive
judgments of learning, and their relationship to test performance, are investigated and reveal
a striking dissociation between participants’ predictions and their actual test performance.
Chapter 4 (Experiments 3 and 4) explores possible explanations for these findings, and
replicates the effects of the previous experiments using a modified procedure in which
participants could study correct answers for as long as they chose.
Chapter 5 describes an experiment (Experiment 5) which investigates the effect of
different lures in the Choice condition, at study and at test. Chapter 6 (Experiments 6 and 7)
asks whether the Generate advantage extends to a cued recall final test format, and examines
more closely the effect, on final test performance, of errors generated at study. Chapter 7
looks at the differences between the procedure used in our experiments and that used in
typical “errorless learning” studies in a quest to reconcile their divergent findings, and uses a
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modified procedure (Experiment 8) to investigate the effect of generating errors across
multiple cycles of learning.
Chapter 8 (Experiments 9 and 10) examines the proposal that testing can be
detrimental to memory because reactivation of a consolidated memory can make it more
susceptible to interference, which can disrupt reconsolidation. We conclude that testing and
interference exert opposite effects on memory but that testing, far from making memory more
vulnerable to interference, has a greater benefit in the presence of interference than in its
absence. Finally, Chapter 9 summarises and discusses the main findings and highlights
avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: A BENEFIT OF GENERATING ERRORS DURING THE
LEARNING OF NOVEL INFORMATION
Our first experiment addresses the question of whether an advantage for generating
over reading can be observed when the cues are novel vocabulary items. In this scenario there
is no pre-existing association in participants’ minds between cue and target because the
words have never been previously encountered, and little or no opportunity to elaborate the
cue in a meaningful way. If a benefit for errorful generation is observed in these
circumstances, this would challenge the claim that such a benefit can only be observed when
there is a pre-existing relationship between cue and target (Grimaldi & Karpicke, 2012; Hays,
Kornell, & Bjork, 2012; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012).
In Experiment 1 participants learned definitions of rare English words (e.g., roke –
mist), using a computerised task in which words and their definitions were displayed on
screen and participants typed their responses into the computer. There were three within
subjects conditions: the Generate and Read conditions used in previous studies, and a novel
“Choice” condition, in which participants were shown the cue and two possible definitions,
one of which was the target, and they had to type in the one they thought was correct. Thus,
participants learned definitions either by reading the word with its definition (Read), by
guessing a definition followed by corrective feedback (Generate), or by choosing from two
definitions followed by feedback (Choice). These three conditions are representative of three
common methods of classroom learning: studying by reading, cued recall tests, and multiple
choice questions (MCQ). Because we were interested in determining which study method
makes optimal use of study time, total trial time was equated for each of the three conditions.
With this design, exposure to the correct answer is longer for Read than for Generate items,
since the target definition is on screen for the total trial time in the Read condition, but only
the last few seconds of the trial time in the Generate condition. This disparity could
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disadvantage Generate items by comparison with Read items. However, we used this design
because we were interested in determining which study method makes optimal use of study
time. A benefit of generating errors over reading has been demonstrated even when total trial
time was equated, with related paired associates (Hays, Kornell, & Bjork, 2012; Huelser &
Metcalfe, 2012; Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009; Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983) and with both
determined and undetermined sentence completions (Kane & Anderson, 1978). If the same
benefit is observed for the learning of novel vocabulary, where there is no pre-existing
relationship between cue and target in participants’ minds, and no opportunity to elaborate
the cue before exposure to the correct answer, this advantage will be all the more striking
given that the correct answer is available for a shorter time in the Generate condition.
After studying 60 words and their definitions under these three conditions,
participants then took a final multiple choice test of all the words, again reflecting a typical
educational testing scenario. The greater sensitivity of a multiple choice test may reveal
differences between conditions which might be harder to detect with a recall test, and it also
permits us to examine the effects of different choice alternatives (lures) at test.
Because we were interested in the effect of making errors, we firmly encouraged
participants to guess at study in the Generate and Choice conditions. We included the two-
alternative Choice condition in order to investigate the effect of giving an error response at
study without the component of generation. Participants were shown the cue and two possible
definitions, one of which was correct and one a lure, and were instructed to type in the one
they thought was correct. When participants are asked to make a choice, no act of generation
is required since the correct answer is presented intact. When material has been previously
studied, taking an MCQ test followed by feedback has been found to yield comparable final
test performance to restudying (e.g., Butler & Roediger, 2007; S. H. K. Kang, McDermott, &
Roediger, 2007; McDaniel, Anderson, Derbish, & Morisette, 2007). With repeated testing,
Chapter 2: A benefit of generating errors
31
superior performance has even been observed (McDaniel, Wildman, & Anderson, 2012).
However, in these studies, performance in the initial MCQ test was very high. In the present
experiment, with no prior study, we expected the words to be unfamiliar to participants and
that correct guesses at study in the Choice condition would be no higher than chance. Under
these conditions we predicted that incorrect choices selected at study would interfere with
correct memory at final test such that this condition would produce poorer performance than
the Read condition, which involved no interference, and poorer performance than the
Generate condition, which we expected to benefit from the active process of producing an
answer, albeit an incorrect one.
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine whether the active process of generating a
definition for an unknown word, even though it would nearly always produce an error, would
lead to better memory for correct definitions than either passive studying or choosing, despite
the fact that the cue provided no constraints on guessing and no opportunity for meaningful
elaboration.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four participants, 12 male, average age 28.7 (SD = 10.7), were recruited from
the University College London (UCL) participant pool which comprises both students and
non-students. They participated in return for a small payment (£4).
Design
The design was within-subjects with one independent variable (Study Method) with
three levels (Read, Generate, and Choice). The dependent variable was the number of items
correctly selected at the final multiple choice test in each condition.
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Materials
For the stimulus materials we created a pool of very unusual English words, each
paired with a one-word definition e.g., hispid - bristly, valinch - tube, frampold –
quarrelsome, from which we selected 60 pairs which were unfamiliar to participants in a pilot
study. Appendix A shows the stimulus materials for all experiments. See Table A1 for the
word pairs used in Experiment 1. For the Choice condition, a lure was created for each of the
English targets. For the final multiple choice test a further two lures were created for each of
the words. The set of 60 items was divided into three subsets of 20 items each for
counterbalancing purposes. Each subset was matched for average number of letters and
syllables per word, and each subset contained the same number of nouns, verbs and
adjectives. Computer software written in Visual Basic 6.0 presented and controlled the
experimental task.
Procedure
Participants were told that they would study words presented in three different
formats and that they should try to remember the correct definitions for a later memory test.
The study phase was preceded by a practice phase to familiarise participants with the task. At
study, each word was presented on the computer screen once and one at a time in one of three
randomly interleaved formats. Each item appeared equally often in each condition across
participants. A Read trial consisted of the cue (the English word) and the target (a one-word
definition) being displayed on the screen for 17 s. A Generate trial consisted of an English
word being displayed for 10 s while the participant was prompted to type in a one-word
definition, followed by presentation of the correct answer for 7 s. During a Choice trial an
English word was displayed for 10 s with two possible choices, the true one-word definition
and a lure, during which time the participant was prompted to type in the definition they
thought was correct. The order of the two choices on the screen was randomly determined.
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Then the correct answer was displayed for 7 s. Participants were told that if they did not
know the word they should guess. Figure 1 depicts the procedure and timings used at study in
Experiments 1-8.
Following the study phase, participants were given 1 min to solve some arithmetic
puzzles. The final phase of the experiment was a multiple choice test. All 60 English words
were presented, one at a time in random order, with four possible alternatives which included
the correct definition and the lure created for the initial choice test, plus two additional lures.
The relative position of each alternative on the screen was randomly determined on a trial by
trial basis. For each word, participants were prompted to select the correct definition from
amongst the four alternatives and type it in. No feedback was given. There were no time
constraints in this phase of the experiment.
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Experiment 1 Experiments 2A, 2B and 6
Read Read
Word + definition Word + definition
17 s 13 s
Generate Generate
Word Word + definition Word Word +
definition
10 s 7 s 8 s 5 s
Choice Choice
Word + 2 options Word + definition Word + 4 options Word +
definition
10 s 7 s 8 s 5 s
Experiment 3: EP group Experiment 3: SP group (Experiment 4 in
brackets)
Read Read
Word + definition Word + definition
15 s self-paced
Generate Generate
Word Word + definition Word Word +
definition
10 s 5 s 10 s (8s) self-paced
Choice Choice
Word + 4 options Word + definition Word + 4 options Word +
definition
10 s 5 s 10 s (8s) self-paced
Experiment 5 Experiment 7 (Experiment 8 in brackets)
Choice Read
Word + 4 options Word + definition Word + definition
8s 5s 17s (13 s)
Generate
Word Word +
definition
10s (8 s) 7s (5 s)
Figure 1. Study trial procedure for Experiments 1- 8. EP = Experimenter-paced, SP = Self-
paced.
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Results
At study correct generations were few (M = 6.5%, SD = 12.3) and correct choices
were at chance (M = 53.3%, SD = 10.5, t(23) = 1.6, p = .133), confirming that most
definitions were unknown to participants pre-experimentally1.
Final test performance differed by study method, F(2,46) = 7.62, p = .001, p2 = .25,
(Figure 2). When all items were considered, whether the associated response was correct or
incorrect at study, Generate items were better remembered than Read (t(23) = 3.65, p = .001,
d = .47) and Choice items (t(23) = 2.80, p = .010, d = .42). Fifteen participants remembered
more Generate than Read items and only three showed the reverse pattern. The Read and
Choice conditions did not differ (t(23) = .77, p = .447, d = .09). Since we were particularly
interested in the effect of making errors at study, we analysed final test performance for just
those items answered incorrectly at study, which entailed dropping a small number of items
from the analysis in the Generate condition and about half the items in the Choice condition
(Figure 2). This analysis revealed a similar pattern, F (2,46) = 3.33, p = .044, p2 = .13.
Generate scores were higher than Read scores, t(23) = 2.40, p = .025, d = .35, but the
difference between Generate and Choice fell short of significance, (t(23) = 1.91, p = .069, d =
.36), possibly because there were too few incorrect items to reveal the effect. Again there was
no significant difference between the Read and Choice conditions (t(23) = .01, p = .990, d =
.002). The benefit of generating over reading is particularly striking because generating
nearly always produced an error, and the correct definition was available for much less time -
just 7 s, compared with 17 s for Read trials.
1 In Experiment 1, the number of correct generations was largely driven by the responses of one
participant who generated correct guesses for over half the items in the Generate condition and three
quarters in the Choice condition. We reran the analysis with this participant excluded and the results
were unaffected. In Experiment 2 the stimulus materials were changed so as not to include any of the
items which were correctly guessed in Experiment 1.
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Contrary to our expectations, choosing did not lead to poorer performance than
reading, even when the analysis was confined to just those items which were incorrect at
study. We examined the type of errors made at final test in the Choice condition. When an
incorrect response was made at final test, this response was significantly more likely to be the
original lure when that lure had also been picked at study (M = 73.4% of incorrect responses
following initial selection of a lure, SD = 30.2) than when a correct answer had been given at
study (M = 35.3% of incorrect responses following an initially correct choice, SD= 33.0),
t(15) = 3.44, p =.004. Indeed, when the initial response was correct but the final test response
was incorrect, participants picked the original lure from the study phase at a rate no different
from the chance rate of 33.3%, t(17) = .78, p = .447. (Note that 6 participants made no errors
at final test following selection of the correct response at study, so they had no data to
contribute to this analysis.) Thus, even though the original lure had been seen in the study
phase and the other two options had not, participants’ incorrect responses were not affected
by any additional familiarity associated with the original lure. However, when both the initial
and final responses were incorrect, participants picked the same incorrect answer at test as
they had done at study at a rate considerably higher than chance, t(15) = 5.31, p < .001,
suggesting that errors made on the initial test can interfere with accurate retrieval at final test.
(Note that 8 participants made no incorrect responses at final test following selection of the
lure at study, so they had no data to contribute to this analysis.)
Thus, although there was no overall detriment to the Choice condition by comparison
with the Read condition, there was some evidence that errors made at study interfered with
final test performance. However, any negative effect of interference seems to have been
offset by a positive effect of selecting a definition from a choice of two, perhaps because this
involved deeper processing than passively reading the word and its definition.
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Figure 2: Mean percentage correct at final memory test in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate
standard errors.
Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed a benefit of generating followed by feedback over reading
during the learning of unusual English words, even though generation produced many errors
at study. Generation was also more beneficial than choosing when all items were considered
and there was a marginal benefit when only items incorrect at study were considered. Our
hypothesis that incorrect choosing might lead to poorer final test performance than reading
was not supported, though there was some evidence that lures selected at study interfered
with selection of the correct answer at test.
Why is generation beneficial, even when many errors are generated, and even when
there is no pre-existing relationship between cue and target to reinforce? One possibility is
that, in the Generate condition, the effort involved in generating a response, together with the
experience of finding that that response is (nearly) always incorrect, leads participants to
perceive Generate items as more difficult to learn than Read or Choice items. If this is the
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case, they may apply more effort or attention to the encoding of corrective feedback in the
Generate condition. Chapter 3 examines the role of metacognition in the errorful generation
task.
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CHAPTER THREE: METACOGNITIVE JUDGMENTS IN THE ERRORFUL
GENERATION TASK.
The finding, in our first experiment, that generating led to better memory than reading
even when cues were previously unfamiliar words is surprising in light of the proposal that an
advantage for errorful generation can only be observed when there is a pre-existing
association between cue and target. In our second experiment, therefore, the first aim was to
replicate the errorful generation benefit observed in Experiment 1 for the learning of unusual
English words (Experiment 2A), and to examine whether it extended to the learning of
foreign language vocabulary (Experiment 2B).
Although most of the words used in Experiment 1 were unfamiliar to most
participants pre-experimentally, and participants were at chance on the Choice test, a few
words were correctly generated, indicating some prior knowledge. In Experiment 2A and
subsequent experiments we replaced items for which the response had been correctly
generated in Experiment 1. We also attempted to replicate the finding using rare foreign
language vocabulary which would be highly unlikely to be familiar to participants. In
Experiment 2B, therefore, the stimuli used were words from Euskara, the language of the
Basque country in Northern Spain. We chose Euskara because it is a “language isolate”, a
language with no known relations.
In addition to seeking to replicate our previous findings, a further aim of Experiment
2 was to investigate participants’ metacognitive awareness of their learning. Participants’
study decisions, such as how much effort to apply to studying a given item, are likely to be
influenced by their perception of how difficult that item will be to remember. In Experiments
2A and 2B, we had participants make a judgment of learning (JOL) after studying each item,
predicting their likelihood of remembering it later. People typically believe that studying is
more effective than testing for previously studied material, even though the converse is true
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(e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b). For unstudied items, generating correct responses has
often, though not invariably, been shown to elicit higher JOLs than reading, suggesting that
participants are aware of the benefits of generation (e.g., Begg, Vinski, Frankovich, &
Holgate, 1991). However, it has also been found that ease of processing, or encoding fluency,
influences JOLs (e.g., Castel, McCabe, & Roediger, 2007; Koriat, 2008; Hertzog, Dunlosky,
Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Schwartz, Benjamin, & Bjork, 1997). Generating errors before
encoding correct information may lead to corrective feedback being processed less fluently,
which in turn may lead participants to give lower JOLs to Generate items. Processing of
feedback may be less fluent when errors are generated because participants have to disengage
their attention from the incorrect response they generated, and from any semantically-related
concepts activated at the same time, and switch it to the encoding of corrective feedback
which may be in an entirely different semantic space. In contrast, for items in the Read
condition there is no requirement to switch from processing one definition to another. We
requested JOLs immediately after the learning of each correct definition in order to capture
participants’ perception of their learning at the very moment they finished studying the item.
We were interested in whether participants’ perception of their learning of correct definitions
would be influenced by whether or not that learning had been preceded by the making of an
error.
Conditions which make learning more effortful often lead to better memory for the
learned items (Bjork, 1994). The difficulty experienced during learning, however, may lead
people to underestimate this benefit. If generating errors leads to Generate items being
perceived as more difficult to learn, participants may apply more effort or attention to
encoding corrective feedback for these items, and this could lead to superior memory for
them. We predicted that generating errors before encoding correct information would lead to
corrective feedback being processed less fluently, and therefore to lower JOLs for Generate
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than Read items, but that memory would be superior for Generate items as observed in
Experiment 1.
We also captured aggregate JOLs at the end of the study phase: We asked participants
to estimate, for each of the three study methods, what percentage of definitions they believed
they would remember when they took the final test. We were interested in whether these
would yield a similar pattern to the item JOLs.
Experiments 2A and 2B
Method
Participants
In Experiment 2A there were 30 participants, 12 male, average age 23.9 (SD = 5.2). In
Experiment 2B there were 24 participants, five male, average age 26.0 (SD = 11.4), none of
whom reported any prior knowledge of Euskara, the language of the Basque region of Spain.
Materials
In Experiment 2A we used 60 word-definition pairs taken from the same pool of items
as in Experiment 1, replacing words for which the definitions had been correctly generated in
Experiment 1 (see Table A2 in Appendix A). For Experiment 2B we selected 60 Euskara
nouns with their English translations (e.g., igel - frog, urmael - pond, untxi - rabbit). The full
set is shown in Table A3. In both experiments we created, for each item, three lures derived
from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) or the English Lexicon Project at
http://elexicon.wustl.edu (Balota et al., 2007). Each lure was matched with the true definition
or translation for number of syllables and for approximate word frequency (Kucera &
Francis, 1967). These appeared as lures for the Choice condition at study, and for all items at
final test. Therefore, for items in the Choice condition, the options presented at test were the
same as the options presented at study (i.e., the target and the same three lures).
Counterbalancing was as in Experiment 1.
Chapter 3: Metacognition and errorful generation
42
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 with the following exceptions.
Study time was reduced to 13 s per trial (with 8 s for entry of responses and 5 s for studying
of feedback) in order to keep the task to a reasonable length given that participants were also
entering JOLs. Four choices were presented at study in the Choice condition instead of two,
in order to increase the proportion of items which would be incorrect at study, thereby
enabling us to examine the effect of errors more comprehensively. After each trial
participants predicted their later likelihood of remembering the item by entering an item JOL,
a number from 0 (“No chance I’ll remember it”) to 100 (“I’ll definitely remember it”).
Following the study phase, participants gave three aggregate JOLs, predicting the
percentage of items they expected to remember from each study method. Entry of item and
aggregate JOLs was self-paced. Response time data for making JOLs are given in Appendix
B. The procedure was identical for Experiments 2A and 2B except that in Experiment 2A
participants were not explicitly told what format the final test would be in, whereas in
Experiment 2B they were told to expect a multiple choice test.
Results
Experiment 2A (English words)
At study only 0.3% of Generate responses were correct. Correct responses to Choice
items (M = 30.3%, SD = 10.6) were above chance2 (t(29) = 2.76, p = .010).
2 Somewhat surprisingly, and unlike in Experiment 1, participants in Experiments 2A and 2B selected
the correct definition/translation at study in the Choice condition at a rate higher than chance. In case
this reflected some existing familiarity with the words and their definitions (though this seems
especially unlikely in the case of Experiment 2B) which might have affected the subsequent analyses,
we removed four participants from Experiment 2A and two from Experiment 2B who achieved
particularly high scores at study in the Choice condition. Without these participants, Choice
performance at study was no longer significantly greater than chance in either experiment. We
recomputed all the subsequent analyses with these participants excluded and none of the conclusions
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Final test performance: Experiment 2A (English words)
Replicating the findings of Experiment 1, when all items were considered, final test
performance differed between study methods, F(2,58) = 9.85, p < .001, p2 = .25 (Figure 3A).
Figure 3: Mean percentage correct at final memory test in (A) Experiment 2A, (B)
Experiment 2B. Error bars indicate standard errors.
Generating with feedback was superior to reading (t(29) = 4.27, p < .001, d = .40) and
to choosing with feedback (t(29) = 3.62, p = .001, d = .33), while the Read and Choice
conditions did not differ (t (29) = .54, p = .596, d = .05). Nineteen participants remembered
more Generate than Read items, while only two showed the opposite pattern. For items which
were incorrect at study, the difference between study methods remained, F(2,58) = 10.01, p <
.001, p2 = .26, as did the advantage for Generate over Read items, t(29) = 4.28, p < .001, d
= .39. Whereas in Experiment 1 the advantage of generation over choosing fell just short of
significance for items incorrect at study, in Experiment 2A there was a clear benefit of
was changed, except (as noted in the relevant Results section) for two comparisons involving JOLs
for Choice items in Experiment 2B, which come into line with the findings of Experiment 2A when
these two participants are excluded.
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generating over choosing incorrect definitions, t(29) = 3.91, p = .001, d = .46. There was no
difference between reading and incorrect choosing, t(29) = .90, p = .373, d = .10.
Was there any evidence that making an error at study in the Choice condition
interfered with selection of the correct answer at test? When an incorrect choice had been
selected at study, and the final test response was also wrong, the same response was selected
at test at a rate numerically but not significantly higher than chance (33%, because there are 3
incorrect lures at test), M = 44.0, SD = 37.8, t(23) = 1.38, p = .180 (not all participants had
data to contribute to this analysis.) In Experiment 1, where test lures for Choice items
consisted of the lure which had been present at study and two new lures, participants were
much more likely to persist with an incorrect choice than to pick a new lure. By contrast, in
Experiment 2A all options at test for Choice items had previously been seen as study lures. In
this situation, selecting and typing in an incorrect response at study did not make participants
significantly more likely to persist with their own incorrect choice than to select one of the
other lures. Put differently, items incorrectly chosen at study were strong enough to lead to
perseverative errors at test when the alternatives were new lures (and the correct target), but
not strong enough to lead to such errors when the alternative test items were familiar lures
(and the correct target).
Experiment 2B (Euskara words)
At study only one response given in the Generate condition was correct across all
participants (M = .2%, SD = 1.0). Correct responses to Choice items (M = 31.3%, SD = 14.5)
were again above chance2 (t(23) = 2.11, p = .046).
Final test performance: Experiment 2B (Euskara words)
Just as with the English version, final test performance differed between study
methods, F(2,46) = 6.05, p = .005, p2 = .21 (Figure 3B). Generating produced better final
test performance than reading, t(23) = 3.36, p = .003, d = .28. Fourteen participants
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remembered more Generate than Read items, while only 3 showed the opposite pattern. The
difference between generating and choosing was close to significant, t (23) = 1.84, p = .079, d
= .18. There was no difference between reading and choosing, t(23) = 1.68, p = .106, d = .12.
The analysis of most interest, of just those items incorrect at study, revealed an identical
pattern of results to the English version of the task in Experiment 2A. There was a difference
between study methods, F(2,46) = 6.81, p = .003, p2 = .23, and an advantage for generating
errors over reading, t(23) = 3.36, p = .003, d = .28. The advantage of generating errors over
choosing incorrectly was also significant in this analysis, t(23) = 2.77, p = .011, d = .30, with
no difference between reading and incorrect choosing, t(23) = .14, p = .892, d = .011.
Did making an error at study in the Choice condition interfere with selection of the
correct answer at test? Here the results differed from those of Experiment 2A.When an
incorrect response was given at study for an item in the Choice condition, and the final test
response was also wrong, participants selected the same incorrect response at test at a rate
significantly higher than the chance level of 33% (M = 59.7, SD = 41.9), t(16) = 2.59, p =
.020 (again, not all participants had data to contribute to this analysis.) Just as in Experiment
2A, test lures were the same as study lures in this version of the task but, whereas in
Experiment 2A selecting an incorrect answer at study did not make it reliably more likely to
be picked at test than any of the other lures also seen at study, in Experiment 2B, when
participants made an error, they tended to persist with the same error they had made at study
rather than select one of the other lures.
Experiments 2A and 2B therefore replicated the benefit of errorful generation over
reading observed in Experiment 1 and also revealed a benefit of errorful generation over
incorrect choosing. As in Experiment 1, there was some evidence (in Experiment 2B) that
lures selected at study can interfere with selection of the correct answer at test.
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Judgments of learning: Experiment 2A (English)
Were participants aware of the benefit of errorful generation during learning? For the
English version of the task, item JOLs differed for the three study conditions, F(2,58) =
20.73, p < .001 (Figure 4A), p2 = .42. Choice JOLs were higher than both Read (t(29) =
3.71, p = .001, d = .27) and Generate (t(29) = 6.37, p < .001, d = .43) JOLs, and Read JOLs
were higher than Generate JOLs (t(29) = 2.59, p = .015, d = .17). Participants’ JOLs, then,
were strikingly inaccurate: the Generate condition produced the highest recall scores but the
lowest JOLs.
Figure 4: Mean item and aggregate judgments of learning (JOLs), and JOLs for items correct
and incorrect at study, in (A) Experiment 2A, and (B) Experiment 2B. Error bars indicate
standard errors.
Aggregate JOLs showed a largely similar pattern (Figure 4A). The assumption of
sphericity was not met, χ 2(2) = 9.63, p = .008, so the Huynh-Feldt correction was applied.
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JOLs differed by study method (F(1.62, 46.99) = 7.77, p = .002, p2 = .21). Choice JOLs
were again higher than both Read (t(29) = 2.60, p = .015, d = .49), and Generate JOLs (t(29)
= 3.49, p = .002, d = .58) but there was no difference between Read and Generate (t(29) =
.85, p = .400, d = .10).
Why were predictions so inaccurate? We examined JOLs made in the Choice
condition, the only condition in which participants regularly made both correct and incorrect
responses at study, in relation to the accuracy of their responses at study. This revealed three
interesting findings. Firstly, Choice JOLs for definitions guessed correctly at study were very
substantially higher than for items incorrect at study (Fig. 4A), t(29) = 7.02, p < .001, d =
1.11. Secondly, JOLs for Choice items correct at study were higher than Read JOLs, t(29) =
6.62, p < .001, and thirdly, JOLs for Choice items incorrect at study were indistinguishable
from JOLs for Generate items incorrect at study (M = 31.3, SD = 16.7), t(29) = .77, p = .450,
and from JOLs for Read items, t(29) = 1.74, p = .093. These findings suggest that Choice
JOLs were largely driven by the fortuitous making of a correct choice at study.
Together with the higher JOLs for Read than Generate items, this suggests that one
factor influencing JOLs was fluency of processing at study, which was itself influenced by
the outcome of the preceding event. Generating errors (which happens on almost every trial)
leads to less fluency and lower JOLs, while reading leads to intermediate fluency and JOLs.
Making an incorrect choice also leads to low fluency and JOLs, but correct choice – despite
being fortuitous – leads to much greater fluency and JOLs. When an error is made, in either
the Generate or Choice conditions, participants have to switch their attention from their own
incorrect response, with all its associations, to the correct response presented as feedback.
This is not necessary in the errorless Read condition and, similarly, where the correct
selection is made in the Choice condition, processing of this correct answer can continue
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uninterrupted and unaffected by interference from a previously chosen or generated error.
(But see Appendix C for an alternative possibility.)
Appendix D reports the relationship between JOLs and test performance. Although
JOLs showed some ability to predict final test scores (Figure 5A), these data should be
interpreted with caution since they may be affected by item selection effects.
Judgments of learning: Experiment 2B (Euskara)
For the foreign language version of the task, item JOLs also differed for the three
study conditions, F(2,46) = 12.60, p < .001, p2 = .35 (Figure 4B). Once again, participants
gave lower JOLs to Generate items than to either Read (t(23) = 3.69, p = .001, d = .39) or
Choice (t(23) = 4.31, p < .001, d = .50) items, but here there was no difference between JOLs
for Read and Choice items, t(23) = 1.38, p = .181, d = .12.
Aggregate JOLs followed a similar pattern to the item JOLs (Figure 4B). There was a
main effect of Study Method, F(2,46) = 5.09, p = .010, p2 = .18. Replicating the findings of
the English version of the task, Choice JOLs were higher than Generate JOLs, t(23) = 3.21, p
= .004, d = .67, and there was no difference between Read and Choice JOLs, t(23) = .28, p =
.783, d = .07. This time Read JOLs were also higher than Generate JOLs, t(23) = 2.73, p =
.012, d = .57.
Just as for the English version of the task, generating produced the highest final test
scores but the lowest JOLs. Again, inspection of Choice JOLs in relation to study
performance is illuminating and reveals the same pattern of results as in Experiment 2A.
First, JOLs for Choice items guessed correctly at study (M = 47.4, SD = 21.8) were much
higher than for items guessed incorrectly (M = 31.6, SD = 15.7), t(23) = 5.52, p < .001, d =
.83 (Figure 4B). Second, JOLs for Choice items guessed correctly at study were significantly
higher than JOLs for Read items, t(23) = 4.36, p < .001. Finally, JOLs for Choice items
guessed incorrectly at study were significantly lower than for Read items, t(23) = 2.38, p =
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.026, though with the exclusion of two participants who performed above chance at study
(see footnote 2), this difference was no longer significant, t(21) = 1.98, p = .061 (M = 31.7,
SD = 14.8 for Read, M = 29.4, SD = 14.3 for Choice incorrect at study). JOLs for Choice
items incorrect at study were higher than JOLs for Generate items, t(23) = 2.22, p = .037, but
again this difference disappeared (t(21) = 1.89, p = .072) (M = 26.5, SD = 14.7 for Generate)
when the two participants were excluded (see footnote 2), yielding the same pattern as in
Experiment 2A. These results again suggest that participants were strongly influenced by
their success or failure at study, and particularly by the fortuitous selection of a correct
choice. In Experiment 2B there was no relationship between JOLs and test accuracy (Fig 5B).
See Appendix D for analysis of these data.
Figure 5: Mean judgments of learning (JOLs) for items correct and incorrect at test in (A)
Experiment 2A, and (B) Experiment 2B. Error bars indicate standard errors.
Discussion
Experiment 2A replicated the benefit of generating over reading for unusual English
words that we observed in Experiment 1, and Experiment 2B showed that this benefit extends
10
20
30
40
50
60
Read Generate Choice
JO
L
ra
ti
ng
s
JOLs
A
Correct at test
Incorrect at test
10
20
30
40
50
60
Read Generate Choice
JOLs
B
Chapter 3: Metacognition and errorful generation
50
to the learning of foreign vocabulary. Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012) have proposed that,
when guessing produces an error, it will only benefit later memory if the correct answer is, in
fact, already known and activated at the time of the guess. The findings of Experiment 2 are
inconsistent with this proposal. Participants in Experiment 2B had no prior knowledge of
Euskara, yet they showed better final test performance for items for which they had generated
an incorrect guess than for items they had studied in the Read condition. In Experiment 2A
the stimuli were obscure English words which were likely to be largely unknown to
participants pre-experimentally, yet they showed the same benefit of generating over reading.
These findings are also inconsistent with the other versions of the semantic relatedness
hypothesis that were described in Chapter 1 (e.g., Huelser & Metcalfe, Hays et al., 2013), and
show that a pre-existing relationship between cue and target is not necessary for the errorful
generation benefit to be observed.
Is it possible that our participants in Experiment 2A had some knowledge of the
definitions prior to the experiment? The cues were deliberately chosen to be very obscure
words which were extremely unlikely to be known to participants pre-experimentally.
However, perhaps our participants were avid crossword-solvers with a passion for Scottish
dialect and archaic English. When participants generate an incorrect response, or no response,
at study, we cannot conclude that they had no prior knowledge of that word. Slamecka and
Fevreiski (1983) reported a generation benefit even when participants had failed to generate
items at study. They proposed that, when generation failed, it was often the case that
participants had in fact retrieved some semantic attributes of the correct answer but had been
unable to retrieve its surface features. When these surface features were supplied, in the form
of corrective feedback at study, this facilitated memory at the final test, both for recall
(Experiment 1) and recognition (Experiment 2). This conclusion was supported by their third
experiment which showed that, even when no feedback was given at study, performance on a
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forced-choice recognition test of the response items was above chance for items which had
not been successfully generated during the study phase, suggesting that these items had in
fact been partially retrieved.
Could our participants’ failure to generate correct responses at study therefore reflect
an inability to produce them in the time available, rather than a lack of knowledge, in line
with Slamecka and Fevreiski’s proposal? To address this question we investigated to what
extent participants’ responses were related to the correct answers. We obtained ratings of the
similarity between participants’ generated words and the correct definitions by using the
latent semantic analysis (LSA) tools available at http://lsa.colorado.edu. LSA extracts and
represents the similarity in meaning of words by means of statistical computations applied to
large bodies of text (Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998). Values close to 1 indicate that items
are highly related, while values close to 0 mean they are highly unrelated. (We could not of
course compute the similarity of the generated words to the cue words, since the cue words
were too obscure to be represented in the corpora used for the LSA.) The mean similarity of
the generated items to the correct definitions was .096 (SD = .047). We compared this with
the average similarity of the targets to all of the other targets, as an example of a randomly
unrelated set of items (M =.105, SD = .045), t(59) = 1.81, p = .076. Participants’ guesses were
no more related to the correct definitions than the correct definitions were to each other.
Together with the finding that the benefit of generating was replicated when participants
learned previously unfamiliar foreign vocabulary, it seems unlikely that the Generate
advantage is an artefact of prior familiarity with the cue words.
In addition to the benefit of generating over reading, Experiment 2 also revealed a
clear benefit of generating errors over incorrect choosing, both for rare English words and for
foreign language words. Participants’ JOLs, however, showed a very different pattern from
their actual test performance, with the lowest item JOLs being given to Generate items and
Chapter 3: Metacognition and errorful generation
52
the highest to Choice items. These high average JOLs given to Choice items were largely due
to much higher JOLs for Choice items guessed correctly at study, while JOLs for items
incorrect at study were no higher than JOLs for Read items, a pattern which is suggestive of
participants using their own performance at study as a basis for predicting their future
memory performance. Participants’ aggregate JOLs were also highest in the Choice
condition, though memory performance showed no advantage of choosing over either reading
or generating. This suggests that participants’ correct answers in the Choice condition, which
were likely to occur around 25% of the time simply by chance, gave them a sense of having
been successful with this mode of learning and led them to give a higher aggregate JOL to
this condition than to the Generate condition, where they did not experience such success,
consistent with previous research showing that ease of processing at encoding can lead to
relative overestimation of future memory performance (e.g., Castel et al., 2007).
The JOLs data may shed some light on the reason for the benefit of generating over
reading observed here. The higher JOLs given to Read than Generate items in both these
experiments are consistent with our hypothesis that Generate items are experienced as more
difficult than Read items. This may lead to greater attention being paid to the corrective
feedback for Generate items. The Read condition may even give rise to an illusion of
knowing, or “knew it all along” effect (Fischhoff, 1977), making it difficult for the
participant to imagine producing an error when tested later. The illusion is exaggerated in the
Choice condition when the participant happens to select the correct response. Our proposal is
that higher JOLs in the Read and Choice conditions reflect an illusion of knowing which
leads to less effort being applied to encoding, or to a less efficient encoding strategy, than for
Generate items, where initial responses are always incorrect. Generating errors therefore
leads both to lower JOLs and to higher final test performance. This is consistent with other
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research showing that greater effort during study leads both to better recall and to lower JOLs
(Zaromb, Karpicke, & Roediger, 2010).
What we can conclude from both these experiments is that participants’ JOLs seemed
to reflect their subjective experience at study. For Generate items, participants predicted
poorest test performance while achieving highest performance. If metacognitive beliefs
influence study decisions, such as the decision as to how much effort needs to be applied to
encoding a given item, participants may make more effort to learn definitions for items
subjectively experienced as more difficult and this could be one way that even errorful
generation potentiates subsequent encoding.
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CHAPTER FOUR: SELF-PACING OF STUDY TIME AND THE OPPORTUNITY
TO SELECT GENERATED GUESSES AT TEST
The preceding experiments have demonstrated an advantage for generating over
reading and choosing. Strikingly, Experiments 2A and 2B showed that participants failed to
predict this benefit, judging Generate items as less likely to be remembered than either Read
or Choice items when in fact they were better remembered. These findings suggest that there
is a powerful benefit of errorful generation over reading and choosing, but that participants
fail to predict this because they perceive the Generate condition as more difficult than the
Read and Choice conditions and their JOLs are a reflection of this perception. However, there
are alternative explanations which need to be eliminated. The two experiments in this chapter
address three issues which may affect interpretation of these results: the reason why
participants give lower JOLs to Generate items; the possibility that Generate items are better
remembered because participants rehearse them during time allocated to the study of Read
items; and the nature of the lures in the final multiple choice test.
Why do participants give lower JOLs to Generate items?
Both Experiments 2A and 2B suggested that participants’ JOLs were strongly
influenced by an event preceding study of the correct answer. In Experiment 2, participants
gave lower JOLs to Generate items than to either Read or Choice items, consistent with our
hypothesis that they experience the Generate condition as more difficult than the other study
methods. However, participants had only 5 seconds in which to process corrective feedback
in the Generate condition, but 13 seconds to process correct answers in the Read condition.
One possible explanation for the higher JOLs given to Read than Generate items, therefore, is
simply that participants had less time to study correct definitions in the Generate condition
and for this reason were less confident about their ability to remember them. In the Choice
condition the correct answer is on screen for the total trial time, even though participants do
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not know it is the correct answer until the last few seconds. Participants may give higher
JOLs to Choice items than to Generate items because of this additional exposure. In
Experiments 3 and 4, we allowed participants to study correct definitions for as long as they
chose. If the same pattern of JOLs is observed when participants are free to study targets for
as long as they choose, this will strengthen the argument that the process of generating an
error leads participants to perceive Generate items as harder to learn than Read or Choice
items and that their JOLs are a reflection of this perception.
Displaced rehearsal of Generate items?
Similarly, if participants felt there was insufficient time to learn Generate items in the
previous experiments, it is possible that they used time allocated to Read items for the
rehearsal of Generate items and this could have led to the Generate over Read advantage in
final test performance. Slamecka and Katsaiti, (1987) using a traditional generation effect
paradigm in which participants either generated synonyms from cues, e.g., “lawyer” from
“attorney – l_____”, or read the cue-synonym pair intact (“attorney – lawyer”), proposed
that, when Read and Generate items are included in the same list, participants find Generate
items harder and consequently engage in “displaced rehearsal” of Generate items by
continuing to rehearse them while Read items are being presented. They found that the
advantage for the generated targets at a final free recall test could be eliminated by requiring
participants to rehearse the current item only, and concluded that the generation effect
observed in previous studies was an artefact of using a mixed list design. Although this
interpretation was challenged by subsequent researchers as an account of the classic
generation effect (e.g., Hirshman & Bjork, 1988; McDaniel, Riegler, & Waddill, 1990), it
remains a plausible alternative explanation for the benefit of errorful generation observed in
our experiments.
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Allowing participants to study each item for as long as they choose will obviate the
need for displaced rehearsal of Generate items. If the Generate over Read advantage remains
under these conditions, this will add further support to the notion that there is something
about the act of generation which potentiates encoding of the correct answer, even when
generation produces an error which is unrelated to the correct answer. In Experiment 3 we
therefore had two groups: a self-paced (SP) group and an experimenter-paced (EP) group. In
Experiment 4 processing of correct answers was self-paced for all participants.
Opportunity to select, at final test, a response generated at study
In Experiments 1, 2A and 2B, we separated the effects of generation and interference
by giving participants the opportunity to select, at test, Choice lures they had selected at study
but not responses they had generated themselves in the Generate condition. A further aim of
Experiment 3 was to examine whether the advantage for generating over both reading and
choosing observed in our earlier experiments would persist when participants had the
opportunity to select, at test, their own incorrect generated responses as well as their own
incorrect Choice responses. We had hypothesised that incorrect choosing might lead to
poorer performance than reading, because the Choice condition involves potential
interference from errors without any benefit from the act of generation, but in fact our
experiments revealed no detriment of incorrect choosing by comparison with reading.
Memory for Choice items incorrect at study was, however, poorer than for Generate items. If
participants had the opportunity to select the same erroneous response they had made at study
in the Generate condition, just as they could in the Choice condition, this might eliminate the
advantage of generating over both reading and incorrect choosing. Furthermore, in
Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B, test options for Choice items included familiar lures from the
study phase whereas test options for the other conditions had not been seen at study. This
allowed us to examine the effect of interference from study lures, but it may have
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disadvantaged the Choice condition relative to the other two. In Experiments 3 and 4 we
equated familiarity of the lures between the three conditions. In Experiment 3 participants
had the option to select, at test, their own generated guess as well as incorrect responses made
in the Choice condition. If the only reason for the benefit of generating over choosing in the
earlier experiments was because of the presence of interfering study lures at test in the Choice
condition but not in the Generate condition, we would expect to see the Generate benefit
eliminated in Experiment 3.
In Experiment 4 the test lures were all definitions for other items, so there was no
possibility of selecting either an incorrectly generated or an incorrectly chosen response. In
this case, eliminating the possibility of interference from Choice study lures may allow an
advantage for choosing over reading to emerge. If incorrect choosing is just as beneficial as
generating under these conditions, this would suggest that there is nothing special about
generating: both generating and choosing can lead to a benefit over reading.
Experiment 3
Method
Materials and procedure were as for Experiment 2A with three exceptions. The first
concerned the timing of trials. For both groups, we allowed 10 s for entry of responses at
study in the Generate and Choice conditions, in order to maximize the chance that
participants would enter a complete and valid word. For the EP group, feedback time for
these two conditions remained at 5 s, with 15 s to study Read items. For the SP group, correct
definitions in the Generate and Choice conditions, and the word plus definition in the Read
condition, were displayed until the participant clicked on a button labelled “Finished
studying”, at which point the JOLs screen was displayed just as in Experiment 2. We kept
time to enter a response equal for the Generate and Choice conditions in both groups since we
were interested in how participants allocated time to study correct answers, not time to
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generate or choose a response. In addition, always having 10 s to respond prevented
participants from simply skipping over items as they might have done if they assumed there
would be no benefit in making incorrect guesses. We wanted to ensure participants had time
to go through the process of generating a response. Second, as in Experiment 2B, we told
participants to expect a test in multiple choice format.
Third, we altered the format of the final multiple choice test in order to examine the
effect on test performance of having available, at test, definitions that participants had
generated themselves. Table 1 illustrates these test options. At test there were five options for
each cue word: the correct definition; two previously-studied definitions from other items,
one taken from each of the other two conditions; an incorrect definition generated by the
participant (either for that very item, if it had appeared in the Generate condition, or for
another item); and an incorrect definition chosen by the participant (either as the definition
for that very item, if it had appeared in the Choice condition, or for another item). Each
option presented therefore appeared in the test three times, as options for three different cue
words. For example, for a given participant, imagine that the word carcanet was studied in
the Generate condition and the participant generated the definition trumpet. At test, carcanet
appeared with its true definition, necklace; with cup (the definition for the word hanap,
presented at study as a Read item); with beggar (the definition for the word gaberlunzie,
presented at study as a Choice item); with trumpet, the definition generated by the participant
at study; and with dove, the Choice option incorrectly chosen when the participant studied
peridot (whose true definition is gem). Each of these options would also appear as options for
words studied in the Read and Choice conditions. For example, the true definition for
carcanet, necklace, would also appear as a lure definition for two other items (one Read, one
Choice), e.g., for rapparee (bandit) and barbet (bird), while the generated definition trumpet
would appear as the generated option for one Read and one Choice word, since these of
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course had no generated response of their own, e.g., for mechlin (lace) and bistoury (knife).
See Table A4 for the full set of items.
In cases where the participant either failed to generate a response for a Generate item
at study, or entered a definition which was a true definition for another item in the
experiment, this was replaced at test by a new lure for all three affected items. When
participants selected the correct item at study in the Choice condition, this was replaced at
test by one of the studied Choice lures for that cue word. These measures were taken to
ensure that the final test did not include options which were simply blank (where no response
had been generated) or repeated (e.g., to avoid the correct definition appearing both as the
target and as the chosen option, in cases where the participant made the correct choice at
study).
If the participant ran out of time to enter their chosen definition at study in the Choice
condition, the program checked which of the study options corresponded to the partial answer
and replaced it with this one at final test. For example, if the participant entered versa in
response to the cue word levisomnous, the program compared this entry with the beginning of
all the available options, i.e. observant, nocturnal, expectant and versatile, and versatile
would appear as an option at final test. If, on the other hand, the participant gave part of the
correct answer, e.g. observ, the program would recognise this as correct and replace it with
one of the other lures, e.g. nocturnal. For Generate items, however, it was impossible to
program the task to check whether the response entered was a real and complete word and
therefore impossible to prevent partial words and nonwords sometimes appearing as options
at final test. We accepted that this would be likely to occur fairly frequently, given the time
constraints on entry of the generated definition. Since the appearance of partial words and
nonwords at test was likely to alert the participant to the fact that their own responses were
being shown at test, we excluded from the analysis any participant whose final test options
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included any such items. This left 24 participants (20 female), average age 18.6, SD = .8, in
the self-paced group and 16 (14 female), average age 18.3, SD = .6, in the experimenter-
paced group, out of an original sample of 56 and 51, respectively. Participants were first year
Psychology undergraduates who took part in fulfilment of a course requirement.
Table 1: Example final test options in Experiment 3. Definitions generated or chosen at study
for the given item are italicised.
Options appearing at final test
Word Study
condition
Correct
definition
Definition
from
another
item
Definition
from
another
item
Incorrect
generation
Incorrect
choice
carcanet Generate necklace cup beggar trumpet dove
hanap Read cup knife post shaman bomb
gaberlunzie Choice beggar post lace pray healer
peridot Choice gem fool bandit shaman dove
rapparee Read bandit necklace bird pray judge
barbet Choice bird anchor necklace sweet fence
mechlin Read lace fool gossip trumpet fence
bistoury Choice knife fish mask trumpet judge
Results
At study, just one participant gave the correct response to just one Generate item, and
the percentage of correct answers given for Choice items (M = 27.9, SD = 10.5) did not differ
from the chance level of 25% (t(39) = 1.73, p = .091).
Final test performance
An important aim of this experiment was to examine the effect on memory of being
able to select items participants had generated or chosen themselves. We therefore included,
in the analysis of the final test data, only those trials where none of the final test options had
been replaced by new items. Every trial included in the final analysis, therefore, was one for
which the five options at test were the correct definition, two incorrect definitions from other
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items, one response generated by the participant and one incorrectly chosen by the participant
or, in a case where the correct choice was made at study, an incorrect lure for that item from
the study phase.
Test accuracy was evaluated by means of a 3 (Study Method) x 2 (Group) ANOVA.
When all items were considered, whether correct or incorrect at study, there was a main
effect of Study Method, F(2,76) = 9.17, p <.001, p2 = .19, no effect of Group, F(1,38) = .27,
p = .605, and no interaction, F(2,76) = 1.57, p = .216. Table 2 shows the means for each
group and Figure 6 shows the means collapsed across groups. Generating produced better
final test performance than reading, t(39) = 5.22, p < .001, d = .56. Twenty-seven
participants (17 in the SP group, 10 in the EP group) showed a benefit of generating over
reading, with only five (2 in the SP group, 3 in the EP group) showing the opposite pattern.
Choosing also led to higher test scores than reading, t(39) = 2.49, p = .017 d = .28, with no
difference between choosing and generating, t(39) = 1.75, p = .089, d = .24.
Table 2: Mean final test performance and item and aggregate judgments of learning (JOLs) in
Experiment 3 (SD in brackets).
Final test performance Item JOLs Aggregate JOLs
SP EP SP EP SP EP
Read
M
SD
62.84
18.07
69.06
19.75
34.35
15.03
35.45
14.30
28.71
15.90
40.31
17.27
Generate
M
SD
73.65
17.70
77.31
12.84
30.25
13.62
27.77
12.77
26.75
17.61
29.81
14.21
Choice (All)
M
SD
71.40
18.16
69.89
22.99
44.29
15.82
36.51
16.65
40.83
21.09
34.25
20.82
Choice
(incorrect at study)
M
SD
69.84
21.85
67.34
25.35
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Next we repeated the analysis for just those items incorrect at study (Figure 6). The
assumption of sphericity was not met, so the Huynh-Feldt correction was applied. There was
a main effect of Study Method, F(1.70, 64.44) = 7.35, p = .002, p2 = .16, no main effect of
Group, F(1,38) = .19, p = .662, and no interaction, F(1.70, 64.44) = 1.53, p = .227.
Generating produced better performance than reading (t(39) = 5.22, p < .001, d = .56) , but
incorrect choosing was no better than reading, t(39) = 1.36, p = .181, d = .17, and was less
beneficial than generating, t(39) = 2.08, p = .044, d = .32, replicating the findings of
Experiments 2A and 2B. Despite the availability, at test, of definitions participants had
generated themselves, generating errors followed by studying corrective feedback led to
better final test performance than either reading or incorrect choosing.
Figure 6: Final test performance in Experiment 3 (both groups combined). Error bars indicate
standard errors.
Effect of interference from errors generated and chosen at study
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participants selected, at test, the very same definition that they had generated themselves for
that item at study as a percentage of all the Generate items (M = 4.2, SD = 6.7), and how
often they selected at test the same incorrect choice they had made at study as a percentage of
all Choice items (M = 7.7, SD = 7.3), and compared these two figures. Participants were
more inclined to persist with incorrectly chosen than with incorrectly generated definitions,
t(39) = 2.49, p = .017. When we calculated the number of times a generated or chosen item
was selected at test as a percentage of just the incorrect responses at test, the comparison
remained significant, t(39) = 2.21, p = .033. The response a participant had generated at study
was only selected at test 13.2% of the time (SD = 21.5), which was significantly lower than
the chance level of 25% (since there were 4 incorrect options), t(39) = 3.49, p < .001,
whereas an incorrectly chosen response was selected 24.0% of the time (SD = 22.6), which
was no different from chance, t(39) = .27, p = .786.
This pattern suggests that, when a participant failed to remember the correct definition
at test, an incorrect choice at study did not interfere with memory any more than other
familiar definitions appearing as lures at test, being selected with the same frequency as other
incorrect lures. This is in line with the findings of Experiment 2A, where participants selected
their own incorrect choices with no greater frequency than other incorrect options which had
appeared as lures at study. For Generate items, on the other hand, participants seemed to be
able to recognise and reject their own incorrect study responses, selecting them less often
than the other incorrect options at test.
We also conducted the main analysis (final test performance) for all 107 original
participants. These data, which showed a similar pattern, can be found in Appendix E.
Judgments of learning
Did participants’ JOLs show any awareness of the benefits of generating over reading
and choosing? A 3 (Study Method) x 2 (Group) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Study
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Method for the item JOLs. The assumption of sphericity was not met, χ 2(2) = 11.10, p =
.004, so the Huynh-Feldt correction was applied, F(1.69, 64.22) = 24.43, p < .001, p2 = .39.
Choice JOLs were higher than both Generate, t(39) = 6.95, p < .001, d = .80, and Read JOLs,
t(39) = 3.24, p < .002, d = .41, and Read JOLs were higher than Generate JOLs, t(39) = 4.75,
p < .001, d = .40. These data, collapsed across groups, are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Mean item and aggregate judgments of learning (JOLs), and JOLs for items correct
and incorrect at study, in Experiment 3. Error bars indicate standard errors.
There was no main effect of Group, F(1,38) .48, p = .491, p2 = .013, but there was an
interaction between Study Method and Group, F(1.69, 64.22) = 3.76, p = .035, p2 = .09. For
the SP group, Choice JOLs were higher than Generate JOLs, t(23) = 7.71, p < .001, d = .95,
and higher than Read JOLs, t(23) = 3.92, p = .001, d = .64, which were higher than Generate
JOLs, t(23) = 2.77, p = .011, d = .29, replicating the pattern observed in Experiment 2A.
Participants gave the lowest JOLs to Generate items even when they could choose how long
to study correct definitions, suggesting that their low JOLs did not stem from a perception of
having insufficient time to process the corrective feedback in the Generate condition. For the
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EP group, Read JOLs were again higher than Generate JOLs, t(15) = 4.25, p = .001, d = .57,
and Choice JOLs were higher than Generate JOLs, t(15) = 2.72, p = .016, d = .59, but there
was no difference between Read and Choice JOLs, t(15) = .39, p = .701, d = .07.
We repeated the ANOVA on JOLs for just those items which were incorrect at study.
There was a main effect of Study Method, F(1.62, 61.54) = 6.84, p = .004, p2 = .15 (Huynh-
Feldt correction). Again, the lowest JOLs were given to Generate items. These JOLs were
lower than both Read JOLs, t(39) = 4.75, p < .001, d = .40, and JOLs for Choice items
incorrect at study, t(39) = 3.05, p =.004, d = .38, but now there was no difference between
JOLs for Read items and those for Choice items incorrect at study, t(39) = .11, p = .910, d =
.02 (Figure 7). Just as in Experiment 2, errorful generation produced better final test
performance than either reading or incorrect choosing but participants failed to predict this
benefit, giving the lowest JOLs to Generate items. There was no effect of Group, F(1,38) =
.53, p = .469, p2 = .01, but again there was an interaction between Study Method and Group,
F(1.62, 61.54) = 3.78, p = .037, p2 = .09. In the SP group, Generate items were given lower
JOLs than both Choice items incorrect at study, t(23) = 3.04, p = .006, d = .49, and Read
JOLs, t(23) = 2.77, p = .011, d = .29, with no difference between Read and Choice, t(23) =
1.34, p = .193, d = .24. In the EP group, JOLs for Generate items were no different from
JOLs for incorrect choices, t(15) = .95, p = .355, d = .17, but were lower than Read JOLs,
t(15) = 4.25, p = .001, d = .57, and JOLs for Read items were higher than those for Choice
items incorrect at study, t(15) = 2.66, p = .018, d = .39.
The finding that the advantage for Choice JOLs over Read JOLs disappeared (and,
indeed, was reversed for the EP group) when we considered only Choice items incorrect at
study, suggests that, as in Experiment 2, the high JOLs given to Choice items were driven by
very high JOLs elicited by items correctly selected at study. Confirming this impression,
JOLs for Choice items correct at study were significantly higher than JOLs for Choice items
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incorrect at study F(1,38) = 57.6, p < .001, p2 = .60, with no difference between the groups,
F(1,38) = 1.83, p = .185, p2 = .05, and no interaction, F(1,38) = .02, p = .901, p2 = 0
(Figure 7). Replicating the findings of Experiment 2A and 2B, JOLs for Choice items correct
at study were significantly higher than JOLs for Read items, t(39) = 7.83, p < .001. This
confidence that Choice items correct at study would be better remembered than items
incorrect at study was misplaced: In fact, the percentage of items correct at study which
persisted to be correct at test (M = 77.8, SD = 26.2) was not significantly greater than the
percentage of items incorrect at study which were converted to being correct at test (M =
73.1, SD = 23.0), t(39) = 1.06, p = .296, d = .19. As for the other experiments, we also
report the relationship between JOLs and final test accuracy in Appendix D. Figure 8 shows
the means.
Figure 8: Mean judgments of learning (JOLs) for items correct and incorrect at test in
Experiment 3.
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For the aggregate JOLs there was a main effect of Study Method, F(2,76) = 4.10, p =
.020, p2 = .10 (Figure 7). Choice JOLs were higher than Generate JOLs, t(39) = 3.25, p =
.002, d = .55, with no difference between Generate and Read, t(39) = 1.78, p = .083, d =
.32, or between Read and Choice, t(39) = 1.27, p = .211, d = .25. There was no difference
between the groups, F(1,38) = .37, p = .545, p2 = .01, but there was an interaction between
Study Method and Group, F(2,76) = 3.81, p = .027, p2 = .09. The EP group gave higher
aggregate JOLs to the Read condition (M = 40.3, SD = 17.3) than to the Choice (M = 34.3,
SD = 20.8) or Generate (M = 29.8, SD = 14.2) conditions but the difference between the study
methods fell short of significance, F(2,30) = 2.78, p = .078, p2 = .16. For the SP group, the
difference was significant, F(2, 46) = 5.80, p = .006, p2 = .20. Aggregate JOLs for the
Choice condition (M = 40.8, SD = 21.1) were higher than JOLs for the Generate condition (M
= 26.8, SD = 17.6), t(23) = 3.46, p = .002, d = .72, and for the Read condition (M = 28.7, SD
= 15.9), t(23) = 2.32, p = .030, d = .65, with no difference between Read and Generate
aggregate JOLs, t(23) =.49, p = .632, d = .12.
Study time
Did participants in the SP group spend any longer studying correct definitions in one
study condition than another? In the Read condition, “study time” of correct definitions is the
total trial time, whereas for Generate and Choice items it is just that part of the trial in which
corrective feedback is given, it does not include the first 10s of the trial which are spent
generating or choosing responses. There was a significant difference between conditions in
study time, F(2, 46) = 35.44, p < .001, p2 = .61. Participants spent longer studying
definitions for Read items (M = 8.02 s, SD = 4.35) than for both Generate (M = 6.68, SD =
4.14), t(23) = 3.75, p = .001, d = .32, and Choice items (M = 5.35, SD = 3.90), t(23) = 9.25,
p < .001, d = .65, and longer for Generate than for Choice items, t(23) = 4.41, p < .001, d =
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.33.
Did accuracy at study affect how long participants spent studying correct definitions?
In the Choice condition participants spent significantly longer studying items which they had
got wrong at study (M = 5.75 sec, SD = 3.81) than items they got right (M = 4.44, SD = 4.11),
t (23) = 3.64, p < .001, d = .33. Together with the finding that JOLs were also higher for
Choice items participants got right at study than for those they got wrong, these results
suggest that participants’ experience of success in the Choice condition led them to perceive
correctly guessed items as easier to learn, both devoting less time to their study and giving
them higher JOLs. Interestingly, although participants spent longer studying Choice items
which were incorrect at study than they spent on correct items, they spent even longer on
Generate items incorrect at study, t(23) = 3.13, p = .005. The fact that study time, like JOLs,
was influenced by the accuracy of the participant’s guess at study in the Choice condition,
adds further support to our proposal that participants’ perception of the difficulty of
remembering an item is affected by the outcome of an event preceding study.
The relationship between study time and final test performance is subject to item
selection effects, but these data are included in Appendix F for completeness.
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the benefit of generating errors over both reading and
incorrect choosing observed in our previous experiments and confirmed that this benefit
persisted even though participants had the opportunity to select, at final test, an incorrect
guess they had generated at study, and even though test lures were equally familiar across the
three study conditions. Furthermore, the benefit of generating over reading in the SP group
suggests that the superiority of the Generate condition was not due to displaced rehearsal of
Generate items during study of Read items, since allowing participants to choose how long to
study should also eliminate any need for displaced rehearsal. Participants’ JOLs also
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replicated the pattern observed in Experiment 2, in that item JOLs were significantly lower in
the Generate condition than in either the Read or Choice conditions. This was true even when
participants were allowed to study correct definitions for as long as they liked, suggesting
that the low JOLs for Generate items observed in Experiment 2 did not stem from a
perception that there was insufficient time to process correct feedback.
As in Experiments 2A and 2B, participants gave much higher JOLs to Choice items
they guessed correctly at study than to Choice items they guessed incorrectly. JOLs for
Choice items incorrect at study were higher than JOLs for Generate items. Even when they
made errors, participants believed they would learn better by the Choice than the Generate
method, though in reality the reverse was true. The amount of time participants in the SP
group allocated to studying correct definitions also reflected this misconception. Although
they spent significantly more time studying Choice items that were incorrect at study than
correct ones, they spent even longer on Generate items, suggesting they believed the Choice
items would be more easily learned even when they had made an error. In the Choice
condition the correct answer is present for the whole of the trial time, although it is only
revealed as the correct one in the last few seconds, after the participant’s choice has been
made. Therefore even when an incorrect choice is made, the answer, when it appears, is
already familiar and may, as a result, be processed more fluently, leading to higher JOLs and
shorter study times. However, this same fluency may also mean that these items are
processed less deeply, leading to poorer subsequent memory. Indeed, at final test, participants
were more likely to select the same incorrect choice they had made at study than an incorrect
response they had generated.
It is interesting that the advantage for generating over reading was observed even
though participants spent longer on Read than Generate items, suggesting that there was
something about the process of generating a guess which enabled more efficient processing
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of the correct answer. Against this interpretation, however, study times for Read items
include time spent processing the cue word, whereas in the Generate and Choice conditions
this has already taken place before timing begins, a factor which may at least partly account
for the longer study times for Read items.
When, in Experiment 3, participants had the option, at final test, of selecting their own
generated responses and their own chosen responses, they were more likely to pick a
definition they had incorrectly selected at study in the Choice condition than one they had
incorrectly generated in the Generate condition, which may have contributed to the advantage
for generating over choosing. Indeed, they were very good at rejecting their own incorrect
generations, choosing these at test at a rate significantly below chance. However, when
participants made an error at test in the Choice condition, they chose their own original error
at a rate no higher than chance, suggesting that incorrect choosing caused no particular
detriment to memory.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 3, study of correct definitions was self-paced and participants had the
opportunity to select, at test, responses they had themselves generated or chosen at study. In
these conditions, the findings of our previous experiments were replicated: generating led to
better memory than reading and incorrect choosing, and participants continued to give lower
JOLs to Generate items than to Read or Choice items.
In Experiment 4 we again allowed participants to study correct answers for as long as
they chose. However, the final multiple choice test equated familiarity of the lures between
the three conditions in a different way. There were four final test options, the target and three
lures. The three lures were all true definitions for other items from the experiment, one from
each of the different study methods. Thus, all test lures were definitions which had previously
been seen in the study phase, and there was no option to select either an incorrectly generated
Chapter 4: Self-paced study time
71
response or an incorrect choice made at study. In Experiment 3, the benefit of generating over
incorrect choosing persisted in spite of the opportunity for interference from participants’
own generated responses as well as from incorrect choices. Participants were better at
recognising and rejecting their own generated responses than their own incorrect choices,
which may have been responsible for this difference. In Experiment 4, with both those
sources of interference eliminated, the benefit of generating over incorrect choosing might
also be eliminated. Of course we still expected to see a benefit of generating over reading, as
in previous experiments.
Method
Participants
There were 30 participants, 13 male, average age 29.2 (SD =10.78).
Materials
Stimuli were the same 60 word-definition pairs as in Experiment 3, with the same
study lures for the Choice condition. Lures in the test phase were all true definitions from the
study phase of the experiment, one from each of the three study methods (Table A5). Thus,
each definition appeared three times in the final test, once as the correct target and twice as
lure definitions for other items. Counterbalancing was as in the previous experiments.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that for the self-paced group in Experiment 3 except
that Generate and Choice cues were displayed for 8s rather than 10s. There was no
experimenter-paced group. As in Experiment 3, participants clicked on a button labelled
“Finished studying” when they had studied the definitions for as long as they wished. The
final multiple choice test options consisted of the correct answer and three lures which were
true definitions from other items in the experiment, one from each of the different study
methods. Thus, there was potential for interference from lures familiar from the study phase,
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but not from participants’ own errors and not from lures available for selection at study in the
Choice condition.
Results
At study no Generate responses were correct. Correct responses to Choice items (M =
29.3, SD = 11.6) were above chance, t(29) = 2.05, p = .0493.
Final test performance
Replicating the findings of previous experiments, when all items were considered,
there was a main effect of Study Method, F(2,58) = 4.19, p < .020, p2 = .126. Generating (M
= 59.3, SD = 21.8) was superior to reading (M = 50.7, SD = 26.3), t(29) = 2.90, p < .007, d =
.36. Choosing (M = 56.7, SD = 23.9) was also superior to reading (t(29) = 2.09, p = .045, d =
.24), while the Generate and Choice conditions did not differ (t (29) = .80, p = .430, d =
0.12). Twenty participants remembered more Generate than Read items, while eight showed
the opposite pattern. Seventeen participants remembered more Choice than Read items, with
3 On removal of the data of one participant whose Choice score at study was more than two
standard deviations above the mean and who correctly selected more than half of the items at study,
correct responses to Choice items (M = 28.4, SD = 10.7) were no longer above chance, t(28) = 1.74, p
= .094. We re-ran the main analyses without this participant’s data. There was a main effect of Study
Method, F(2,56) = 4.56, p < .015, p2 = .140. Generating (M = 59.1, SD = 22.2) was superior to
reading (M = 49.8, SD = 26.3), t(28) = 3.09, p < .005, d = 0.38. Choosing (M = 56.0, SD = 24.1) was
also superior to reading, t(28) = 2.09, p = .045, d = 0.25, while the Generate and Choice conditions
did not differ, t (29) = .91, p = .371, d = 0.13. These effects are similar to those in the analysis of all
participants. However, when only items incorrect at study were included, the difference between
study methods now became significant, F(2,56) = 3.40, p = .040, p2 = .108. Since there were no
incorrect generations at study, the advantage of generating over reading was as above. There was no
difference between incorrect choosing (M = 56.1, SD = 25.7) and reading, t(28) = 1.68, p = .104, d =
0.24), nor between incorrect choosing and generating, t(28) = .74, p = .465, d = .12.
Chapter 4: Self-paced study time
73
seven showing an advantage for reading. When the analysis was re-run excluding Choice
items which were correct at study (but with all Read and Generate items included, since there
were no Generate items which were correct at study), the difference between study methods
fell just short of significance, F(2,58) = 3.09, p = .053, p2 = .010 (but see footnote 3). The
mean score for Choice items incorrect at study was 56.46 (SD = 25.33), falling between the
Read and Generate scores and not significantly different from either.
Judgments of learning
Just as in previous experiments, an ANOVA conducted on the judgments of learning
showed a main effect of Study Method, F(2,58) = 14.92, p < .001, p2 = .34. Despite having
as long as they chose to study correct feedback, participants gave lower JOLs to Generate
items (M = 32.1, SD = 18.0) than they did to either Read items (M = 38.2, SD = 20.5), t(29) =
3.6, p = .001, or Choice items (M = 40.8, SD = 21.6), t(29) = 5.1, p < .001. There was no
difference between Read and Choice JOLs, t(29) = 1.71, p = .097.
Also replicating the findings of previous experiments, JOLs for Choice items correct
at study (M = 56.0, SD = 26.0) were significantly higher than JOLs for Choice items incorrect
at study (M = 34.0, SD = 20.1), t(29) = 8.13, p < .001. In final test performance, however,
there was no difference between the percentage of correct study choices which remained
correct at test (M = 57.1, SD = 30.5) and the percentage of incorrect study choices which
were converted to correct at test (M = 56.5, SD = 25.3), t(29) = .12, p = .905. Choosing
correctly at study did not benefit later memory any more than choosing incorrectly did,
though participants predicted that it would.
JOLs were higher for items correct at test (Read: M = 40.4, SD = 21.8; Generate: M =
34.5, SD =19.8; Choice: M = 40.7, SD = 21.3) than for items incorrect at test (Read: M =
33.5, SD = 18.2; Generate: M = 27.0, SD =16.4; Choice: M = 37.1, SD = 20.3). As for the
previous experiments, analysis of these data can be found in Appendix D.
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Aggregate JOLs also showed a main effect of Study Method, F(2,58) = 4.81, p = .012,
p2 = .14. Choice JOLs (M = 34.9, SD = 20.1), were higher than both Generate JOLs (M =
26.9, SD = 20.5), t(29) = 2.8, p = .009, and Read JOLs (M = 28.7, SD = 22.5), t(29) = 2.17, p
= .038, but there was no difference between Read and Generate JOLs, t(29) = .78, p = .445.
Study time
Study time data showed the same pattern as in Experiment 3. An ANOVA revealed a
main effect of Study Method, F(2,58) = 16.64, p < .001, p2 = .365. Participants spent longer
studying Read items (M = 7.34s, SD = 3.58) than either Generate (M = 6.48s, SD = 3.41),
t(29) = 2.82, p = .008, or Choice items (M = 5.33s, SD = 2.61), t(29) = 4.93, p < .001, and
longer studying Generate than Choice items, t(29) = 3.50, p = .002.
Discussion
Experiment 4 replicated the findings of Experiment 3. Even though participants could
study correct definitions for as long as they chose, generating led to better test performance
than reading while JOLs showed the opposite pattern. Choosing was also superior to reading
when all items were considered, though this difference fell short of significance when only
items incorrect at study were included in the analysis.
Effect of final test options on test performance in Experiments 1-4
In Experiments 3 and 4, generating produced better test performance than reading,
replicating previous findings. In both these experiments, and unlike in previous ones,
choosing was also superior to reading when all items were considered. However, this
advantage disappeared when only items incorrect at study were included in the analysis.
The multiple choice format of the final test in Experiments 1-4 allowed us to examine
the effect of different lures at test. Generating was superior to reading in all experiments, no
matter what options were used at final test. How did Choice performance differ across these
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experiments? When all Choice items were included in the analyses, whether correct or
incorrect at study, choosing was disadvantaged relative to generating in Experiments 1, 2A,
and 2B, in which Choice study lures all appeared at test for Choice items, while lures for
Read and Generate items were all new. However, this disadvantage was eliminated when, in
Experiments 3 and 4, familiarity of test lures was equated, placing the three conditions on a
more equal footing. In these experiments there was no difference between generating and
choosing, and choosing was superior to reading when all items were considered.
When items correct at study were excluded from the analyses, incorrect choosing
never led to better test performance than reading in any of the five experiments, and it led to
significantly worse performance than generating in all experiments except Experiment 1,
where the difference was marginally significant, and Experiment 4, where there was a non-
significant numerical advantage for generating. Thus, equating familiarity of the lures
(Experiments 3 and 4) at test boosted Choice performance sufficiently to wipe out the
advantage of generating over choosing when all items were considered, but not enough to
eliminate the advantage when just those items incorrect at study were included.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the inclusion of all of the Choice study
lures among the final test options (Experiments 1 and 2) interfered with ability to select the
correct answer in the Choice condition. When this source of interference was reduced
(Experiment 3) or removed (Experiment 4), choosing was not always disadvantaged relative
to generating, at least when all items were considered. In Experiments 3 and 4 choosing was
even superior to reading when all items were considered. However, no matter what lures were
used at test, incorrect choosing never conferred the advantage over reading that generating
did. Generation, even when it produces errors, has a powerful enhancing effect on memory
for corrective feedback by comparison with passive reading. Choosing, when it produces
errors, does not have this same enhancing effect.
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Although incorrect choosing generally led to lower test performance than errorful
generation, it never led to worse performance than reading. This was true even in Experiment
2B, when participants showed some tendency to persist with their own incorrect choices
when compared with making a new error. However, in all experiments, when participants
made incorrect choices at study, they were more likely to answer those items correctly at test
than to make any type of error. Making incorrect choices was neither harmful nor helpful to
memory compared with reading.
The benefit of errorful generation in Experiments 1-4
In all five experiments described so far, we observed a benefit of errorful generation
over reading when participants learned definitions of previously unfamiliar English words or
translations of novel foreign vocabulary, even though the correct answer was displayed for a
much shorter time in the Generate than in the Read condition. The errorful generation benefit
was observed whether or not the participant’s initial guess appeared as one of the final test
options, and even when participants regulated their own study time. Generating errors
followed by feedback was also more beneficial than incorrect choice in Experiments 2A, 2B,
and 3, with the difference falling short of significance in Experiments 1 and 4.
Participants’ JOLs, however, showed a very different pattern, with the lowest item
JOLs consistently being given to Generate items and the highest to Choice items. These high
Choice JOLs were largely driven by high JOLs for items guessed correctly at study,
suggesting that participants used their own performance at study as a basis for predicting their
future test performance.
To assist in conveying the main data pattern, and because all experiments employed a
within-subjects design with the same study conditions, Table 3 summarises test accuracy and
JOLs (and their 95% confidence intervals) by aggregating data from all five experiments.
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Table 3. Mean values for final test accuracy and JOLs across Experiments 1-4 (95%
confidence intervals in brackets)
Read Generate Choice
Correct at study Incorrect at study
Test accuracy 71.14
(69.8 – 72.5)
79.29
(77.9 – 80.7)
78.77
(76.7 – 80.9)
73.96
(72.0 – 76.0)
JOLs 35.38
(34.3 – 36.5)
30.22
(29.1 – 31.4)
54.68
(52.6 – 56.8)
33.40
(32.2 – 34.6)
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT CHOICE OPTIONS AT STUDY
AND TEST, ON FINAL TEST PERFORMANCE AND ON JUDGMENTS OF
LEARNING
Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012) found a benefit of errorful generation for related but
not unrelated word pairs and proposed that this was because encoding is facilitated when the
correct answer is present in the “search set”. They suggested that, when participants search
for a target which is related to the cue, they retrieve many possible associations, including the
correct one. When weakly associated pairs are being learned, as in Grimaldi and Karpicke’s
experiments, the participant may give, as their response, a stronger associate to the cue but
the weaker, correct one, has also been activated and is strengthened by this activation, leading
to an advantage for generating over reading. For example, participants may produce “wave”
as a response to the cue “tide” but other candidates (such as beach, surf, ocean) also receive
some activation. If one of these is the target, this activation facilitates its encoding when it is
presented as feedback. By contrast, when unrelated pairs are used, there is little likelihood
that the correct answer will be present in the search set as the participant’s guesses are likely
to be related to the cue but not to the target.
Experiments 1-4 provided evidence that a pre-existing cue-target relationship is not
necessary for the errorful generation benefit to be observed. When participants learned novel
English words and foreign language words, their responses were unrelated to the targets and
it is implausible that the target would have been activated along with the correct response.
The facilitation observed for the learning of Generate items cannot therefore be explained by
Grimaldi and Karpicke’s account. In the Choice condition, however, the options available at
study may be considered as constituting the search set. An interesting question, therefore, is
whether the presence of the target among the options facilitates its encoding when it appears
as corrective feedback, and whether encoding of the target is enhanced to a greater degree if
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it is the option chosen by the participant. Experiment 5 examined the idea that encoding is
facilitated when the correct answer is present in the “search set” in the Choice condition. In
this experiment all items were studied under Choice conditions, but the options available at
study were varied so that they either included, or did not include, the target. We also
examined participants’ metacognitive judgments of learning with regard to this question.
Experiments 2-4 showed that participants’ JOLs were heavily influenced by their experience
immediately prior to studying corrective feedback. Experiment 5 examined how participants’
JOLs would be affected by the presence or absence of the target at study.
Experiment 5
The first aim of Experiment 5 was to examine whether the presence of the correct
target among the options in the Choice condition affects its encoding when it is presented as
feedback. The presence of the target among Choice options could enhance its encoding when
presented as feedback, consistent with Grimaldi and Karpicke’s proposal, particularly if it
were selected at study. Alternatively, rejecting the correct target in favour of one of the lures
could lead to impaired memory for the target at final test. In Experiment 5 all items were
studied under Choice conditions. One third of the items were studied using the standard
Choice condition (STD), so that the target and three lures were presented. One third were
studied under a “Target Absent” (TA) condition. In this condition the correct target was
replaced by an option labelled “other” which was presented with three lures. The remaining
items were filler items, where the study options comprised the target, two lures and an
“other” option. The filler items were included to avoid participants learning that the option
labelled “other” was the correct choice whenever it was available.
If presence of the correct target among the study options enhances its encoding when
it is selected, the proportion of items correctly selected at study which persist as correct at test
in the STD condition will be greater than the proportion of items for which correct “other”
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responses are made at study in the TA condition and which are also correct at test. If presence
of the correct target is harmful when it is not chosen at study, then the proportion of items
incorrectly chosen at study in the STD condition which are converted to correct at test will be
lower than the proportion of items incorrectly chosen in the TA condition which are
converted to correct at test.
We also collected judgments of learning. In Experiment 3 we found that participants
gave much higher JOLs in the Choice condition when they had guessed correctly at study
than when they had not. In the current experiment we examined whether responding correctly
at study, either with a target in the STD condition or an “other” response in the TA condition,
would lead to higher JOLs than responding incorrectly, or if only selection of the target itself
would lead to higher JOLs. We also examined whether absence of the target among the
options in the TA condition would lead to lower JOLs, due to reduced familiarity of the target
when presented as feedback.
Lastly, we manipulated final test format as a between-subjects factor. For both
groups, the final test was in multiple choice format but for one group the lures were all lures
from the study phase whereas for the other group they were new items. Experiments 1-4
provided suggestive evidence that inclusion of study lures as final test options interfered to
some extent with participants’ ability to select the correct answer at test, in that choosing was
no better than reading in Experiments 1 and 2, when test options for Choice items included
all of the study lures, but it was more beneficial than reading in Experiment 4, when no study
lures were included. Experiment 5 enabled us to compare, in the same experiment, the effect
of a final test where all lures were the same as at study with one where no options had been
seen at study, either as lures or as incorrect definitions. If availability at test of the same lures
as were present at study interferes with selection of the correct answer, we should see an
advantage in test performance for the No Lure group.
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Method
Design
A mixed 2 x 2 design was used with one within-subjects factor, Study Method, which
had two levels (Target Absent and Standard). The between-subjects factor was Group (Lure
and No Lure). For the Lure group the options in the final multiple choice test consisted of the
target and the three lures presented with that item at study. For the No Lure group the options
were the correct target and three new items. The dependent measure was the number of
definitions correctly selected on the final multiple choice test.
Participants
Participants were 30 members of the general population, 13 males and 17 females,
average age 26 (SD = 8.0), recruited via the UCL subject pool. They were each paid £4. They
were randomly allocated to two groups, with 18 in the Lure group and 12 in the No Lure
group.
Materials
The stimulus set consisted of 60 unusual English words, taken from the same pool of
items as was used for Experiment 1. Each word had a one-word definition and three lures
which were approximately matched with the correct definition for word frequency according
to the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms, and for number of syllables. Items were
counterbalanced such that each item appeared equally often in each condition across
participants. See Table A6 for the full set of materials.
Procedure
The study procedure was identical to that in Experiment 2 except that the two study
methods were both variants of the Choice condition. In each case, the cue word was
presented with four possible options. Participants were told that, for some of the items, one of
the options would be “other”. In this case, the correct answer might or might not be present
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among the options. If they believed the correct answer was not among the options, they
should select the option labelled “other”. In the STD condition, the four options consisted of
the target and three lures. In the TA condition, the options were three lures and the “other”
option. In this case “other” was the correct response. For the filler items, the options were the
target, two lures and an “other” option. In this case “other” was an incorrect response. Item
JOLs were elicited after study of each correct definition, but participants were not asked to
make aggregate JOLs at the end of the study phase.
Results
Initial study phase performance
Selection of the correct answer at study in the STD condition was above the chance
rate of 25%: M = 31.3, SD = 12.0, t (29) = 2.9, p = .007. Correct selection of “other” in the
TA condition was also above chance, M = 32.7, SD = 15.6, t (29) = 2.5, p = .019.
Final test performance
Of primary interest was whether the presence of the target at study would affect final
test performance in the STD and TA conditions. In each of these conditions, three lures are
present at study. The remaining option is either the target (STD condition) or “other” (TA
condition). Thus, the two conditions differ only in whether or not the target is present at
study. A mixed 2x2 ANOVA, with Study Method (STD or TA) as the within subjects factor
and Group (Lure or No Lure) as the between subjects factor, revealed no difference in final
test score between the study methods when all items were considered, F(1,28) = .33, p =
.572, nor between the groups, F(1,28) = 2.33, p = .138, and no interaction, F(1,28) = .33, p =
.572. Figure 5A shows the means collapsed across groups. In the Lure group, the mean score
was 75.0 (SD = 22.2) for the STD condition and 72.5 (SD = 21.6) for the TA condition. In the
No Lure group, the mean score was 85.0 (SD = 18.1) for the STD condition and 85.0 (SD =
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18.8) for the TA condition. Although scores were numerically higher for the No Lure group,
as might be expected, the difference was not significant.
Figure 9: Experiment 5: (A) Final test performance by study method and accuracy at study.
(B) JOLs by study method and accuracy at study.
Selection of the target at study
Did selecting the target at study in the STD condition lead to better final test
performance than selecting “other” in the TA condition? In neither of these cases is an
incorrect option picked, but in the STD condition the target is present throughout the trial,
whereas in the TA condition it only appears in the last 5 seconds as feedback. STD items
correctly selected at study might be better remembered than TA targets because of this
difference. We conducted an analysis for just those items which were correct at study (i.e.,
the correct option picked in the STD condition, or “Other” picked in the TA condition). A
mixed 2 (Study Method) x 2 (Group) ANOVA revealed no difference between study
methods, F(1,24) = .42, p = . 524. Thus, the presence and selection of the target in the STD
condition did not enhance final test performance compared with correctly selecting “other” in
the TA condition. There was a significant difference between the groups, F(1,24) = 4.6, p = .
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042, but no interaction between Study Method and Group, F(1,24) = .12, p = .730. Means
were higher for the No Lure group (M = 89.7, SD = 16.1 for the STD condition, M = 88.1, SD
= 18.9 for the TA condition) than for the Lure group (M = 77.6, SD = 23.6 for the STD
condition, M = 72.3, SD = 23.0 for the TA condition). It was generally easier for the No Lure
group, who had no possible interference from study lures, to pick the right answer than it was
for the Lure group, but it made no difference whether the target or “other” had been correctly
selected.
Effect of incorrect rejection of target at study?
Did the presence of the target impair final test performance when it was incorrectly
rejected at study? We compared the percentage of items incorrect at study and converted to
correct at test in the STD and TA conditions. A 2 (Study Method) x 2 (Group) ANOVA
showed no effect of Study Method, F(1,28) = .34, p = .565, nor of Group, F(1,28) = 1.96, p =
.173, and no interaction, F(1,28) = .08, p = .703. For the No Lure group, the means were 84.6
(SD = 19.0) for the TA condition and 85.3 (SD = 22.2) for the STD condition. For the Lure
group, the means were 72.8 (SD = 22.3) and 74.8 (SD = 24.2) respectively. Selecting an
incorrect lure when the target was present among the options at study did not impair
performance relative to when the target was not present.
Effect of accuracy at study on test accuracy
Was it more likely that a correct response at study would also be correct at test than
that an incorrect study response would be converted to correct at test? A 2 (Accuracy at
study: correct/incorrect) x 2 (Study Method: STD/TA) x 2 (Group: Lure/No Lure) ANOVA
showed there was no effect of Accuracy at study, F(1,24) = .36, p = .557. It was no more
likely that a correct study response would persist as correct at final test (M = 80.4, SD = 22.3)
than that an incorrect study response would be converted to correct at test (M = 78.3, SD =
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22.4). There was no main effect of Study Method, F(1,24) = .56, p = .461, no interaction
between Study Method and Accuracy, F(1,24) = .14, p = .708, and no difference between the
groups, F(1,24) = 2.5, p = .124.
Judgments of learning
There was no difference in final test performance between the STD and TA
conditions, whether all items were considered or just those correct or incorrect at study. Was
this reflected in the JOL ratings? We analysed the data for all participants together, since the
groups differed only in the options available at test, a difference which does not affect the
JOLs, since these are made at study. A paired samples t test revealed that significantly higher
JOLs were given to STD items than to TA items, t(29) = 4.8, p < .001 (Figure 5B). Thus, the
absence of the target at study in the TA condition did not lead to worse memory performance
but it did lead to lower JOLs.
Did accuracy at study affect JOLs? A 2 (Study Method) x 2 (Accuracy: correct or
“other” vs. incorrect) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Study Method, F (1,25) = 43.7, p <
.001, a main effect of Accuracy, F(1,25) = 51.9, p < .001, and an interaction between them, F
(1,25) = 38.1, p < .001. JOLs were significantly higher for correct (M = 58.7, SD = 21.2) than
incorrect (M = 29.9, SD = 14.0) responses in the STD condition, t(29) = 8.6, p < .001, but
were no higher for TA “other” responses (M = 33.6, SD = 17.4) than they were for TA
incorrect responses (M = 30.4, SD = 13.3), t(25) = 1.34, p = .192. Thus, the mere fact of
getting the answer right, and correctly rejecting the incorrect lures, was not sufficient to lead
to higher JOLs: Only selection of the correct target led to higher JOLs for correct than
incorrect responses. JOLs were also higher for correct STD responses than for TA “other”
responses, t(25) = 7.2, p < .001, but there was no difference between JOLs for incorrect STD
and incorrect TA responses, t(29) = .59, p = . 563. Although JOLs for TA “other” responses
were no different from TA lure responses, they were significantly higher than STD lure
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responses, t(25) = 2.47, p = .021. In other words, correctly rejecting the incorrect lures in the
TA condition (by selecting “other”) led to higher confidence that the target would be
remembered than incorrectly selecting a lure in the STD condition, again suggesting that
JOLs are strongly influenced by an event immediately preceding study of corrective
feedback.
Discussion
Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012) proposed that activation of the target at study, in the
course of generating a guess, facilitates its encoding when it is presented as feedback, leading
to a Generate advantage for related word pairs (since the target is likely to be activated during
guessing) but not for unrelated word pairs (since it is very unlikely to be activated). The aim
of Experiment 5 was to examine the effect, on both final test performance and judgments of
learning, of the presence or absence of the target among the options in the Choice condition.
Strikingly, there was no difference in final test performance between the STD
condition, where the target was included among the options at study, and the TA condition,
where it was not. If encoding of corrective feedback is facilitated by the presence of the target
in the search set, then we would have expected to see better performance for STD items than
for TA items, in this scenario where cues are unfamiliar to participants. Of course, if
participants knew some of the definitions pre-experimentally, then it could be argued that,
when they select the TA “other” option, they are also activating, through retrieval, the correct
definition. In this case we would not expect to see a detriment to the TA condition. However,
the finding that the percentage of items correctly selected at study which remained correct at
test was no greater than the percentage of items incorrect at study which were converted to
correct at test, makes it unlikely that when correct responses were given at study this was
because of prior knowledge. Thus, the presence of the target in the STD condition did not
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facilitate its encoding when it was provided as feedback, by comparison with the TA
condition where it was not present.
In all analyses, the presence of the correct target among the study options had no
effect on final test performance. It did, however, affect judgments of learning. In Experiment
5, JOLs for items correctly selected in the STD condition were higher than JOLs for items
incorrectly selected. These data add further support to the proposal that JOLs are heavily
influenced by the fortuitous selection of a correct answer at study, replicating the pattern we
observed in Experiments 2 to 4. The fact that JOLs for TA “other” responses did not differ
from JOLs for TA lure responses extends our findings to show that it is the selection of the
target itself which is important, not simply the experience of being correct. Participants are
correct both when they select the target in the STD condition, and also when they select
“other” in the TA condition, but only selection of the target led to higher JOLs than for
incorrect answers, adding further support to our proposal that participants experience an
“illusion of knowing” when they select an option which turns out to be correct. When “other”
is selected in the TA condition, the correct answer, when it appears, is unfamiliar, whereas in
the STD condition, the feedback is congruent with the selected correct response and is
processed more fluently as a result, leading to higher JOLs for these items.
Furthermore, while JOLs did not differ for TA “other” and TA lure responses, JOLs
for TA “other” responses were higher than for STD lure responses. Even though participants
did not know the answer in either case, confidence was lower when an incorrect item was
picked and a correct one was present (in the STD condition) than when “other” was correctly
identified as the right choice (in the TA condition).
88
CHAPTER SIX: ASSESSING CUED RECALL AND THE EFFECT OF
INTERFERENCE FROM RESPONSES AT STUDY
In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that generating an incorrect definition for an
unfamiliar English word and being provided with corrective feedback led to significantly
better performance on a later multiple choice test than spending the same length of time
studying the word with its definition. In Experiments 3 and 4 we observed the same effect
when study of corrective feedback was self-paced. Experiments 6 and 7 were designed to
explore whether an advantage for errorful generation would also be observed when memory
was tested with a final test in cued recall format.
A recall test cued by the word alone would, by its very nature, enable participants to
reproduce the same responses they gave at study for Generate or Choice items. In Experiment
3, where participants’ study responses were also available for selection in the final multiple
choice test, participants were very good at rejecting their own generated responses and better
than they were at rejecting their incorrect choices. A multiple choice test differs from a recall
test in the amount of cue support available to memory. In the multiple choice test of
Experiment 3 both the correct target and the incorrect response either generated or chosen by
the participant were available for selection. Under these conditions, it may have been
relatively easy for a participant to distinguish between their own response and the
experimenter-provided response. With a cued recall test, neither response is presented to the
participant, who has to retrieve the relevant information from memory. If generating
strengthens the item which is generated, in this case the participant’s own incorrect response,
this response may dominate and interfere with the ability to recall the correct target,
consistent with the predictions of the “errorless learning” literature discussed in Chapter 1. In
this case the advantage for generating over reading observed in Experiments 1-4 may be
eliminated or even reversed when memory is tested by a cued recall test.
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Because we wanted to separate the benefits of generation from the potential
detriments of interference, in Experiment 6 we manipulated the opportunity for participants
to respond, at test, with the same response they had given at study. If the advantage for
generating over reading remains when participants have the opportunity to respond with their
own errors, this would suggest that the benefits of generating are sufficient to outweigh any
negative effect of interference from generated guesses. If the benefit of generating over
incorrect choosing also remains in these circumstances, this would suggest that there is
something powerful about the act of generating one’s own response, even when erroneous,
which potentiates encoding of corrective feedback, and that choosing does not confer a
comparable benefit.
Experiment 6
Experiment 6 had two principal aims. First, we asked whether the benefit of
generating over reading and choosing can be generalized to a cued recall final test in addition
to a multiple choice test. Second, we asked whether final test performance would be affected
by whether or not it was possible to select, at test, the same response which had been
generated at study. To examine the effect of allowing or eliminating the possibility for
interference from responses generated at study to manifest itself at final test, Experiment 6
used two slightly different versions of the cued recall final test. The first enabled intrusions
from the study phase to occur at final test in both the Generate and the Choice conditions, the
second allowed them in neither condition. We crossed these two final test conditions with the
three study conditions in a mixed 2 x 3 design.
In one test version, Lure-Present, participants were presented, at final test, with a
choice of two possible initial letters for the definition. One of these was the initial letter of the
correct definition and the other was either the initial letter of the word generated by the
participant at study in the Generate condition (for Generate items) or of the lure in the Choice
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condition (for Read and Choice conditions). Note that in this experiment, the Choice
condition had just two options at study, as in Experiment 1, the target and one lure. In the
second version of the final test, Lure-Absent, one letter was the initial letter of the correct
definition and the other was a letter other than the initial letter of the definition generated by
the participant or the lure from the Choice condition. Thus, in the Lure-Present version it was
possible for participants to select the same incorrect answer they had chosen at study, while
in the Lure-Absent version it was almost impossible. (It was possible in the few cases where
the participant happened to generate a definition with the same initial letter as the correct
definition.) Comparison of these two groups will enable us to examine the effect of
interference, during retrieval at final test, of a guess generated by the participant at study.
Method
Design
A mixed design was used with one within-subjects variable, Study Method, which had
three levels (Read, Generate and Choice), and one between-subjects variable, Group, with
two levels (Lure-Present and Lure-Absent). The dependent variable was the number of
definitions correctly recalled at final test.
Participants
Participants were 130 students enrolled in an introductory Psychology course. There
were 102 females and 28 males, average age 18.8 (SD = 1.2). Eighty-one participants
reported that English was their first language and 49 reported that it was not.
Materials
The stimulus set consisted of 60 unusual English words, each with a one-word
definition, e.g., kedge – anchor, taken from the same pool of items as used in the earlier
experiments. For the Choice condition, a lure was created for each of the definitions. Each
lure had the same number of syllables as the correct definition and approximately the same
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word frequency according to the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms (Table A7). The set was
divided into three subsets of 20 items each for counterbalancing purposes. Each subset was
matched for average number of letters and syllables per word, and contained the same
number of nouns, verbs and adjectives. Each subset was also matched for the average word
frequency of the definitions. Within each subset, no two definitions had the same initial letter.
For each initial letter which appeared in one subset, the same letter also occurred in the other
two subsets. For example, each of the three subsets had a definition beginning with “a”, one
beginning with “b” etc. The same was also true of the lures. No lure had the same initial letter
as its corresponding correct definition.
Procedure
The experiment involved a single session which took around 30 minutes to complete.
As in Experiment 1, there were just two options at study in the Choice condition, and no
JOLs were captured. The procedure differed from that of Experiment 1 in just two respects.
First, in the study phase the total trial time was 13 secs (as in Experiment 2). In the Generate
and Choice conditions participants had 8 seconds to produce a response and 5 seconds to read
the correct answer. Second, the final phase of the experiment was a cued recall test. All 60
English words were presented, one at a time in random order. Along with the cue,
participants were presented with a choice of initial letter for the definition, one of which was
the correct initial letter. For the Lure-Present group the other letter was the initial letter of the
definition generated by the participant (for words in the Generate condition) or the initial
letter of the lure from the Choice condition (for items in the Read or Choice conditions). For
example, imagine that a participant in the Lure-Present group generated, at study, the
(incorrect) definition tasty for the cue gallionic (whose true definition is careless). At final
test, the cue gallionic would appear with two options: c____ and t_____. The participant’s
task was to enter a definition beginning with either c or t. Similarly, for the item esurient, the
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two Choice options at study were lonely (incorrect) and hungry (correct). At test, the cue
esurient appeared with the options l_____ and h_____. These options allowed the participant
to enter an incorrect definition they had generated or seen at study for the given item. For the
Lure-Absent group, the alternative letter was different from the initial letter of either the
generated item or the study lure item. In this case, the participant might generate the
definition tyre for the cue word mechlin (whose true definition is lace) at study. At test, they
would see the cue word mechlin with two options, l____ and c____. In this case, neither
option allowed them to enter the same definition they had generated at study. The relative
position of each alternative on the screen was randomly determined on a trial by trial basis.
For each word, participants were prompted to recall and enter the correct definition. Only
responses beginning with one of the initial letters presented were accepted: where other
responses were entered, an error message appeared and the participant was prompted to
amend their answer. No feedback was given.
Results
Initial study phase performance
In the Generate condition the percentage of correctly generated definitions was very
low (M = 0.4, SD =1.3). The percentage of correct answers given on the initial test in the
Choice condition (M = 50.7, SD = 10.8) did not differ from the chance level of 50%, t(129) =
.69, p = .492. These data confirm that the definitions were largely unknown to participants
prior to the experiment. There was no difference between the groups in the number of correct
selections in the Choice condition.
Final test performance
Figure 10 shows the mean number of items recalled in each of the three study
methods at the final test. First we analysed performance for all items, irrespective of accuracy
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of initial response. The data were positively skewed and a Shapiro-Wilks test revealed that
all variables were significantly non-normally distributed, probably due to the high number of
zero scores in the data (around 7% of scores were zero), so non-parametric tests were used4.
As a non-parametric means of determining whether the two versions of the task interacted
with study type, we performed a rank transformation of the data and a mixed 3 x 2 (Study
Method x Group) ANOVA on the transformed scores (Conover & Iman, 1981). The
interaction was not significant, F(2,256) = .694, p = .500, and a Mann Whitney test showed
no difference between the groups (Z = 1.33, p = .185) so we combined the data from the two
groups for further analysis. A Friedman test on final test data from all 130 participants
revealed a significant difference between the three study methods (χ2= 11.731, p = .003).
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed a significant benefit of the Generate over the Read
condition, Z = 2.16, p = .031. There was no significant difference between the Generate and
Choice conditions, Z = .97, p = .332 or between the Read and Choice conditions, Z= 1.47, p =
.142. Of 130 participants, 75 scored higher in the Generate than the Read condition, 42
scored higher in the Read than the Generate condition and there were 13 ties. A Sign test
showed that the probability of this result occurring by chance was very low, Z = 2.96, p =
.003.
Final test performance for items answered incorrectly at initial test
Next we considered final test performance for just those items which were answered
incorrectly at study, which entailed dropping a small number of items from the analysis in the
Generate condition and about half the items in the Choice condition. These data were also
non-normally distributed. A Friedman test revealed a significant difference between study
4 In our other experiments, scores were sometimes normally distributed and sometimes not but they all showed
significant effects with both ANOVA and non-parametric tests. In Experiment 6 the ANOVA and non-
parametric tests diverge. Since the data were not normally distributed and were skewed, we used a non-
parametric test in this instance.
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methods, χ2 = 10.51, p = .005. Wilcoxon signed ranks tests showed a significant benefit of
the Generate over the Read conditions, Z = 2.00, p = .045, and of the Generate over the
Choice conditions, Z = 2.80, p= .005, but no difference between the Read and Choice
conditions, Z = .71, p = .478. These data are illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Mean percentage correct at the final memory test in Experiment 6. Error bars
indicate standard errors.
Choice condition
In the Choice condition, where a response at final test was correct, it was significantly
more likely to have been answered correctly (M = 14.9, SD = 12.5) in the initial test than
incorrectly (M = 10.7, SD = 9.8), Z = 4.41, p < .001.
Intrusions at final test of errors made during study
For the Lure-Present group, we examined to what extent incorrect responses given at
study were reproduced at final test as a proportion of all incorrect responses at study in each
condition. Participants were more likely to reproduce incorrect definitions they had generated
at initial study in the Generate condition (M = 9.7, SD = 9.4) than they were to reproduce
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incorrect definitions they had selected in the Choice condition (M = 4.7, SD = 7.4), and this
difference was highly significant (Z = 3.76, p < .001).
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 6 was to examine whether the errorful generation benefit
observed in our previous experiments would also occur when the final test was in cued recall
format, and to examine more closely the effect of interference at final test. When we
considered the final scores of all 130 participants, regardless of whether the item had been
answered correctly or incorrectly at study, we observed the same benefit of generating over
reading that we had observed in Experiments 1 to 4. When we considered only those items
which had been incorrectly answered at initial study, generating an incorrect answer and
receiving corrective feedback also led to significantly better performance than simply reading
the cue with its definition, and to better performance than selecting an incorrect answer from
a choice of two. Thus we have now observed this benefit of generating over reading both
with a multiple choice final test and with a cued recall final test.
In Experiment 6 two versions of the final test were created in order to examine the
effect of interference from responses which had been generated or chosen at study. There was
no difference in final recall between the Lure-Present and Lure-Absent groups, suggesting
that the opportunity to select the same response did not impair performance relative to when
there was no such opportunity. However our analysis of the persistence of errors in the Lure-
Present group showed that participants were significantly more likely to reproduce an error
made in the Generate condition than one made in the Choice condition, the opposite of the
pattern observed in Experiment 3, where the final test was in multiple choice format. Despite
these error intrusions, there was still a significant advantage for the Generate over the Read
condition in the Lure-Present group but no advantage for choosing over reading. This striking
result suggests that there is something about the act of generation, even when it results in an
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error, which enables corrective feedback to be processed effectively enough to outweigh the
negative effects of interference. Errors made at study in the Choice condition were less likely
to persist to final test, but this did not lead to an advantage for choosing over reading.
Generating, then, enabled both errors and correct responses to be better remembered than in
the Choice or Read conditions.
Perhaps the act of generation, because it involves activating many cues, leads to a
more distinctive memory representation being formed than in either of the other two
conditions. As long as participants are able to distinguish their own, erroneous, response from
the correct answer provided as feedback, this will lead to better recall in the Generate
condition than in the other conditions. Although a final test in multiple choice format may
facilitate this task by presenting the correct target alongside the incorrect responses, the
outcome of Experiment 6 suggests that Generate items are strengthened sufficiently to lead to
an advantage for generating even when participants have to retrieve the answers themselves
in a cued recall format final test. Choosing also strengthens items, but to a lesser extent:
Choosing led to better final test performance than reading in Experiment 3, when the final
multiple choice test included both correct target and incorrect responses among the options,
but was no better than reading in the cued recall test of Experiment 6.
Experiment 7
Experiment 6 demonstrated that the Generate benefit observed in our earlier
experiments extends to a cued recall final test. However, scores were very low and
performance was at floor for many participants. The aim of Experiment 7 was to attempt to
replicate the finding of an errorful generation effect using a cued recall final test while
achieving higher scores. We therefore used 40 items instead of 60, and only two study
methods, Read and Generate, with 20 items in each. In addition, we used the same, slightly
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longer, timings that we used in Experiment 1, to give participants more time to process the
definitions. In Experiment 7, all participants took the same version of the final test, which
was cued by the word alone. This will enable us to confirm that the effect can be replicated
with a more traditional format of cued recall test.
Method
Participants
Participants were 24 members of the general population. 10 males and 14 females,
average age 27.8 (SD = 8.4), recruited via the UCL subject pool. They were each paid £4.
Materials
The stimulus set consisted of 40 unusual English words, taken from the same pool of
items as was used in the earlier experiments (Table A8). Half the items were presented in the
Read condition, half in the Generate condition. Each item appeared equally often in each
condition across participants.
Procedure
The study procedure was identical to that in Experiment 6 with three exceptions. First,
there was no Choice condition at study and only 40 word-definition pairs were used. Second,
items in the Read condition were displayed for 17 seconds while, in the Generate condition,
participants had 10 seconds to generate a response and 7 seconds to view feedback (as in
Experiment 1). Third, at test, all 40 cues were presented alone – unlike in Experiment 6, the
initial letters of targets and lures were not presented – and participants were instructed to type
in the correct definition. As in the previous experiments, each cue remained on screen until
the participant entered a response.
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Results
Initial study phase performance
In the Generate condition, across all participants, only 1 item was answered correctly
at study, though this item was not correctly answered at test, suggesting that at study it may
have been a fortuitous guess rather than an item which was already known to the participant.
Final test performance
Scores were higher in the Generate (M = 30.8, SD = 18.7) than the Read (M = 26.9, SD =
26.1) condition, though this difference failed to reach significance, t(23) = 1.34, p = .195.
Fifteen participants scored higher on Generate than Read items, with eight showing the
opposite pattern. Inspection of the data revealed that two participants scored substantially
higher than the others in the Read condition, scoring 90% and 95% respectively, where the
next highest score was 55%. These scores were 2.4 and 2.6 standard deviations above the
mean respectively. When data from these two participants were excluded from the analysis, a
paired samples t test showed a significant advantage for generating (M = 27.7, SD = 16.1)
over reading (M = 20.9, SD = 17.3), t(21) = 2.83, p = .010.
There was some tendency for errors made at study to be repeated at final test.
Participants reproduced, at final test, errors they had generated at study 6.9% of the time (SD
= 9.3). Seventeen of the 24 participants reproduced at least one of their own errors.
Discussion
Although the advantage of generating over reading did not reach significance in
Experiment 7 when data from all participants were included in the analysis, there was no
evidence of any harmful effect of generating errors, despite the fact that participants had less
time to process correct answers in the Generate condition (just 7s) than in the Read condition
(17s). When data from two participants who scored substantially higher than the other
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participants in the Read condition were removed from the analysis, a strong generation
benefit was again observed. These two were also the highest scorers overall. Brewer and
Unsworth (2012) found that testing provided more benefit to students with poor memory
abilities, as measured by performance on a series of episodic memory tests, than to those with
high memory abilities. It is possible that high scoring participants use highly effective
strategies to process Read items, including, perhaps, rehearsal and self-testing, during the
time that Read items are on the screen, leading to a reduction or elimination of the Generate
benefit. It would be interesting for future research to examine the factors affecting individual
differences in the errorful generation benefit.
Discussion of Experiments 6 and 7
Experiments 6 and 7 replicated our previous finding that generating a definition for an
unfamiliar English word, even when the generated response is incorrect, has a powerful effect
on subsequent retention of the correct definition. We have now observed an advantage of
generating errors over reading both when memory is tested with a multiple choice test
(Experiments 1-4) and also with a cued recall test (Experiments 6 and 7, though the
difference fell short of significance in Experiment 7 when all participants were included). We
have also shown that the advantage for the Generate condition persists when participants
have the opportunity to reproduce their own errors at test, whether the final test is in cued
recall format or multiple choice format. This is interesting in light of the fact that, when the
test was in multiple choice format (Experiment 3) participants were very good at rejecting
responses they had themselves generated at study, selecting these less often than they selected
Choice lures they had selected at study. When the test was in cued recall format, however
(Experiment 6), they were significantly more likely to give, at test, the same incorrect
response they had given in the Generate condition than the same incorrect response they had
given in the Choice condition. In spite of this interference from responses made at study, the
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advantage for generating over reading remained, and generating was also more beneficial
than choosing.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: IS INTERFERENCE INCREASED BY GENERATING
MULTIPLE ERRORS?
The preceding experiments have demonstrated an advantage for errorful generation
over reading whether the final test is in multiple choice or cued recall format. This benefit of
generating errors is striking given that a large body of literature on “errorless learning” has
proposed that errors generated during learning can have a detrimental effect on later memory
performance (e.g., Baddeley & Wilson 1994). Errorless learning studies typically compare a
condition in which participants generate many errors in response to a test cue with a
condition in which they are presented with the correct answer, with the latter proving more
beneficial to later memory. An intriguing question concerns why these studies so often show
an advantage for a passive errorless condition relative to a condition involving the generation
of errors, while our experiments have consistently shown the reverse pattern. There are
several differences between our task and the ones typically used in errorless learning studies.
One difference which may be important is in the amount of potential for interference from
errors that is created in the typical errorless learning task by comparison with ours. In
errorless learning studies, not only are participants encouraged to make many erroneous
guesses on each presentation of the item, but they also go through several cycles of learning,
increasing the potential for errors. In contrast, in our task only one error is generated. It is
possible that multiple incorrect responses cause greater interference, resulting in a detriment
to the errorful condition in the errorless learning studies.
In Experiment 8 we aimed to bring our procedure closer to the procedure used in a
typical errorless learning study by having some participants go through several cycles of
learning. In this experiment items were 40 Euskara – English word pairs, and they were each
studied in either the Read or the Generate condition. The final test was a cued recall test.
Participants underwent one, two or three cycles of learning. If the errorless learning
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advantage observed in some studies occurs because multiple cycles of learning create more
interference from errors in the errorful condition, we would expect to see a reversal of the
Generate benefit between the one-cycle group and the three-cycle group. That is, we would
predict a Generate over Read advantage in the one-cycle group, replicating our previous
findings, but a Read over Generate advantage in the three-cycle group, due to increased
interference from multiple errors.
Experiment 8
Method
Design
The design was a mixed 3 x 2 design, with Group (number of cycles: 1, 2, or 3) as a
between subjects factor, and Study Method (Read or Generate) as a within subjects factor.
Participants
Participants were 118 students enrolled in an introductory Psychology course. There
were 97 females and 21 males, average age 18.7 (SD= 0.9). Seventy-five participants
reported that English was their first language and 43 reported that it was not. They were
randomly allocated to three groups, which underwent one (N = 40), two (N = 38) or three (N
= 40) cycles of learning respectively.
Materials
The stimulus set consisted of 40 Euskara words with their English translations, taken
from the same pool of items as was used in Experiment 2B (Table A9). Half the items were
presented in the Read condition, half in the Generate condition. Each item appeared equally
often in each condition across participants.
Procedure
The study procedure was identical to that in Experiment 7 with two exceptions. First,
items in the Read condition were displayed for 13 seconds, while in the Generate condition
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participants had 8 seconds to generate a response and 5 seconds to view feedback. Second,
the number of cycles of learning varied according to the group to which the participant had
been allocated. For the one-cycle group, the study phase was similar to that in Experiment 7,
as the set of 40 items was presented once only. In the two-cycle and three-cycle groups,
following initial presentation of all 40 items, they were presented again, in a different random
order each time, for either one or two additional cycles. In each cycle, items were presented
in the study method to which they were initially assigned. That is, Read items were presented
in Read format in each cycle in which they appeared, and Generate items appeared in
Generate format. As in Experiment 7, the final test was in cued recall format and there were
no time constraints.
Results
Initial study phase performance
No items were correctly generated on the first cycle of study, confirming that the
words were unknown to participants pre-experimentally.
Final test performance
Minor variations in spelling at final test were allowed. A 3 (Group) x 2 (Study
Method) ANOVA on the final test scores showed no main effect of Study Method, F(1, 115)
= 1.71, p = .194, a significant effect of Group (number of cycles), F(2,115) = 59.44, p < .001,
and no interaction, F(2, 115) = 1.82, p = .167. The effect of Group was as expected: final test
scores were significantly higher for the two-cycle group than the one-cycle group, t(76) =
5.72, p < .001, and higher for the three-cycle group than for the two-cycle group, t(76) =
5.05, p < .001. The means are shown in Figure 11.
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The mean percentage of correct responses at final test, across all groups, was 42.71
(SD = 29.4) for the Read condition and 40.85 (SD = 27.8) for the Generate condition. The
means for the three groups are shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Mean percentage correct at the final memory test in Experiment 8. Error bars
indicate standard errors.
Discussion
In the light of our previous experiments (especially Experiments 6 and 7 which also
used a cued recall test format) it is surprising that there was no advantage for generating over
reading in the one-cycle group. However, there was no disadvantage to generating, despite
the fact that in the Read condition the correct answer was available for the full 13s of the trial
time, whereas it was displayed for just 5s in the Generate condition. Indeed, in the three-cycle
group, there was a numerical advantage for Generate items at final test, even though at least
one error (and in some cases three) had been produced. Correct answers for these items had
been presented for a total of 15s across the three cycles, while correct translations for Read
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
One cycle Two cycles Three cycles
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
co
rr
ec
t
at
fi
na
l
te
st
Group
Read
Generate
Chapter 7: Generation of multiple errors
105
items had been displayed for a total of 39s. Thus generating incorrect responses was not
harmful to learning compared with simply reading the translation. There was no evidence that
increasing the number of errors generated for each item led to any detriment to Generate
items compared with Read items.
However, in errorless learning studies participants typically make several guesses per
trial, in addition to undergoing several cycles of learning, so there is potential for many more
erroneous responses to be generated. It is possible that our manipulation, by allowing only
one error per trial, did not create sufficient interference to cause any detriment to memory. It
will be interesting for future research to examine whether generating several errors on each
trial, in addition to undergoing several cycles of learning, will increase the amount of
interference to the extent that it nullifies, or reverses, the benefit of generation. In errorless
learning studies it is usual for responses to be given orally in the errorful condition. A
possible future modification of our task could therefore have participants respond orally to
cues in the study phase and be encouraged to generate up to four errors per trial, as in the
typical errorless learning study. Responding orally reduces the amount of time needed for
each trial, compared with typing in four responses, and will mirror the typical errorless
learning procedure more closely.
Errorless learning studies also often constrain responses by giving participants the
initial letter or letters of the target. For example, Haslam, Hodder, and Yates (2011) had
participants generate names in response to pictures of faces and provided them with the initial
letter (e.g., “S”) of the name to be guessed. Participants were encouraged to make up to four
guesses (e.g., Susan, Sarah, Suzanne, Sonya) before being given the correct answer. This
method may increase interference by increasing similarity between the incorrect guesses and
the target. Because responding is constrained to a limited number of possibilities it may also
increase the subjective plausibility of the incorrect responses generated: in other words,
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participants may have more confidence that one of their responses will be correct. In the task
used in the experiments reported here, where the set of possible responses is unconstrained,
participants are unlikely to believe that they will happen to give a correct response to a cue
they have never seen before and they may therefore be less committed to their own responses.
A possible avenue for future research, therefore, is to constrain participants’ responses in the
Generate condition. This could be done by providing the initial letter, increasing phonological
similarity between responses, and thereby potentially increasing interference. Alternatively, a
category to which the item belongs could be provided (e.g., fruits, animals etc.). This would
increase the probability of generating a correct response, and therefore may lead participants
to commit more firmly to their own responses, which may also increase the potential for
interference.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: TESTING CAN PROTECT MEMORIES AGAINST
INTERFERENCE
Experiments 1-8 examined the proposal that, while testing is often beneficial to
memory, taking a test that generates many errors can be harmful to subsequent memory,
because the errors we make ourselves may interfere with memory for corrective feedback
presented after the generation attempt. In contrast, those experiments showed that the act of
generation potentiates the encoding of subsequent feedback sufficiently to outweigh any
negative effect of the errors produced by the test itself. Testing can therefore be beneficial
even when it produces many errors, and even during novel learning when there is no pre-
existing association between cues and targets, by potentiating the processing of feedback.
Experiments 9 and 10 examine a different scenario in which the benefits of testing
may be affected by interference. In this instance it is proposed that testing can be harmful to
memory when correct information is retrieved but interfering new learning is introduced
immediately after retrieval. According to this proposal, the very act of reactivating a
consolidated memory can destabilize it, so that it needs to be reconsolidated in order to
persist in its original form. During the reconsolidation period memories are particularly
susceptible to interference, which may cause them to undergo modification or even
unlearning. In Experiments 9 and 10 we investigated whether retrieving memories could
make them more susceptible to interference from new learning following retrieval or
whether, by contrast, testing can protect memories against interference. I begin with a brief
review of the literature in this area.
Does retrieval make memories more susceptible to interference?
As noted in Chapter 1, the beneficial effect of retrieval practice on later recall of the
retrieved items is well established (e.g., Allen, Mahler, & Estes, 1969; Karpicke & Roediger,
2008) and is observed even when no corrective feedback is given (Allen et al., 1969;
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Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Kuo & Hirshman, 1996), and when testing is compared with a
restudy condition (e.g., Carpenter, Pashler, Wixted, & Vul, 2008; Cull, 2000), suggesting that
something specific to the retrieval process itself leads to enhanced memory for the tested
items. Bjork and Bjork (1992) proposed that testing increases the retrieval strength, or
accessibility, of successfully retrieved items and the more difficult the retrieval, the greater
the boost to retrieval strength. When retrieval is easy, a test confers little benefit. The recent
distribution-based framework proposed by Bjork and colleagues (Halamish and Bjork, 2011;
Kornell, Bjork, &, Garcia, 2011) for understanding when testing is and is not beneficial,
proposes that successful final recall is a function of the difficulty of the final test and retrieval
strength at the time of this final test. A more difficult final test means that retrieval strength
has to be higher in order for an item to reach the threshold for successful retrieval. Thus
retrieval practice, which boosts retrieval strength, is most beneficial when the subsequent
final test is difficult, because the additional strength provided by practice allows items to be
retrieved which otherwise would not be.
Despite widespread evidence of the benefits of testing, it can sometimes have
detrimental effects on memory, for example by increasing false memory as well as correct
memory (McDermott, 2006) or by increasing susceptibility to misinformation (Chan,
Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009). In these studies learning and testing took place within a single
session, before consolidation would have had time to occur. Memory impairment or updating
in declarative memory has also been observed, however, when consolidated memories were
reactivated, a day or two after learning, by a brief reminder such as the presentation of a
single cue from the learned list, or a brief allusion to the original study episode, immediately
before the learning of new information (e.g., Forcato, Argibay, Pedreira, & Maldonado, 2009;
Forcato, Burgos, Argibay, Molina, Pedreira, & Maldonado, 2007; Forcato, Rodriguez,
Pedreira, & Maldonado, 2010; Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, & Nadel, 2007; Hupbach, Gomez, &
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Nadel, 2009). In these demonstrations of disruption to reconsolidation the reminder did not
include a complete test of the original memory so the question of whether the benefits of
testing would be sufficient to outweigh impairment or modification caused by interfering
learning remains open. However, a study of motor skill learning by Walker, Brakefield,
Hobson, and Stickgold (2003) did include a complete test of the original material as the
reminder treatment. Walker et al. had participants learn two different finger-tapping
sequences a day apart. At a final test on the third day, memory for the first sequence was
poorer when participants had briefly rehearsed this sequence before learning the second
sequence on Day 2 than when they had not. The authors proposed that reactivating the
memory had made it labile and susceptible to disruption by the learning of the new sequence.
This raises the interesting question of whether taking a test could, in similar fashion, lead to
impairment of declarative memory.
Does retrieval lead to an increased susceptibility to interference or can it immunize
memory against interference? There is some evidence that testing may protect against
proactive interference when a memory is first acquired. Szpunar, McDermott, and Roediger
(2008) found that participants who were tested after studying each of five lists showed better
recall of List 5 than participants who were only tested on List 5, and they made fewer
intrusions from earlier lists. The effect was specific to retrieval: only testing, not restudying,
after each list protected against the build up of proactive interference.
Halamish and Bjork (2011, Experiment 3) investigated whether retroactive
interference is moderated by testing, also at the time of initial memory acquisition.
Participants studied cue-target pairs followed by two cycles of either restudy or test. They
then read cue-target pairs, some of which had the same cues as studied pairs but different
targets (interfering pairs). This was followed by a final cued recall test of the original studied
pairs. Testing led to better recall than restudying only when it was followed by interfering
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pairs. Testing did not completely immunize against interference, however: recall was
significantly lower on the final test than on the initial test when interfering pairs were studied
in between.
The study by Halamish and Bjork (2011) suggests that testing may provide some
protection against retroactive interference during memory acquisition but does not immunize
the memory completely. Here, again, learning and testing took place within a single session,
before consolidation would have taken place, and participants were required only to read the
interfering pairs, not to learn them. In the current study we examine what happens when a
memory has already been consolidated and is retrieved for the purposes of a test taken a day
after learning. The reconsolidation hypothesis proposes that retrieving a consolidated
memory may labilize it, making it vulnerable to unlearning if new material is learned
immediately afterwards. In Experiments 9 and 10 participants learned items over a three-day
period, to allow time for memory consolidation and reconsolidation to occur. After learning
English-Swahili word pairs (List 1) on Day 1, some participants took a “reminder” test of
these words, thereby reactivating the memory, before learning interfering English-Finnish
words (List 2) on Day 2. Others learned the English-Finnish pairs without the reminder test.
All were given a final test on Day 3. The reconsolidation studies discussed earlier showed
impairment or modification to memories when they were reactivated using just a subtle
reminder. The goal of Experiments 9 and 10 was to investigate the effect of memory retrieval
in the more usual circumstances in which retrieval practice takes place, such as when taking a
vocabulary test. Under these circumstances does retrieval make memory vulnerable to
interference or does the benefit of retrieval practice outweigh, or even immunize against, any
negative effect of interference? By having participants learn, rather than simply read, the
interfering List 2 we aimed to create the conditions necessary for disruption to the already-
consolidated List 1 memory.
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Experiment 9 investigates whether reactivating memory of List 1 by taking a test
leads to a detriment to that memory when new material is learned during the reconsolidation
period, leading to poorer subsequent recall of List 1 in the tested group. By contrast, we find
superior recall in this group. Experiment 10 examines whether the magnitude of the testing
benefit observed in Experiment 9 is reduced by the learning of List 2 or whether testing
immunizes List 1 memory to the extent that it is invulnerable to the detrimental effects of
interference. By using four groups which between them represent all possible combinations
of the reminder test and the List 2 interference task, we show that testing and interference
exert opposite effects on memory but that testing, far from making memory more vulnerable
to interference, protects memory against interference.
Experiment 9
Method
Participants
Thirty-two participants, 16 female, average age 33.31 (SD =18.01), took part in return
for a small payment and were equally divided between two groups. A further five were
excluded because they failed to complete all three sessions and one because she already knew
some Swahili words.
Materials
A list of 20 English-Swahili word pairs (List 1) was constructed, for study by both
groups of participants on Day 1. A second list was constructed, comprising 20 English-
Finnish word pairs (List 2), for study by both groups on Day 2. Half of the word pairs in List
2 shared the same English cues as List 1 (Table A10). Thus the English word bed appeared
only with its Swahili translation kitanda, whereas the word cat appeared on both lists with its
translations paka (Swahili) and kissa (Finnish).
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Procedure
Both groups studied List 1 on Day 1 and List 2 on Day 2. One group (R+I+) received
a test of List 1 immediately before learning List 2, while the other group (R-I+) did not
(R=Reminder, I=Interference). All participants received a cued recall test of both lists on Day
3.
At study (of List 1 on Day 1, and of List 2 on Day 2), word pairs were presented one
at a time for 6 secs, in randomized order. After every four word pairs, recall of the four
translations was tested, cued by the English word, until each word had been correctly
translated twice. Corrective feedback (in black for a correct response, red for incorrect) was
provided on every trial. After study of all 20 items, six blocks of practice followed. In each
block, each word was tested, with feedback, until correctly answered, at which point it was
dropped from practice for the remainder of that block. In the first two blocks, five words were
presented until correctly answered, and then a new set of five was tested and so on until all 20
had been answered correctly. In the third block, words were tested in two sets of 10. In the
remaining three blocks, all 20 words were tested in randomized order and participants were
shown how many they had translated correctly on first presentation in that block. On
completion of the task, each word had been correctly translated exactly eight times, while
number of presentations varied. On Day 2, the R+I+ group received a reminder test of List 1
immediately before studying List 2. For the reminder test, all twenty cue words were
presented, one at a time, and the participant was instructed to type in the correct Swahili
translation for each. No feedback was given. The R-I+ group did not receive the reminder
test.
On Day 3, participants took four tests without feedback. First they were tested on List
1 Forwards (English to Swahili). Each cue word was presented and participants typed in the
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translation. This process was repeated for List 1 Backwards (Swahili to English), then for List
2, first forwards and then backwards.
Results and Discussion
Was memory for List 1 affected by the taking of a reminder test on Day 2? Table 4
shows the mean scores for words with shared and unique cues for each group in all four tests.
Table 4. Mean scores out of 10 (SDs in brackets) obtained on all four final tests in
Experiment 9, by cue type.
Day 3 Test Group Shared cues Unique cues
List 1 Forwards R+I+ 6.4 (2.7) 7.9 (1.9)
R-I+ 5.0 (2.4) 5.8 (2.5)
List 2 Forwards R+I+ 6.4 (2.8) 7.4 (2.4)
R-I+ 5.8 (2.3) 6.9 (2.0)
List 1 Backwards R+I+ 7.6 (2.7) 8.4 (2.0)
R-I+ 7.0 (1.8) 7.9 (2.3)
List 2 Backwards R+I+ 7.8 (3.2) 8.4 (1.3)
R-I+ 8.8(1.5) 8.5 (1.6)
Figure 12 shows the total scores collapsed across cue type. For the List 1 Forwards test, a 2
(Group) x 2 (Cue Type) mixed ANOVA did indeed show a main effect of Group, F(1,30) =
5.04, p = .032, but recall was higher for the R+I+ group. Far from being deleterious to the
List 1 memory, the reminder test enhanced it, that is, there was a testing effect.
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Figure 12 Mean scores (out of 20) on all four final tests in Experiment 9, collapsed across cue
type.
There was also a main effect of Cue Type, F(1,30) = 14.98, p = .001. Unique cue words were
better recalled than shared cue words, but there was no interaction between Group and Cue
Type, F(1,30) = 1.49, p = .231, indicating that the group effect was similar for shared and
unique cues. Unique cue words were also better recalled than shared cue words in the List 2
Forwards test, F(1,30) = 18.01, p < .001. However, there was no difference between the
groups, F(1,30) = .45, p = .510, and no interaction, F(1,30) <1, p = .702.
The advantage for the unique cued words over the shared cue words was also present
in the List 1 Backwards test, F(1,30) = 7.58, p = .010 but again there was no difference
between the groups, F(1,30) < 1, p = .469, and no interaction, F(1,30) < 1, p = .919. For the
List 2 Backwards test, no effects were significant: Cue Type, F (1,30) < 1, p = .646; Group,
F(1,30) < 1, p = .42; with no interaction, F(1,30) = 1.45, p = .237. Thus the effect of the
reminder test was specific to forwards and not backwards testing of List 1. Indeed, a 2
(Group: R+I+ vs. R-I+) x 2 (Test: List 1 Forwards vs. List 1 Backwards) ANOVA showed a
significant interaction between Group and Test, F(1,30) = 9.34, p = .005.
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Did taking a reminder test make memory for List 1 more susceptible to updating with
words from the other list? It was marginally more common for List 2 translations to be
mistakenly given in the List 1 test (M = .59, SD = .91) than vice versa (M = .25, SD = .67),
F(1, 30) =3.95, p = .056, but there was no difference between the groups, F(1,30) < 1, p =
.89, and no interaction, F(1, 30) = 2.65, p = .11. Taking the reminder test made no difference
to the extent to which items were erroneously translated using a word from the other
language.
Experiment 10
Experiment 9 provided no evidence that reactivating the List 1 memory by taking a
reminder test made it more susceptible to interference from List 2 learning. On the contrary,
instead of a reconsolidation effect we found a testing effect: the reminder test led to enhanced
memory for List 1. However, it is possible that we did not observe disruption to List 1
memory because List 2 was not an effective interfering agent. In Experiment 10, we therefore
included a group which learned List 2 immediately after List 1 (I+), and a control group
which just learned List 1 (I-), to determine whether List 2 was capable of interfering with
consolidation of List 1 when that memory was first acquired. The I+ and I- groups took a
final test of List 1 one day after List 1 learning, in order to equate the interval between
acquisition and test with the interval between retrieval (reminder test) and final test in the
groups which received a reminder. Secondly, it is possible that there was some disruption to
the List 1 memory in the R+I+ group in Experiment 9, but it was offset by the beneficial
effect of the extra practice this group received by having the reminder. In other words, the
test did not completely immunize List 1 memory against interference and participants in the
R+I+ group might have performed even better had they not learned List 2 after the List 1
reminder. In Experiment 10, in addition to the R+I+ and R-I+ groups of Experiment 9, we
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included two additional groups. The R+I- group took a reminder test but did not learn List 2,
and the R-I- group did neither. Thus we had four groups which between them represented
every combination of reminder testing and interference, plus two groups to test for an
interfering effect of List 2 on learning (rather than recall) of List 1. Table 5 shows the
schedule of learning and testing for all six groups.
Table 5: Schedule of learning and testing for the six groups in Experiment 10. L1 = Swahili
learning task. L2 = Finnish learning task. ? = test.
Group Day 1 Day 2 Test (Day 3)
I- L1 L1?
I+ L1 - L2 L1? L2?
R+I+ L1 L1? - L2 L1? L2?
R-I+ L1 L2 L1? L2?
R+I- L1 L1? L1?
R-I- L1 L1?
Method
Participants
Participants took part in return for a small payment. After exclusion of five who failed
to attend all sessions and seven who failed to complete the task within the prescribed number
of trials, 100 participants remained, 62 female, average age 23.88 (SD 7.19). They were
randomly assigned to one of the six groups such that there were 14 participants in each of the
I+ and I- groups and 18 participants in each of the remaining four groups (R+I+, R+I-, R-I+,
R-I-).
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Materials
Materials were similar to those used in Experiment 9, except that all 20 English cues
were shared by the two lists in order to maximize the potential for interference (Table A11).
Procedure
For the I+ and I- groups, there were two sessions on consecutive days. The I+ group
learned List 1 immediately followed by List 2 on their first day (designated Day 2 in Table 5
in order to align the final tests), while the I- group learned List 1 only. Both groups were
tested the following day. The remaining four groups learned List 1 on Day 1 and were tested
on Day 3. On Day 2, the R+I+ group took a reminder test of List 1 followed by learning of
List 2; the R-I+ group learned List 2 only; the R+I- group took the reminder test only, and the
R-I- group did neither.
For all groups, study of Lists 1 and 2 proceeded in the same way as in Experiment 9
except that there were five blocks of practice instead of six and, in the last two blocks, the
block was terminated after 45 trials even if participants had not answered every item
correctly, in order to limit the length of the task for participants who found it difficult. Data
from participants who reached the 45-trial limit without having answered all items correctly
were excluded from the analysis. On completion of the task, each word had been correctly
translated exactly seven times, while number of presentations varied. On Day 3, first List 1
was tested, forwards and backwards, then List 2, forwards and backwards.
Results
There was no significant difference between the six groups in the scores achieved in
the final block of List 1 learning, F(5,94) = 1.40, p = .23, nor in the number of trials taken to
complete the task, F(5,78) < 1, p = .51. Table 6 shows the means.
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Table 6: Mean number of items correctly recalled first time in final block of List 1 (out of 20)
and number of trials required to complete the task in Experiment 10 (SD in brackets).
Group Mean no. of items correctly
recalled first time in final
block of List 1
Mean number of trials
taken to learn List 1
I- 17.4 (2.8) 201.7 (44.3)
I+ 18.4 (1.7) 195.7 (40.0)
R-I+ 17.7 (2.6) 206.6 (45.6)
R+I+ 18.7 (1.6) 194.9 (38.5)
R+I- 18.7 (1.8) 215.4 (64.0)
R-I- 18.8 (1.3) 186.7 (33.7)
Confirming that List 2 was capable of interfering with List 1 on initial acquisition, the
I- group scored significantly higher than the I+ group on both the List 1 Forwards test t(28) =
2.45, p = .021, and the List 1 Backwards test t(28) = 2.14, p = .042. Learning List 2
immediately after List 1 impaired recall of List 1 a day later (Figure 13A). Thus List 2 is an
effective interfering agent.
To assess the effects of taking the reminder test and of learning List 2, and their
interaction, on performance in the List 1 Forwards test we carried out a 2 x 2 between-
subjects factorial ANOVA, with Reminder (Reminder test, R+/No reminder test, R-) and
Interference (List 2 learning, I+/No List 2 learning, I-) as the factors, for the remaining four
groups. This revealed main effects of Reminder, F(1,68) = 6.37, p = .014, and of Interference,
F(1,68) = 29.06, p < .001, and a significant interaction, F(1,68) = 9.59, p = .003. Final test
recall performance for these four groups is shown in Figure 13B. Simple effects analyses
showed that the reminder test had a highly significant effect on List 1 Forwards recall in the
presence of interference, F (1,68) = 15.79, p < .001, revealing a testing effect, but not in its
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absence, F (1, 68) < 1, p = .686. Interference, in the form of List 2 learning, had a significant
effect on List 1 Forwards recall when there was no reminder test, F (1, 68) = 36.02, p < .001,
reducing List 1 recall by nearly half. However, taking a reminder test before the List 2
learning improved performance substantially, so that there was no longer a significant effect
of interference on List 1 Forwards recall, F (1, 68) = 2.63, p = .109. These results suggest that
taking a reminder test immunized the List 1 memory against interference caused by the
learning of List 2. Strikingly, this powerful benefit to subsequent recall of taking a reminder
test was only evident when the test was followed by interfering learning. Recall of List 1 was
just as good in the R-I-group, which did nothing on Day 2, as in the R+I- group, which took
the reminder test alone, suggesting that, when there was no interfering task, memory for the
original List 1 was as good 48 hours after learning as it was after 24 hours and there was no
additional benefit of taking a test.
Figure 13. No. of List 1 items correctly recalled at final test (out of 20) in Experiment 10 for
(A) the I + and I- groups and (B) the R-I+, R-I-, R+I+ and R+I- groups.
There was no significant difference in performance on the List 2 Forwards test
between the R-I+ (M = 12.3, SD = 4.0) and R+I+ (M = 12.2, SD = 5.6) groups, (t(34) < 1, p =
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.919), and no difference on the List 2 Backwards test (R-I+: M = 18.1, SD = 1.6, R+I+: M =
18.6, SD = 1.7), t (34) < 1, p = .314. Taking the reminder test enhanced memory for List 1
without affecting memory for List 2.
Although the equivalent performance on the List 1 Forwards test in the R+I- and
R+I+ groups suggests that the reminder test was sufficient to neutralize the effects of
interference altogether, another way to analyse the data is to compare performance on the
reminder test and the final test for these two groups. A mixed 2 (Test: reminder vs. final) x 2
(Group: R+I- vs. R+I+) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Test, F(1,34) = 11.84, p = .002,
and an interaction between Test and Group, F(1,34) = 18.78, p < .001, such that there was a
significant increase in recall for the R+I- group between the Day 2 reminder test (M = 16.1,
SD = 3.8) and the Day 3 List 1 Forwards test (M = 16.4, SD = 3.6), t(17) = 2.12, p = .049,
but a significant decrease in recall for the R+I+ group (M = 17.6, SD = 3.0 and M = 14.2,
SD= 4.4, respectively), t(17) = 3.97, p = .001. These results suggest that the reminder test did
not completely immunize List 1 memory against interference, consistent with the findings of
Halamish and Bjork (2011, Experiment 3), though the significant advantage for the R+I+
group over the R-I+ group, and the equivalent final test performance of the R+I+ and R+I-
groups, suggest it provided substantial protection.
Discussion
In two experiments we observed a testing effect when participants took a reminder
test before learning interfering material. In Experiment 9, taking a reminder test of List 1
before learning List 2, far from disrupting List 1 memory, led to higher final recall scores in
the List 1 Forwards test, and in Experiment 10 this benefit also transferred to the List 1
Backwards test. This was not because List 2 was not an effective interfering agent: In
Experiment 10, poorer recall in the I+ than the I- group confirmed that List 2 was capable of
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interfering with memory for List 1 when that memory was first acquired. The other four
groups in that experiment, by covering all possible combinations of taking the reminder test
and learning List 2, enabled us to examine whether the magnitude of the testing benefit was
reduced by the learning of List 2 immediately after the reminder.
Could there have been some disruption to the List 1 memory in the R+I+ group that
was offset by the beneficial effect of the extra practice this group received by having the
reminder? In fact, performance in the R+I+ group, which took the reminder test and learned
List 2, was not significantly poorer than that in the R+I- group, which did not learn List 2,
suggesting that testing immunized List 1 memory against interference. Comparison of the
reminder test and the final test for the R+I+ and R+I- groups, however, suggests that,
although the reminder test provided substantial protection against interference, there
remained some detrimental effect of List 2 learning.
In the R-I+ group, learning List 2 reduced List 1 final test performance by nearly half
compared with the R-I- group. Is it possible that the presentation, in the List 2 learning task,
of cues which were familiar from the List 1 task, acted as a subtle reminder of List 1,
reactivating and labilizing List 1 memory and disrupting its subsequent reconsolidation?
While some propose that every retrieval triggers reconsolidation (e.g., Sara, 2000), others
claim that reconsolidation only occurs when the structure of the reminder meets certain
conditions (Forcato et al., 2009). Perhaps a complete test, such as our List 1 reminder test,
fails to labilize the memory but a more subtle reminder, the presentation of the shared cues in
the List 2 task, does lead to labilization. However, these shared cues were presented in
exactly the same way in the List 2 task performed by the R+I+ group, following the reminder
test, but this group’s final test performance was no poorer than that of the R+I- group which
did not learn List 2. Furthermore, in Experiment 9, List 2 learning disrupted List 1 memory
for words with unique cues to the same extent as it did for shared cue words, both when List
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2 learning was preceded by a reminder and when it was not, suggesting that the effect on List
1 memory was not due to labilization caused by the presentation of shared cues during List 2
learning. An alternative explanation, discussed below, is that interference from List 2
increased final test difficulty to the extent that many List 1 items became inaccessible.
Whatever was the mechanism by which List 2 caused a detriment to List 1 memory in the R-
I+ group in the current study, the reminder test in the R+I+ group had a powerful enhancing
effect which outweighed the detrimental effect of List 2 learning, protecting List 1 memory
against interference.
In Experiment 10, the reminder test provided more benefit in a situation where the
List 1 memory was vulnerable to interference than when there was no interference. In fact,
there was no difference in performance between the R+I- and R-I- groups, that is, no testing
effect when there was no interfering list to learn. Halamish and Bjork (2011, Experiment 3)
also found that taking a test could protect memory from interference even when the test
provided no benefit when it was not followed by interference. In their study learning, testing,
and interference all took place in the same session. Our findings suggest that testing can
confer a similar benefit a day after learning, when memory has had time to consolidate.
Why did we find no testing effect for the R+I- group when compared with the R-I-
group and why did the reminder test protect List 1 memory from interference even when it
provided no enhancement to memory in the absence of interference? The conditions in which
retrieval practice is beneficial are determined by many factors including the timing and
spacing of tests and the nature of the material studied between tests. Testing is most effective
at a point when items are still sufficiently accessible to be recalled on the test but are in
danger of becoming less accessible without a test. When items are still easily recallable, a test
confers little or no benefit (see, for example, Cepeda, Vul, Rohrer, Wixted, & Pashler, 2008).
In our study, List 1 learning involved many test cycles, which may have ensured there was
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little forgetting during the following 48 hours in the R-I- group even in the absence of
retrieval practice, and therefore there was no advantage of taking an intervening test for the
R+I- group. Consistent with Halamish and Bjork’s (2011) framework, the reminder test may
increase the memory strength of the items successfully recalled on the test but if these items
are already overlearned, this may not translate into a higher level of final test performance for
the tested (R+I-) versus the untested group (R-I-). Halamish and Bjork (2011) proposed that
testing will confer a greater benefit in the presence of any factor which makes the final test
more difficult, such as final test format, test delay or, in our study, the learning of the
interfering List 2. Interference from List 2 makes recall of List 1 at final test more difficult.
Put differently, items need to be higher in memory strength in order to overcome the
interference and exceed the threshold for retrieval. With no reminder test, several items fail to
reach this threshold, leading to the dramatic cut in recall we see in the R-I+ group compared
with the R-I- group, for whom the final test is easier because there is no interference from
List 2. By contrast, the reminder test increases the strength of the retrieved items in both the
R+I+ and R+I- groups. If items are already overlearned, as they are likely to be following our
thorough Day 1 training regime, this increase in memory strength does not translate into more
items recalled on Day 3 in the R+I- group than in the R-I- group, it simply maintains at the
same level the number of items recalled. In the R+I+ group, however, the boost to retrieval
strength induced by the reminder test ensures that, even though the final test is made more
difficult by interference from List 2, items are strong enough to exceed the threshold for
retrieval on Day 3. Thus, a reminder test which is unnecessary when there is no following
interference, becomes crucially important when there is.
An example of a similar interaction between testing and interference comes from a
study by Storm, Bjork, and Storm (2010) who found an advantage for an expanding over a
uniform schedule of retrieval practice only when the practiced material was made vulnerable
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to forgetting by the interpolation of interfering material. They suggested this was because
expanding retrieval practice involved an earlier test than uniform practice. When the
interpolated material was non-interfering there was little forgetting before the first test with
either schedule, but the earlier test became crucially important in the presence of interference
as it allowed more items to remain accessible. Similarly, our reminder test only became
important when the interfering List 2 was introduced, making List 1 vulnerable to forgetting.
In this situation, the reminder test enabled List 1 to remain accessible despite the negative
effects of interference.
We therefore found no evidence that taking a reminder test a day after learning led to
any detriment to List 1 memory when tested on the third day. Rather, testing had an
immunizing effect against interference. If reconsolidation occurs every time a memory is
retrieved (e.g., Sara, 2000; Hardt et al., 2010) we might have expected to see some detriment
to List 1 memory when retrieval was followed by interfering learning, but we did not. It is
possible, however, that List 1 memory was not labilized by our reminder test and there was
consequently no need for reconsolidation, consistent with an alternative proposal that
retrieval does not always lead to labilization of a memory (Forcato et al., 2009). From a
practical point of view, our findings suggest that, in a situation in which one is learning new
information with the potential to interfere with previously-learned material, a brief test of the
latter may help to keep that memory accessible with little or no detriment to the new learning.
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CHAPTER NINE: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this thesis was to examine whether the well-known benefits of generation
and retrieval are sufficient to outweigh the negative effects of interference, in two scenarios
in which it has been proposed that testing can be harmful to memory because it increases
susceptibility to interference. The first scenario involves tests in which many errors are
generated, which have the potential to interfere with memory for correct information, and the
second is the situation in which retrieval of a consolidated memory is thought to render it
labile and vulnerable to interference from the learning of new information.
Experiments 1-8 examined whether generating errors was helpful or harmful to
memory when the cues were novel items and there was no pre-existing relationship between
the cue and the target in participants’ minds. We consistently observed a benefit of generating
errors over reading correct responses, except in Experiment 8 where generating and reading
led to equivalent performance, despite correct answers being available for a much shorter
time in the Generate condition. The benefit of errorful generation was observed whether the
final test was in multiple choice format (Experiments 1-4) or cued recall format (Experiments
6 and 7), whether study of correct answers was experimenter-paced (Experiments 1-3 and 6-
7), or self-paced (Experiments 3 and 4), and including conditions where it was possible for
the participant to respond, at final test, with an error generated at study (Experiments 3, 6,
and 7).
Experiments 9 and 10 examined whether reactivating a previously consolidated
memory, in the form of a test taken a day after learning, would make that memory more
susceptible to interference from new learning following the reactivation, in line with the
reconsolidation hypothesis. In contrast, we found that testing immunized memory against
interference.
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Testing, and interference from errors: The benefit of generating errors
during learning
Experiments 1-8 provide evidence that taking a test can be beneficial to memory even
when the test produces many errors, and even when those errors are unrelated to the correct
answers presented as feedback. Generating responses, even when they were nearly all errors,
enabled corrective feedback to be processed more effectively than when cue and target were
presented intact for passive study. Although there was evidence that participants remembered
their own generated responses, the benefit of generation on the encoding of corrective
feedback was sufficient to outweigh any negative effect of interference from those erroneous
responses.
Theoretical accounts of the benefits of errorful generation
Strengthening of a pre-existing association
Why did generating errors followed by feedback lead to better memory performance
than reading or choosing? Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012) proposed that generating errors can
only benefit memory to a greater extent than passive reading when the correct answer is
already known and is activated during the initial generation attempt. Others (Hays et al.,
2013; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012) have also argued that an existing cue-target relationship is
necessary for this benefit to be observed. These explanations all assume that the benefit of
errorful generation occurs because the correct answer, or items with a pre-existing association
to it, are activated and strengthened during the generation attempt and that this strengthening
enables corrective feedback to be encoded more effectively. Our findings are inconsistent
with these proposals. Whether participants learned definitions for obscure English words or
translations for previously unstudied foreign language words, we consistently observed a
benefit of generating over reading, despite the fact that the stimulus materials were previously
unknown to participants so there could be no pre-existing association to activate and
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reinforce. The benefit of errorful generation cannot, therefore, be solely due to a
strengthening, through testing, of items related to the cue and the target. Our findings suggest
that generation can benefit memory even when it yields many errors, and even when these
errors are unrelated to the target, by making the encoding of subsequent feedback more
effective than when it is not preceded by a generation attempt. Of course, this is not to say
that semantic relatedness between cue and target is not helpful to memory. When cue and
target are related, activation of the target or other concepts associated to it may well enhance
encoding of corrective feedback in the way suggested by Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012),
consistent with their findings of a generation benefit for semantically related, but not
unrelated, pairs (see also Huelser and Metcalfe, 2012). While semantic relatedness may be
helpful to memory when incorrect responses are generated, our findings suggest that it is not
a necessary condition for the errorful generation benefit to be observed.
Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012) and Huelser and Metcalfe (2012) found no advantage
for generating over reading when cue and target were unrelated to one another. However,
unlike in the experiments presented here, their procedure involved cues which would have
been very familiar to participants, and it encouraged generation of incorrect responses with a
strong pre-existing association to the cue. If generating a guess activates not only the guess
but many other associated concepts, then these pre-existing associations, which are strongly
related to the cue but unrelated to the target, are likely to have come to mind again at final
test, on presentation of the cue, and may therefore have interfered with retrieval of the
designated “correct” but unrelated answer. For example, a participant may generate “sand” in
response to the cue “beach” and then be told that the target is “window”. Presentation of
“beach” at test may elicit “sand” because of its strong pre-existing association, and its recent
activation, and this may be sufficient to interfere with retrieval of the unrelated “window”
even if encoding of “window” has also been enhanced by generation. In the experiments
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reported here the cue words were unfamiliar to participants pre-experimentally so had no pre-
existing associations with participants’ guesses and there was therefore less potential for
interference from the incorrect guess at final test. Generation can benefit memory both by
strengthening existing associations and by potentiating the encoding of feedback. Where the
generated guess is related to the cue but not to the target, the strengthening of this interfering
cue-guess association may cancel out the benefit generation confers on the processing of
feedback. By using novel vocabulary items, which had no pre-existing associations in
participants’ minds, we were able to observe a benefit to the encoding of feedback which was
uncontaminated by an opposite, interfering effect of generation on the generated item itself.
Thus we have been able to show that the errorful generation benefit does not depend solely
on a strengthening of pre-existing associations that enhance memory as a result of also being
associated to the target, though this mechanism undoubtedly plays a part in some situations.
Instead, the act of generation per se, regardless of what is generated, is able to make the
encoding of subsequent feedback more effective. This is important from a theoretical
perspective but it is also important from a practical point of view, since our task is closer to
the kind of learning situations people are likely to encounter in educational settings.
Future research could investigate the role of semantic relatedness by including, within
the same experiment, word pairs studied under three different cue conditions: related (e.g.,
tree - leaf), unrelated (pillow-leaf) and novel (where the cue is a foreign language or non
word, e.g., plitsu-leaf). If pre-existing semantic relatedness between cue and target is helpful
to the errorful generation benefit, then we would expect to see a greater benefit for related
than for novel pairs. If semantic activation of information which is related to the cue but not
to the target interferes with memory to the extent that it outweighs any other benefit of
generating a guess, then we would expect to see a similar benefit for novel and for related
pairs, but no benefit for unrelated pairs. If semantic activation of information related to the
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cue is neither helpful nor harmful to memory, having no effect on the benefit of errorful
generation, then we would expect to see a similar errorful generation benefit for all types of
pair - related, unrelated and novel, though this last possibility seems unlikely, given the
findings of Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012) and Huelser and Metcalfe (2012).
Enhanced attention to corrective feedback - the role of curiosity and surprise
Generating errors was beneficial to memory even when there was no pre-existing
association which could be reinforced by corrective feedback. Incorrect guessing in the
Choice condition, however, was less effective, producing equivalent memory performance to
reading. This suggests that there was something about the active process of generating a
response, rather than merely selecting one, which facilitated encoding of corrective feedback,
even when the generated response was incorrect.
One possibility is that participants focused more attention on correct feedback in the
Generate condition than in the Read or Choice conditions. M. J. Kang et al. (2009) found that
curiosity to know the correct answer, following the making of an error, enhanced subsequent
memory. A possible explanation for our findings is that participants’ curiosity about the
correct answer was aroused to a greater extent in the Generate than in the Choice condition,
perhaps because searching for an answer in the Generate condition involves more active
engagement and effort than simply selecting one in the Choice condition or perhaps because,
in the Choice condition, the participant knows that the correct answer will be one of the
limited number of possible options displayed for selection, and the answer when it comes is
therefore less surprising. Similarly, generating may evoke more curiosity than reading, where
the correct answer is on display from the start. If heightened curiosity leads to better recall, it
is possible that one reason why Generate items are better remembered than Read items is that
generating guesses increases curiosity.
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Butterfield and Metcalfe (2001; 2006) and Fazio and Marsh (2009) showed that
participants processed corrective feedback more effectively when it did not match their
expectations. This occurred when they found they had made an error after being highly
confident that they were right, and also when they got an answer right despite having low
confidence in that answer. Butterfield and Metcalfe (2001) proposed that surprising feedback
captured participants’ attention which, in turn, led to more effective encoding. In our study,
where participants had to learn completely novel material, they would have known that their
generated guesses were almost certain to be wrong but they may still have been highly
curious to learn the correct answer, and the discrepancy between their own response and the
actual answer may have induced a similar sense of surprise and led to greater attention being
applied to encoding that answer, consistent with other research showing that such
discrepancies drive learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
It will be interesting for future research to examine the role of curiosity, or
motivation, in the errorful generation task. For Generate items, participants could be asked to
rate their curiosity to learn the correct answer, giving their rating either before or after
generating their guess, but before seeing corrective feedback. For Read items, they would see
the cue, give their rating, and then be shown the correct answer. If generating a guess
increases curiosity to learn the correct answer, curiosity ratings given after generating a guess
will be higher than those given before a guess, and higher than for Read items, whereas
curiosity ratings will be similar for Read and Generate items when the rating is given
immediately following the cue, since no guess has yet been generated. On the other hand,
generating would be predicted to lead to superior test performance than reading, regardless of
when the curiosity rating is made, consistent with our previous findings. When ratings are
made immediately before processing correct answers (i.e., after a guess for a Generate item
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or after the cue for a Read item) a positive correlation between test performance and curiosity
ratings would be predicted.
A further condition in which there is a delay between presentation of the cue and the
request for a curiosity rating in the Read condition will enable measurement of the extent to
which curiosity is increased simply by having to wait longer for the answer to be displayed,
regardless of whether or not an error is produced. If curiosity is increased by waiting,
curiosity ratings will be higher in the Read condition after a delay than when given
immediately. If curiosity leads to memory enhancement, then higher curiosity ratings in the
Read condition will correspond to higher test performance. If generating an error increases
curiosity more than waiting does then curiosity ratings will be higher following a generated
response than following a delay in the Read condition, and if curiosity leads to enhanced
memory, then test performance should also be higher for these Generate items. If, on the
other hand, curiosity ratings do not differ in these two conditions but test performance does,
this would suggest that the benefit of generating errors cannot be attributed solely to
curiosity.
Generation of additional retrieval cues
There are other possible explanations for the benefit of generating over reading and
incorrect choosing. Kornell et al. (2009) suggested that the advantage for generating over
reading observed in their weak-associate task may have occurred because searching for an
answer encourages deep processing of the question, activating related concepts and
facilitating integration of the correct answer. This could be the case in a situation where the
cue is a familiar word and the correct association is already present in participants’ memories,
as it was in their experiments and in the “related” conditions used by Grimaldi and Karpicke
(2012) and Huelser and Metcalfe (2012), but it cannot explain our results, where the cue was
completely novel. However, generating a response is likely to activate many concepts which
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could, even if unrelated to the correct answer, create a distinctive context for the learning of
the answer and serve as retrieval cues on a subsequent recall attempt. This may be
particularly effective if, as we are suggesting, difficulty experienced during learning leads to
enhanced attention to corrective feedback. In this case, the pattern of results we observed
could be due to a combination of factors.
Certainly, there was evidence that participants often remembered the guesses they had
generated at study, suggesting that they were attending to the cue and trying to find some
association with it, rather than generating random guesses regardless of the cue. In
Experiments 3 and 6, the final test format enabled participants to enter, at test, a response
they had generated or chosen at study. In Experiment 3, the lures in the multiple choice final
test consisted of true but incorrect definitions from the study phase, borrowed from other
items in the experiment, and incorrect responses that participants had generated or chosen at
study. In that experiment, when participants chose an incorrect answer in the final MCQ test,
they were very good at rejecting their own generated responses, selecting them at a rate lower
than chance, and at a significantly lower rate than they selected their incorrect choices.
Incorrect choices were selected no more often than the chance rate. In contrast, Experiment 6
produced a different pattern of results. In that experiment, the final test was in cued recall
format and the Lure group was presented with two choices, consisting of the initial letter of
the generated or chosen response and the initial letter of the target. Participants reproduced, at
final test, the same incorrect response they had given at study nearly 10% of the time and at a
significantly higher rate than they reproduced incorrect study choices.
These data suggest that incorrect generated responses were better remembered than
incorrect choices. In a multiple choice test, the items are all presented on screen, so
participants do not have to retrieve the correct definition from memory. Instead, the task
becomes one of identifying the source of the available options in order to distinguish the
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target from the lures. In Experiment 3, this meant distinguishing the target from other familiar
definitions shown in the study phase, as well as incorrect choices seen and selected at study,
and incorrect guesses generated by the participant. Most often the participant was able to
identify the definition which was matched with the cue at study, but when an incorrect
response was ultimately chosen at test, participants were able to distinguish their own
generated guesses from the other lures, enabling them to reject their own study responses at a
rate higher than chance. In contrast, they selected their incorrect choices at chance rates. This
suggests that incorrectly generated guesses were better remembered, and recognised as self-
generated, than incorrect choices.
The cued recall test of Experiment 6 provides less cue support. Here the participant
has to retrieve items from memory, with only a choice of two alternative initial letters to
constrain selection. The finding that, when participants repeated an error made at test, it was
more often a generated guess than an incorrect choice suggests that generation strengthened
the generated error more than incorrect choosing strengthened the incorrect choice, making it
more accessible at the final test. Despite these intrusions from study errors in the Generate
condition, generating still produced superior memory performance to reading and choosing
overall. This could be because, as described above, generating enhances the encoding of
corrective feedback by means of increased attention to the feedback, or because participants
are able to use their generated guess as an extra retrieval cue at final test.
To investigate further the possibility that generated guesses, even when unrelated to
the target, may benefit memory by providing extra retrieval cues which assist with retrieval
or recognition at final test, a series of experiments could be designed to examine the extent to
which a response generated by the participant at study may assist retrieval of the correct
response at test by acting as a mediator. There are several ways this question could be
addressed. Pyc and Rawson (2010) note that, for a mediator to benefit memory, two factors
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are important: the mediator must be recallable in response to the cue, and, having been
recalled, it must be able to elicit the target from memory (see also Dunlosky, Hertzog, &
Powell-Moman, 2005, for other factors affecting the usefulness of mediators). An experiment
which eliminates the need for the mediator to be recalled from memory should therefore
produce improved test performance as long as the mediator is effective in eliciting the target.
Our task could be modified such that, at final test, half of the Generate items are presented
with the response the participant generated at study for that item. If the generated response
can assist with retrieval of the target by acting as a mediator, correct recall of targets should
be better for the items for which the generated response is provided than for those for which
it is not. Of course, if participants were already recalling their own responses at a high rate,
providing them might not increase test scores significantly.
Another approach could be to present participants, at final test, with a list of cues, a
list of items they had generated at study, and a list of correct targets and ask them to match
them. If, in cases where participants matched targets correctly to their cues, they correctly
matched them to their associated generated responses at a rate no higher than chance, this
would enable us to rule out the explanation that the errorful generation benefit is due to the
generated response acting as a mediator. If, on the other hand, correct cue-target pairs were
also correctly matched to generated responses at a rate higher than chance, this would be
consistent with the mediator account, but not conclusive evidence since good memory for the
association between the generated response and the cue or target may be correlated with good
memory for the cue-target association without causing it.
Therefore, if evidence consistent with a mediator account is found, a further
experiment could examine whether the benefit of errorful generation can be wholly accounted
for by the fact that it involves the production of a generated response which can be used as a
mediator. Participants would experience a modified version of the Read condition in which,
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after studying both cue and target, they would be asked to give a response which they might
have generated for that cue had they not been shown the target (or a response suitable for use
as a MCQ test lure). If generating something acts as a mediator, then this modified Read
condition should lead to better performance than the standard Read condition. If the mediator
is the only mechanism by which generating produces better performance than reading, then
the modified Read condition should lead to similar performance to the Generate condition. If,
however, the generation benefit is at least partly attributable to some other factor, e.g.,
curiosity or surprise, then memory for Generate items will still be superior to that for items
studied in the modified Read condition.
Metacognition in the errorful generation task
This is the first set of errorful generation experiments to ask participants to make a
judgment of learning after studying each item. These judgments of learning are interesting for
both theoretical and practical reasons. The finding that JOLs were heavily influenced by
success at study is theoretically interesting because it suggests that not only are people’s
perceptions of their learning strongly affected by fluency of processing at encoding but that
this fluency is itself influenced by the production of either a correct or incorrect answer
immediately prior to encoding of corrective feedback. JOLs are important from a practical
point of view because of the effect they may have on the study strategies people are likely to
adopt in everyday learning situations. Moreover, they are also informative with regard to
helping to understand the errorful generation benefit we have observed in the current set of
experiments. Participants consistently gave lower JOLs to Generate than to Read or Choice
items, even when, in Experiments 3 and 4, they had the opportunity to study correct answers
for as long as they liked. This perception that Generate items were harder to learn than items
studied under the other two methods may have led participants to apply more effort to the
learning of corrective feedback for Generate items, consistent with research showing that
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studying difficult items requires greater cognitive effort which in turn enhances memory
(Ellis, Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984; Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979; Zaromb,
Karpicke, & Roediger, 2010).
Interestingly, Huelser and Metcalfe (2012) asked participants, after their final test, to
rank the study methods used in their experiment (two Read conditions of different
presentation durations, and a Generate condition) according to their effectiveness.
Participants ranked reading as more effective than generating, even though their own test
performance had produced the opposite result. This suggests that they did not remember
which items had been studied under which method and were making their rankings on the
basis of their expectations about the relative efficacy of the two methods. In the present
study, aggregate JOLs given at the end of the study phase may also have reflected
participants’ expectations rather than their actual experience, and these too showed that
participants expected memory to be poorest for items studied in the Generate condition.
Whereas these post-test or post-study summary ratings may be driven by a pre-existing
expectation or heuristic regarding the different methods (what Matvey, Dunlosky &
Gutentag, 2001, call an analytic inference), item JOLs may give us a measure of participants’
perception of the ease or difficulty of learning for each individual item at the moment of
study. The fact that these item JOLs were also lower for Generate items than for the other
study methods even when participants could control how long they studied feedback,
suggests that the effort involved in coming up with a response, followed by the making of an
error, led to a perception that these items were more difficult to learn than items in the other
conditions. Furthermore, JOLs for Choice items were heavily influenced by whether or not
the correct definition had been chosen at study. In particular, Choice JOLs for items correct at
study were always higher than JOLs for Read items, even when participants gave similar
aggregate JOLs to Choice and Read items (as in Experiment 2B and Experiment 3),
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suggesting that success at study for Choice items gave participants high confidence that they
would also remember those items at final test. As can be seen in Table 3, across Experiments
2-4, Choice items correct at study were indeed better remembered than Read items, in line
with participants’ JOLs. However, final test performance for these items was similar to
performance for Generate items while JOLs were substantially higher, the highest JOLs being
given to Choice items correct at study and the lowest to Generate items.
Experiment 5, which used only Choice conditions at study, extended our findings by
showing that simply being correct was not sufficient to elicit higher JOLs than for incorrect
choices - only selection of the target itself, and not correct selection of "other" (in the TA
condition), led to higher JOLs than selection of lures. This adds further support to the
proposal that (fortuitously) correct selection of the target induces a feeling of familiarity
when that target appears as feedback, and this leads to higher JOLs for these items.
Participants may even experience an "illusion of knowing", as discussed in Chapter 3. It is
interesting that there was no difference in final test performance between items correctly
guessed at study in the STD condition and those correctly given an "other" response in the
TA condition, in spite of the extra exposure correct targets in the STD condition have at
study.
This is the first errorful generation study to include a Choice condition, and the first to
collect JOLs. By creating a situation in which participants make both correct and incorrect
guesses, and by collecting item by item JOLs, we have been able to show that participants’
perception of their learning of correct answers is strongly affected by whether or not they
happen to guess correctly at study.
Experiment 3 showed that participants were more likely to reproduce, at final test, an
incorrect guess made at study in the Choice condition than one made in the Generate
condition. However, Choice JOLs for items incorrect at study were often higher (Experiments
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2B and 3) than JOLs for Generate items, even though both involved making an error at study,
suggesting that the making of an error was not the only factor affecting JOLs. In the Choice
condition, the options available at study constitute the “search set” for the given item. Here,
far from facilitating encoding of corrective feedback, options in the search set interfered with
correct recognition at test to a greater extent than generated guesses did. The greater
familiarity of the correct answer when it was presented as feedback in the Choice condition
may have led to higher JOLs but also to less effort applied to encoding, leading to a
dissociation between JOLs and final test performance. This is consistent with our proposal
that fluency at encoding influences participants’ metacognitive judgments which in turn
affect the degree of effort or attention applied to the processing of corrective feedback.
However, participants do not realise that the extra effort involved in processing Generate
feedback will lead to better memory, so they still give low JOLs to these items. Of course, we
have not measured effort or attention directly but this proposal is consistent with other
research suggesting that ease of processing leads to higher JOLs (Castel et al., 2007; Koriat,
2008; Hertzog et al., 2003; Schwartz, Benjamin, & Bjork, 1997) and that both curiosity
(Berlyne & Normore, 1972, M. J. Kang et al., 2009) and effort (e.g., Bjork, 1994; Ellis,
Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984; Tyler et al, 1979; Zaromb, Karpicke, & Roediger, 2010) lead to
enhanced memory. It will be interesting for future research to examine effort more directly.
Format of the final test
Grimaldi and Karpicke (2012), Huelser and Metcalfe (2012) and Hays, Kornell, and
Bjork (2012) all used final tests in cued recall format. In our experiments, we consistently
observed a benefit of generating over reading when a multiple choice test was used
(Experiments 1-4), even when the test enabled selection of erroneous responses generated at
study (Experiment 3). With a cued recall test, there was a clear benefit of generating in
Experiment 6, and a numerical advantage in Experiment 7, which reached significance after
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exclusion of two outliers. In Experiment 8, however, there was no difference between
generating and reading. It may be that correct answers are strengthened to a greater extent for
Generate than for Read items, leading to the consistent benefit observed on the multiple
choice tests in Experiments 1-4, but that this strengthening is not always sufficient to lead to
a benefit when the task is to retrieve the item from memory, not simply to recognise it.
Furthermore, in the three experiments which used a recall test (Experiments 6-8),
correct answers for Generate items were presented for a much shorter time at study than
correct answers for Read items were. Any boost to memory strength due to generating may
therefore have been offset by an advantage for Read items in terms of the additional time
available for study of correct answers. The larger sample used in Experiment 6 may have
enabled the Generate advantage to emerge in spite of this. By using the multiple choice
format final test in Experiments 1-4, we were able to observe a clear benefit of errorful
generation which may not always be so easy to detect with a cued recall test.
Timing of the final test, and timing of feedback
Experiments 1- 8 all used a short retention interval, with just one minute’s filled delay
between the study phase and the test phase. An important question for future research is
whether the errorful generation benefit will persist over a longer retention interval of, for
example, a day or a week. While Kane and Anderson (1978) found a benefit of errorful
generation at a retention interval of one week, they also found evidence of an increase in
interference from errors generated at study. One explanation for the benefit of errorless
learning in memory-impaired populations is that memory-impaired people have difficulty
identifying the source of their memories. An incorrect item they have generated themselves is
strengthened more than an item provided by the experimenter, and comes to mind more
readily at final test. Participants with poor source memory are unable to identify it as self-
generated, leading to perseverative errors at test. With healthy young participants, source
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memory may decline over long retention intervals, e.g., of a week, so it is possible that the
errorful generation advantage may be reduced or eliminated in these circumstances.
Another important issue for future research is whether the errorful generation benefit
depends on corrective feedback being provided immediately following the generation of a
response at study. Vaughn and Rawson (2012) found a benefit of errorful generation for
weakly associated word pairs when feedback was given immediately after generation
(Experiment 2) but not when it was given after a delay in which other items were presented
for generation (Experiment 1). On the other hand, studies in which participants are
questioned before studying a text inevitably involve a delay between generating responses to
the questions and the subsequent studying of the text, yet these studies have found a benefit
of incorrect guessing even under these circumstances (e.g., Pressley, Tanenbaum, McDaniel,
& Wood, 1990; Richland, Kornell & Kao, 2009). Of course, the nature of the materials is
very different in these cases. With text materials, the benefit may arise because questions
presented before the text is studied draw participants’ attention to testable content in the text.
It will be important for future research to try to identify the optimal timing of feedback for
the learning of different kinds of material.
Errorless learning
Experiment 8 was designed to bring our task closer to the typical task used in "errorless
learning" studies, in an effort to explore why those studies so often show a benefit of passive
studying over generating errors while our experiments consistently showed the opposite
effect. As discussed in Chapter 7, there are many differences between our task and the typical
errorless learning tasks. A difference which may be important as far as these differing
outcomes are concerned is that the typical errorless learning task encourages the generation
of many errors per item, both by eliciting many errors on each trial and also by having
participants go through several cycles of learning for each item. The task used in Experiments
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1-4 and 6-7 elicits only one error per item, and each item is studied just once. Experiment 8
was designed to explore whether encouraging generation of multiple errors, by having
participants experience several study cycles, would yield a benefit of reading over generating
rather than the opposite pattern observed in our other experiments. Unfortunately, in this
experiment the Generate benefit did not emerge even in the one-cycle group. However, there
was no evidence that increasing the number of cycles, and therefore the number of errors
generated for each Generate item, led to an increasing benefit in favour of the Read
condition: On the contrary, for the three-cycle group there was a numerical advantage for
generating. One important avenue for future research will be to increase the number of errors
participants make on each trial, as well as having them go through several cycles of learning,
to increase the opportunity for erroneous responses to interfere with recognition or recall of
the correct answer at test.
Other possibilities, discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, include constraining
responses by providing the initial letter or letters of the target. Generating multiple responses
per trial, with the same initial letter, would increase phonological similarity between errors
and the target, potentially creating interference with learning the correct response. The
subjective plausibility of responses may also be an important factor. In our task participants
may not make a strong association between the cue and their own generated response because
they are highly unlikely to be correct. Constraining responses, either by providing one or
more letters, or by providing a semantic cue, such as a category, would increase the
probability that the participant will guess the target, and may lead participants to make a
stronger association between their own error and the cue.
Finally, while some errorless learning studies have included healthy young people
among their participants, often their main focus is on people with memory impairments or
healthy older adults. It would be interesting to examine the performance of, for example,
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healthy older adults on the errorful generation task used in our experiments, to determine if
errorful generation is as beneficial for that population as it has been shown to be with our,
typically younger, participants.
Errorful generation: Benefits and costs
Experiments 1-8 found no detriment of testing when it produced many errors. On the
contrary, generating typically produced superior memory performance to errorless reading.
Even tests which involved choosing never led to a detriment from making errors, by
comparison with reading, and choosing led to superior performance when final test options
were all equally familiar and when all items were considered, whether correct or incorrect at
study (Experiments 3 and 4). On the other hand, testing led to metacognitive errors, in that
participants were strongly influenced by whether or not they happened to guess correctly at
study, leading to erroneous predictions about their future performance. Given that
metacognitive judgments can affect learners’ study strategies, the misperception that
generating is less beneficial to memory than passive studying, may lead to underuse of a
potentially powerful learning tool. Methods to attenuate this misperception are worth
exploring in future research.
Testing and interference from new learning
Experiments 9 and 10 examined whether reactivating a memory in the form of a test
taken a day after learning would make it more susceptible to interference. In Experiment 9
testing, far from creating a detriment to List 1 memory, enhanced it, showing a testing effect.
In Experiment 10, interference, in the form of List 2 learning, had a substantial detrimental
effect on memory for List 1, reducing recall of List 1 by nearly half compared with when
there was no List 2 learning. However, a single test of List 1, without feedback, on Day 2
eliminated that detriment and protected List 1 memory against interference from the learning
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of List 2. There was no evidence that reactivating List 1 memory, then learning List 2,
disrupted reconsolidation of List 1.
Few studies have investigated reconsolidation in human memory, and findings have
been mixed among those which have. Some researchers (e.g., Forcato et al., 2009) have
proposed that labilization of consolidated memories only occurs when a memory is
reactivated without being fully retrieved, in other words when there is a mismatch between
what is expected and what occurs. However, others have reported reconsolidation effects
following a full test of the memory (Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Finn & Roediger, 2011; Walker
et al., 2003), though in Finn and Roediger’s study retrieval occurred so soon after learning
that it is debatable whether consolidation, let alone reconsolidation, had had time to occur.
Our findings suggest that a full test, even without feedback, protects the memory from the
harmful effects of interference from new learning.
Testing and interference: Application to educational settings
Testing is increasingly being advocated as a means of enhancing learning in
educational settings (e.g., Pashler, Bain, Bottge, Graesser, McDaniel, & Metcalfe, 2007). To
maximize its usefulness it is important to identify in what conditions testing is most
beneficial, and when it might be harmful to memory. The discovery that generation can be
beneficial to memory even when it produces many errors and even when there is no pre-
existing association between the cue and the target (Experiments 1-8), is relevant to any real
world situation where novel information is to be learned, for example when learning concepts
in science, economics, politics, philosophy, literary theory, or art. An understanding of the
effect of errors is also particularly important in a world in which technological innovations
mean that students are increasingly creating their own online content, using tools such as
discussion boards, wikis and self-assessment software packages, creating ample opportunity
for the generation of erroneous material.
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A few studies have examined testing effects in real classroom settings, though there
are considerable difficulties in carrying out this kind of applied research (see, for example,
Agarwal, Bain, & Chamberlain, 2012). One study (McDaniel, Agarwal, Huelser, McDermott,
& Roediger, 2011) investigated the benefits of testing in an American middle school setting,
and included a condition in which students were given a multiple choice test before the
teacher’s lesson on the tested topic (pre-lesson test), but after reading the relevant textbook
chapter. This condition therefore has some, though not exact, similarity with the Choice
condition used in the errorful generation experiments reported here, though it differs in terms
of the materials used and in the fact that pupils had the opportunity to read about the topic in
the textbook before taking the test. McDaniel et al. found that there was neither a benefit nor
a detriment of pre-lesson testing, compared with giving no test, on end-of-unit summative test
performance up to three weeks later, nor on summative tests given 3 months (end of
semester) or 8 months (end of year) after initial learning, although this last result was
marginally significant in favour of the pre-lesson test.
While a handful of classroom studies have incorporated, in their design, pre-lecture
tests in short answer format rather than MCQ format (e.g., Narloch, Garbin, & Turnage,
2006; Nevid & Mahon, 2009), these studies have tended to focus on indirect benefits of pre-
lecture testing, such as motivating students to do the assigned reading, activating relevant
schemas prior to the lecture, and focussing attention on key concepts subsequently covered in
the lecture. For example, Narloch, Garbin, and Turnage (2006) examined the efficacy of
giving students pre-lecture tests based on assigned reading, and found a benefit for tested
over nontested groups in terms of later performance on both multiple choice and essay exam
questions. Students’ self-reports of their preparation time for the pre-lecture tests suggest that
at least part of this benefit was due to more time spent on the assigned reading in the tested
groups, and the design of the study makes it impossible to isolate the effect of generating
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responses per se. While indirect benefits of tests such as students’ increased engagement with
pre-lecture assigned readings are undoubtedly important, it would be interesting to investigate
whether the generation benefit observed in the present experiments, where material has not
been previously studied, would transfer to applied settings. No study, to my knowledge, has
yet addressed this.
One line of research, with some similarity to the present one, has examined the benefit
of “productive failure” in the learning of novel mathematics concepts (see Kapur &
Bielaczyk, 2011, for review). In one study (Kapur, 2012), school children learned the concept
of variance either by “direct instruction” (DI, i.e., being taught the canonical solution by the
teacher using worked examples, and then being given data analysis problems to solve) or, in
the “productive failure” (PF) condition, worked in groups to invent a method for solving
those same data analysis problems, prior to being taught the canonical solution. The
productive failure group offered many solutions based on their prior knowledge, but not the
canonical one which they were subsequently taught. On a subsequent test, however, they
outperformed the direct instruction group in both conceptual understanding of the solution,
and ability to apply it to new problems. This was in spite of the fact that the study design
meant that the DI group had had the opportunity to practise more data analysis problems
overall. While there are many differences between Kapur’s study and the experiments
reported here, his findings suggest a real benefit of incorrect generation in the classroom,
which will be important to follow up using a similar task to the one used in our experiments.
Similarly, the finding (in Experiments 9 and 10) that testing can protect memories
against interference from new learning which otherwise could disrupt even well-learned
memories, is of real practical value. When learning new material with some similarity to
previously learned information, learners would do well to undergo a brief rehearsal of the
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original material before embarking on learning the new information, and need not fear that
this will lead to increased confusion between the two.
Concluding remarks
This thesis examined whether testing, which is known to enhance memory in many
situations, would be helpful or harmful to memory in cases where the test itself has the
potential to increase interference, a factor which is often detrimental to memory. In fact, the
evidence from the experiments reported here suggests that the benefit of testing is remarkably
robust in the face of interference, at least in the two scenarios considered in this thesis.
Experiments 1-8 showed a consistent benefit of generation, even when it produced
many errors, and even when the opportunity for participants to persist with their errors was
maximized. That this was so even though items to be learned were unfamiliar, challenges the
proposal that generating errors during learning can only benefit memory when there is a pre-
existing association between cue and target which can be reinforced by corrective feedback.
While the reinforcement of pre-existing associations between cue and target may play an
important role in the classic testing effect, and in some errorful generation situations, the
benefit we observed during the learning of novel items must be attributable to a different
mechanism, and determining the exact nature of that mechanism is an important goal for
future research. One disadvantage to testing, though, was in its effect on participants’
metacognitive judgments, which were unduly influenced by the outcome of fortuitous
guesses.
Likewise, the reconsolidation hypothesis predicts modification or unlearning when a
memory is reactivated immediately prior to interfering new learning. In contrast, Experiments
9-10 not only found no detriment to memory from testing under these conditions, but found a
benefit such that testing immunized the memory against interference from the new learning.
Indeed, testing conferred a greater benefit in the presence of interference than in its absence.
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Appendix A – Stimulus materials for each experiment.
Table A1: Stimulus materials for Experiment 1
Cue Target Lure 1 Lure 2 Lure 3
compendious concise elegant overhanging scholarly
descry discover betray demolish outline
encomium tribute theatre meeting committee
esculent edible dainty precise moist
frond leaf edge group stream
gossamer flimsy greedy false huge
immolate sacrifice soften pacify criticize
imprecation curse stain error lie
inculcate instil insert enter fill
interstice space pillar layer archway
lassitude tiredness flexibility pessimism gratitude
maunder ramble moan grieve pester
minatory threatening exploratory insignificant ridiculous
plangent noisy heavy funny pleasant
roke mist pole wheel stick
spoliate plunder blemish disrupt indulge
sprauncy smart jolly lean spicy
stentorian loud stern firm old
subduce withdraw bewitch conclude underlie
subsecive spare later repeated jealous
contumacious rebellious meddling spacious expensive
effulgent shining generous bulging exuberant
inimical hostile unique notable impaired
limpid clear weak sticky supple
objurgate rebuke argue oppress oppose
opprobrium disgrace pleasure approval excitement
orotund pompous stout respected boring
peculate embezzle complain gamble misbehave
picaroon cheat urchin clown tourist
recreant surrendering hypocritical unreliable dishonest
roil billow roast tumble simmer
slake quench attack slice climb
spoffish fussy proud cute young
stanchion support dwelling companion mentor
stolid unemotional unalterable inevitable unavoidable
burgeon flourish hesitate reconcile hurry
subluxation dislocation sufficiency entirety imbalance
subvention grant custom trick trial
succursal branch journey revision overview
superate overcome exceed overestimate maximise
everse overthrow prevent deny alternate
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blandish flatter fortify promise condemn
immure imprison accustom secure abandon
inchoate undeveloped independent unknown inexplicable
valinch tube rope clamp screw
intractable unmanageable untouchable inaccessible inadequate
mendicant beggar misfit tailor criminal
perpend consider foretell await delay
pertinacious unyielding relevant discerning energetic
abjure reject ensure believe praise
rebarbative repellent sarcastic influential aggressive
recondite hidden needed guilty unsure
renitent resistant sorrowful continuous intuitive
sententious moralising controversial passionate irritable
sodality fellowship misfortune loneliness harmony
subdolous crafty gloomy naughty silly
surquedry arrogance abundance politeness deceitfulness
threnody lament excess frenzy fear
trammel impede trouble destroy mumble
tyro beginner dictator soldier juggler
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Table A2: Stimulus materials for Experiment 2A
Cue Target Lure 1 Lure 2 Lure 3
menald spotty brainy chatty drowsy
frampold quarrelsome dishonest insolent ungrateful
floccose woolly crooked flagrant husky
hispid bristly mundane soggy reddish
orotund pompous burly cheery lavish
leggiadrous elegant protective impersonal sensible
stentorian loud stern trim bold
subsecive extra welcome tiny brilliant
selcouth strange fresh bright round
gaberlunzie beggar culprit dweller healer
opprobrium disgrace ordeal pitfall forfeit
carcanet necklace packet bonnet slipper
roke mist creek grove bush
succursal branch gift scheme drill
achene fruit tape myth knee
umiak boat hill frame song
famulus assistant scholarship consumer illusion
objurgate rebuke disperse begrudge fiddle
descry detect accuse reject tremble
subduce withdraw predict concede devise
rebarbative repellent bubbly victorious obstinate
spoffish fussy bogus unkind risky
recreant cowardly flamboyant defiant mischievous
plangent noisy clumsy dreary sleepy
esurient hungry nervous fortunate stupid
infandous horrible constructive reluctant intensive
sprauncy smart lean brave dim
coriaceous tough wise calm glad
clancular secret evil pointed quiet
surquedry arrogance fortitude merriment gallantry
desman mole vase peg toad
mechlin lace shrine herb chord
kedge anchor razor needle doorway
quidnunc gossip nonsense moonlight romance
valinch tube bird horn maid
gadoid fish tongue bench yard
stanchion post bank youth ship
spoliate plunder grapple blemish dwindle
conspue despise inflict exclude postpone
trammel restrict complain exert frighten
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morigerous obedient meticulous amicable inquisitive
levisomnous observant nocturnal expectant versatile
compendious concise devout weighty sulky
insulse boring aloof cunning moody
gallionic careless furious dismal stormy
minatory threatening conclusive forthcoming eccentric
recondite obscure absurd clever weary
glabrous smooth rare odd mad
tantivy quick warm dry flat
hauberk garment banquet fortress puppet
falchion sword barge hood plank
frisket mask glove cork pearl
zamindar landlord dentist salesman clergy
quant pole brick lamp tray
kaross jacket mountain owner campus
sodality fellowship sympathy intention dignity
bistoury knife fair judge rock
droze drip coax starve groan
maunder ramble amaze beware prosper
mundify wash hurt plot fail
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Table A3: Stimulus materials for Experiment 2B
Cue Target Lure 1 Lure 2 Lure 3
ahuntz goat towel spoon jug
aker ram hedge stair broom
apaiz priest sketch quest flag
apal shelf tar layer nerve
basamortu desert planet marble crossing
bizar beard storm gear card
danbor drum sleeve rake cliff
ezti honey saddle parade cocktail
gerezi cherry wallet peanut feather
hezur bone lunch prince grave
hosto leaf tank silk crest
igel frog shrub wand gnome
kajoi drawer pig glue sack
lepoko necklace turret kettle doorstep
lurrikara earthquake turkey nightmare hammer
oihan jungle suitcase quarrel border
opari gift scheme rice fate
orratz needle scholar reward anchor
poltsa bag pride wire skill
sagu mouse wool doll coin
aldapa hillside monkey salad berry
arrautza egg tin lens cab
belarri ear stem jet barn
dordoka turtle wardrobe pillow mansion
erbi hare fern crust plum
erizain nurse lion fleet dome
erle bee tomb pump juice
gurdi cart mat hook flask
gutunazal envelope summary luxury heritage
hileta funeral slavery harmony accident
kokotz chin shirt mirror grain
kometa kite flute crease hinge
leize cave wheat pearl mask
hegal wing tray pen brick
ohitura custom verdict thunder sunset
soka rope thread lawn clue
sutondo fireplace puppet garment banquet
tresna tool code joy proof
urmael pond star fog vein
zorro packet saucepan ruler orchard
ardi sheep plug bowl flower
arkatz pencil sugar ocean mistake
bidaia journey witness profit folklore
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borda shed log ghost calf
eskularru glove hose duck cork
euritako umbrella veranda hurricane caravan
gazta cheese moss rack cage
hodei cloud sand prize dawn
ijito gypsy vulture treasure rainbow
iloba niece veil stool trunk
iturri fountain candle lemon hunter
katilu mug pram claw rib
mahats grape swan cloak thorn
margotu paint noise gate fool
marraskilo snail weed jewel skate
oinetako shoe purse bush hawk
sarbide driveway arrow neighbour insect
saski basket voyage portrait meadow
untxi rabbit walnut violin infant
oilo hen plate mess soap
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Table A4: Stimulus materials for Experiment 3
Cue Target Study lure 1 Study lure 2 Study lure 3 Test lure 1 Test lure 2 “New” lure
compendious concise devout weighty sulky glassy obedient hospitable
frampold quarrelsome dishonest insolent ungrateful observant cowardly grubby
spoffish fussy bogus unkind risky woolly noisy sloppy
hispid bristly mundane soggy reddish boring threatening fragrant
orotund pompous burly cheery lavish careless lasting discreet
acherontic dismal feeble corrupt selfish horrible smart impartial
leggiadrous elegant protective impersonal sensible obscure hungry sturdy
stentorian loud stern trim bold extra tough distinctive
glabrous smooth rare odd mad secret quick varied
selcouth strange fresh bright round spotty repellent impossible
rapparee bandit chariot gateway steamboat seaweed necklace snowstorm
hauberk garment banquet fortress puppet gem mole ledge
falchion sword barge hood plank jug herb prisoner
mechlin lace shrine fold spear button gossip castle
frisket mask glove cork pearl mist anchor trifle
zamindar landlord dentist salesman clergy bird pole mineral
kaross jacket mountain owner campus fruit tube magic
withe branch gift scheme drill fool fish plot
hanap cup load sheet meat knife post wave
karimption crowd band fort stream beggar camel chest
rebarbative repellent bubbly victorious obstinate loud secret jovial
morigerous obedient meticulous amiable inquisitive smooth spotty arrogant
recreant cowardly flamboyant defiant mischievous strange glassy erratic
plangent noisy clumsy dreary sleepy concise observant tedious
minatory threatening conclusive forthcoming eccentric quarrelsome woolly childish
olamic lasting blessed monstrous sweeping fussy boring suspicious
sprauncy smart lean brave dim bristly careless lucky
esurient hungry nervous fortunate stupid pompous horrible unexpected
coriaceous tough wise calm glad dismal obscure dirty
tantivy quick warm dry flat elegant extra clean
mehari camel almond fanfare helmet branch knife goldfish
carcanet necklace packet bonnet slipper cup beggar orchard
desman mole vase peg toad crowd seaweed worm
munjeet herb booth grudge prey bandit gem chimney
quidnunc gossip nonsense moonlight romance garment jug ribbon
kedge anchor razor needle doorway sword button onion
quant pole brick lamp tray lace mist bell
valinch tube lane horn maid mask bird slave
gadoid fish tongue bench yard landlord fruit chicken
stanchion post bank youth ship jacket fool cover
menald spotty brainy chatty drowsy quick dismal craggy
hyaline glassy thorny spongy lumpy repellent elegant sickly
levisomnous observant nocturnal expectant versatile obedient loud grandiose
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floccose woolly crooked flagrant husky cowardly smooth dainty
insulse boring aloof cunning moody noisy strange greedy
gallionic careless furious kindly stormy threatening concise merry
infandous horrible constructive reluctant intensive lasting quarrelsome persistent
recondite obscure absurd clever weary smart fussy imaginary
subsecive extra welcome tiny brilliant hungry bristly formal
clancular secret evil pointed quiet tough pompous official
gaberlunzie beggar culprit dweller healer post landlord spider
varec seaweed ordeal pitfall forfeit camel jacket ointment
peridot gem dove marsh trout necklace branch vine
urceus jug wolf mast cord mole cup feather
netsuke button puzzle token harness herb crowd costume
roke mist creek grove bush gossip bandit pine
barbet bird fence trail root anchor garment gallery
achene fruit tape myth knee pole sword soldier
balatron fool guide bomb gate tube lace palace
bistoury knife fair judge rock fish mask leader
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Table A5: Stimulus materials for Experiment 4
Cue Target Study lure 1 Study lure 2 Study lure 3 Test lure 1 Test lure 2 Test lure 3
compendious concise devout weighty sulky glassy obedient elegant
frampold quarrelsome dishonest insolent ungrateful observant cowardly fussy
spoffish fussy bogus unkind risky woolly noisy bristly
hispid bristly mundane soggy reddish boring threatening pompous
orotund pompous burly cheery lavish careless lasting quarrelsome
acherontic dismal feeble corrupt selfish horrible smart concise
leggiadrous elegant protective impersonal sensible obscure hungry dismal
stentorian loud stern trim bold extra tough smooth
glabrous smooth rare odd mad secret quick strange
selcouth strange fresh bright round spotty repellent loud
rapparee bandit chariot gateway steamboat seaweed necklace garment
hauberk garment banquet fortress puppet gem mole sword
falchion sword barge hood plank jug herb bandit
mechlin lace shrine fold spear button gossip landlord
frisket mask glove cork pearl mist anchor lace
zamindar landlord dentist salesman clergy bird pole mask
kaross jacket mountain owner campus fruit tube cup
withe branch gift scheme drill fool fish jacket
hanap cup load sheet meat knife post crowd
karimption crowd band fort stream beggar camel branch
rebarbative repellent bubbly victorious obstinate smooth secret noisy
morigerous obedient meticulous amiable inquisitive loud spotty cowardly
recreant cowardly flamboyant defiant mischievous strange glassy repellent
plangent noisy clumsy dreary sleepy concise observant threatening
minatory threatening conclusive forthcoming eccentric quarrelsome woolly lasting
olamic lasting blessed monstrous sweeping fussy boring smart
sprauncy smart lean brave dim bristly careless quick
esurient hungry nervous fortunate stupid pompous horrible obedient
coriaceous tough wise calm glad dismal obscure hungry
tantivy quick warm dry flat elegant extra tough
mehari camel almond fanfare helmet branch knife necklace
carcanet necklace packet bonnet slipper cup beggar herb
desman mole vase peg toad crowd seaweed camel
munjeet herb booth grudge prey bandit gem mole
quidnunc gossip nonsense moonlight romance garment jug anchor
kedge anchor razor needle doorway sword button pole
quant pole brick lamp tray lace mist tube
valinch tube lane horn maid mask bird post
gadoid fish tongue bench yard landlord fruit gossip
stanchion post bank youth ship jacket fool fish
menald spotty brainy chatty drowsy quick dismal woolly
hyaline glassy thorny spongy lumpy repellent elegant spotty
levisomnous observant nocturnal expectant versatile obedient loud horrible
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floccose woolly crooked flagrant husky cowardly smooth glassy
insulse boring aloof cunning moody noisy strange observant
gallionic careless furious kindly stormy threatening concise boring
infandous horrible constructive reluctant intensive lasting quarrelsome careless
recondite obscure absurd clever weary smart fussy extra
subsecive extra welcome tiny brilliant hungry bristly secret
clancular secret evil pointed quiet tough pompous obscure
gaberlunzie beggar culprit dweller healer post landlord secret
varec seaweed ordeal pitfall forfeit camel jacket gem
peridot gem dove marsh trout necklace branch beggar
urceus jug wolf mast cord mole cup mist
netsuke button puzzle token harness herb crowd jug
roke mist creek grove bush gossip bandit button
barbet bird fence trail root anchor garment fruit
achene fruit tape myth knee pole sword fool
balatron fool guide bomb gate tube lace knife
bistoury knife fair judge rock fish mask bird
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Table A6: Stimulus materials for Experiment 5
Cue Target Study lure 1 Study lure 2 Study lure 3 Test lure 1 Test lure 2 Test lure 3
compendious concise devout weighty sulky elegant adept hospitable
frampold quarrelsome dishonest insolent ungrateful fussy prickly grubby
spoffish fussy bogus unkind risky bristly tiresome sloppy
hispid bristly mundane soggy reddish pompous husky fragrant
orotund pompous burly cheery lavish quarrelsome insecure discreet
acherontic dismal feeble corrupt selfish concise unstable impartial
leggiadrous elegant protective impersonal sensible dismal muscular sturdy
stentorian loud stern trim bold smooth notable distinctive
glabrous smooth rare odd mad strange golden varied
selcouth strange fresh bright round loud patient impossible
rapparee bandit chariot gateway steamboat garment admirer snowstorm
hauberk garment banquet fortress puppet sword maze ledge
falchion sword barge hood plank bandit ambush prisoner
mechlin lace shrine fold chord landlord mint castle
frisket mask glove cork pearl lace hose trifle
zamindar landlord dentist salesman clergy mask cavity mineral
kaross jacket mountain owner campus cup camera magic
withe branch gift scheme drill jacket shadow plot
hanap cup load sheet meat crowd snake wave
karimption crowd band fort stream branch grass chest
rebarbative repellent bubbly victorious obstinate noisy immovable jovial
morigerous obedient meticulous amiable inquisitive cowardly chivalrous arrogant
recreant cowardly flamboyant defiant mischievous repellent impetuous erratic
plangent noisy clumsy dreary sleepy threatening outspoken tedious
minatory threatening conclusive forthcoming eccentric lasting trivial childish
olamic lasting blessed monstrous sweeping smart unfair suspicious
sprauncy smart lean brave dim quick heroic lucky
esurient hungry nervous fortunate stupid obedient noble unexpected
coriaceous tough wise calm glad hungry dirty wise
tantivy quick warm dry flat tough frank clean
mehari camel almond fanfare helmet necklace ladle goldfish
carcanet necklace packet bonnet slipper herb cloak orchard
desman mole vase peg toad camel falcon worm
munjeet herb booth grudge lamb mole bucket chimney
quidnunc gossip nonsense moonlight romance anchor lantern ribbon
kedge anchor razor needle doorway pole fabric onion
quant pole brick lamp tray tube pen bell
valinch tube lane horn maid post blanket slave
gadoid fish tongue bench yard gossip joint chicken
stanchion post bank youth ship fish enemy cover
menald spotty brainy chatty drowsy woolly silky craggy
hyaline glassy thorny spongy lumpy spotty flimsy sickly
levisomnous observant nocturnal expectant versatile horrible hesitant grandiose
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floccose woolly crooked flagrant husky glassy bland dainty
insulse boring aloof cunning moody observant dizzy greedy
gallionic careless furious kindly stormy boring insistent merry
infandous horrible constructive reluctant intensive careless sentimental persistent
recondite obscure absurd clever weary extra formidable imaginary
subsecive extra welcome tiny brilliant secret proud formal
clancular secret evil pointed quiet obscure traditional official
gaberlunzie beggar culprit dweller healer seaweed patchwork spider
varec seaweed ordeal pitfall forfeit gem hurdle ointment
peridot gem dove marsh trout beggar gadget vine
urceus jug wolf mast cord mist plague feather
netsuke button puzzle token harness jug coin costume
roke mist creek grove bush button tower pine
barbet bird fence trail root fruit dancer gallery
achene fruit tape myth knee fool paint soldier
balatron fool guide bomb gate knife concert palace
bistoury knife fair judge rock bird bottle leader
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Table A7: Stimulus materials for Experiment 6
Cue Target Lure
achene fruit tape
algid chilly shallow
carcanet necklace packet
coriaceous tough glad
descry detect exploit
esurient hungry lonely
famulus assistant illusion
floccose woolly jerky
frampold quarrelsome dishonest
gaberlunzie beggar hovel
kaross jacket mountain
objurgate rebuke amaze
orotund pompous burly
quidnunc gossip nonsense
roke mist creek
selcouth strange fresh
subsecive extra welcome
trammel impede outwit
unguinous oily kindly
zamindar landlord ribbon
aegagrus goat maze
clancular secret obvious
conspue despise inflict
desman mole toad
facinorous infamous judicious
gadoid fish knee
infandous horrible luminous
inosculate join hang
insulse boring righteous
leggiadrous elegant protective
levisomnous observant nocturnal
mechlin lace shrine
plangent noisy clumsy
rebarbative repellent acoustic
recreant cowardly flamboyant
stanchion post watch
subduce withdraw enslave
surquedry arrogance diligence
tressilate quiver grapple
valinch tube bird
balatron joker phantom
complect intertwine overwhelm
droze drip coax
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frisket mask glove
gallionic careless knightly
hauberk garment banquet
hispid bristly artful
kedge anchor razor
maunder ramble nurture
minatory threatening extensive
morigerous obedient inflexible
mundify wash hurt
quant pole dish
recondite hidden thorough
senescent elderly forthcoming
sejant seated junior
sodality fellowship mystery
sprauncy neat lean
stentorian loud stern
tantivy quick warm
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Table A8: Stimulus materials used in Experiment 7.
Cue Target
leggiadrous elegant
spoffish fussy
recreant cowardly
hispid bristly
esurient hungry
infandous horrible
sprauncy smart
coriaceous tough
clancular secret
surquedry arrogance
desman mole
mechlin lace
kedge anchor
quidnunc gossip
valinch tube
gadoid fish
succursal branch
objurgate rebuke
conspue despise
subduce withdraw
morigerous obedient
levisomnous observant
compendious concise
insulse dull
gallionic careless
minatory threatening
recondite obscure
glabrous smooth
tantivy quick
hauberk garment
falchion sword
frisket mask
carcanet necklace
roke mist
kaross jacket
sodality fellowship
bistoury knife
droze drip
descry detect
mundify wash
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Table A9: Stimulus materials used in Experiment 8
Cue Target
upela cask
bakarti recluse
zarata fuss
ondare legacy
ohoin thief
gazta cheese
sagar apple
leize cave
artile wool
untxi rabbit
ohitura custom
sardesca fork
tipula onion
atezain porter
gorespen praise
hodei cloud
ikasgai lesson
opari gift
gosari breakfast
baserri farm
aran plum
debeku embargo
arbuio scorn
atsekabe dismay
kaxoi drawer
ahate duck
eskularru glove
tximino monkey
ukondo elbow
mahuka sleeve
belatz hawk
oinetako shoe
orratz needle
bizitasun vitality
saski basket
bidaia journey
gerriko belt
hezur bone
zelai grass
landare plant
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Table A10: Stimulus materials used in Experiment 9
English Swahili (List 1) Finnish (List 2)
Shared cues
cat paka kissa
house nyumba talo
bird nyuni lintu
flower ua kukka
stone jiwe kivi
book kitabu tilata
child mwana kapsi
water maji vesi
bread mkate leipa
chair kiti tuoli
Unique cues - Swahili
bed kitanda
hair nywele
food chakula
broom fagio
head kichwa
jug chombo
horse farasi
fire moto
bag gunia
tree mti
Unique cues - Finnish
fish kala
window ikkuna
potato peruna
table payta
apple omena
deer hirvi
spoon lusikka
dress puku
sun aurinko
train Juna
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Table A11: Stimulus materials used in Experiment 10
English
Swahili
(List 1)
Finnish
(List 2)
boat mashua soutuvene
lake ziwa jarvi
doctor tabibu laarkari
garden bustani puutarha
fish samaki kala
potato kiazi peruna
jug chombo ruuku
spoon kijiko lusikka
friend rafiki ystava
curtain pazia verho
child mwana kapsi
scarf leso huivi
snow theluji lumi
bird nyuni lintu
dust vumbi tomu
cat paka kissa
cloud wingu pilvi
bread makate leipa
beer pombe olut
horse farasi hevonen
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Appendix B – Response times for item judgments of learning.
In Experiment 2A there was no difference in JOL response times between the three
study conditions, F(1.29, 37.37) = .22, p = .704 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied).
Mean response times were 3.51s (SD = 1.5) for the Read condition; 3.69s (SD = 2.0) for the
Generate condition; and 3.59s (SD = 3.1) for the Choice condition. This was also the case in
Experiment 3, for the SP group: There was no difference between the three study methods,
F(2,46) = .43, p = .651. The mean time to make JOLs was 2.54s (SD = .8) in the Read
condition; 2.58s (SD = .6) in the Generate condition; and 2.49s (SD = .5) in the Choice
condition. These data were not captured for the EP group.
In Experiment 2B, however, there was a significant difference in times to make JOLs
between the three conditions, F(2,46) = 5.85, p = .005). Participants spent longer making
JOLs for Generate items (M = 3.66s, SD = 1.6) than they did for Read items (M = 3.27s, SD =
1.4), t(23) = 2.84, p = .009, and longer for Generate than for Choice JOLs (M = 3.40s, SD =
1.6), t(23) = 2.74, p = .012.
179
Appendix C - Interpretation of JOLs data
An alternative account of our JOLs data is that, for Read items, participants anchor
their judgments near the middle of the scale, indicating that they do not know whether or not
they will remember the items, whereas for Generate items they are more confident. Their
lower JOLs for Generate than Read items would therefore reflect higher confidence that they
would not remember these items. To test this possibility, we collected data from 9 additional
participants who took the standard version of the task, as in Experiment 2A, with the
modification that following each JOL they gave a second rating (0-100) indicating how
accurate they thought their JOL was. As shown in Figure C1, we obtained a similar curve to
that obtained by Dunlosky, Serra, Matvey, and Rawson (2005) in that, perhaps
unsurprisingly, higher confidence ratings (what Dunlosky et al. called “second order JOLs”)
were given to the lowest and the highest JOLs. However, there was no difference between
conditions, suggesting that participants were not using a different basis for their JOLs in the
Read and the Generate conditions.
Figure C1: Mean confidence ratings as a function of judgments of learning (JOLs).
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Appendix D - JOLs for items correct and incorrect at test
For completeness, we report data concerning the relationship between JOLs and test
accuracy in Experiments 2-4, though item selection effects mean these data should be
interpreted with caution: Items which are very difficult to learn may elicit both lower JOLs
and greater effort but the greater effort may not be sufficient to result in correct test
performance. In Experiments 2A, 2B, 3 and 4, and within each condition, JOLs for items
subsequently answered correctly at test were numerically higher than for items answered
incorrectly.
We computed within-participant gamma rank correlations between JOLs and final test
accuracy to examine this relationship further (see Nelson, 1984). The means are given in
Table D1. In Experiment 2A the mean gamma correlation was significantly higher than zero
in all conditions (t(24) = 4.43, p < .001 for Read; t(19) = 3.50, p = .002 for Generate; and
t(24) = 2.96, p = .007 for Choice), showing some ability for JOLs to predict test performance.
(Note that gamma cannot be computed in cases where a participant has no incorrect responses
in a given condition, hence the differences in degrees of freedom.) There was no difference in
resolution (i.e., accuracy at monitoring the relative recallability of items) between conditions,
F (2,36) = .112, p = .894, indicating that participants were no more accurate in one condition
than in another.
In Experiment 2B, the mean gamma correlation between JOLs and test accuracy did
not differ significantly from zero in any condition (t(16) = .69, p = .501 for Read; t(10) =
1.28, p = .230 for Generate; t(16) = .99, p = .336 for Choice), and did not differ between
conditions, F(2,18) = .35, p = .710. Resolution was generally poor with this version of the
task.
In Experiment 3, the mean gamma correlation between JOLs and test accuracy was
significantly higher than zero in all conditions, (t(38) = 7.36, p < .001 for Read; t(36) = 5.31,
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p < .001 for Generate; and t(37) = 2.44, p = .020 for Choice), with no difference in resolution
between conditions, F (2,70) = 2.67, p = .076.
Experiment 4 showed a similar pattern: The mean gamma correlation between JOLs
and test accuracy was significantly higher than zero in all conditions, t(28) = 4.12, p < .001
for Read; t(28) = 4.13, p < .001 for Generate; and t(28) = 2.08, p = .047 for Choice, with no
difference in resolution between conditions, F (2,56) = 1.75, p = .183.
Overall these results demonstrate that, within each condition, participants showed
some ability to predict their true likelihood of recalling each item, although this was not
statistically significant in Experiment 2B. Resolution did not differ across conditions in any
experiment. Of course, this within-condition relationship between memorability and JOLs is
distinct from the between-conditions influence of study condition on JOLs, on which the
main text focuses.
Table D1: Mean (SD) gamma values for the correlation between JOLs and final test
performance in Experiments 2A, 2B, 3 and 4.
Read Generate Choice
Exp 2A .34 (.38) .34 (.43) .27(.45)
Exp 2B .09 (.54) .20 (.53) .13 (.53)
Exp 3 .39 (.33) .33 (.38) .18 (.46)
Exp 4 .27 (.36) .34 (.44) .14 (.37)
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Appendix E - Final test performance for all participants in Experiment 3
We ran the main analysis (test accuracy) for all 107 participants in Experiment 3,
excluding test trials containing partial words and nonwords. In the case of one participant this
left only one usable item so this participant’s data were excluded. This analysis yielded a
similar pattern to that of the subset. There was a main effect of Study Method, F(2, 208) =
7.36, p = .001, p2 = .066, no effect of Group, F(1,104) = 2.72, p = .102, and no interaction,
F(2,208) = 2.32, p = .101. Generating (M = 75.4, SD =17.6) led to better recall than reading
(M = 67.5, SD = 20.7), t(105) = 4.18, p < .001, d = .41. Choosing (M = 72.8, SD = 21.3) was
better than reading, t(105) = 2.47, p = .015, d = .25, with no difference between choosing and
generating, t(105) = 1.20, p = .234, d = .13.
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Appendix F - Study time and test performance in Experiment 3
For completeness we report the relationship between study time and final test
performance in Experiment 3, but these results should be treated with caution since item
selection artefacts make it hazardous to draw any firm conclusions from them. For example,
participants may spend longer on items which are most difficult, but the extra time spent may
not be sufficient to compensate for the difficulty and may therefore not result in correct test
performance (see Nelson, 1993, for a useful discussion of this point). For each study method,
we compared average study times for items which were ultimately correct versus incorrect at
test. A 2 (Accuracy: correct vs. incorrect) x 3 (Study Method) ANOVA showed a main effect
of Study Method, F(2,40) = 30.68, p < .001, but no effect of Accuracy, F(1,20) = .02, p =
.884, and no interaction, F(2,40) = 1.46, p = .245. Participants spent the same amount of time
studying items they would later get right at test (M = 7.58 s, SD = 3.77, for Read; M = 6.32,
SD = 4.26 for Generate; M = 5.24, SD = 3.86 for Choice) as they did studying items they
would later get wrong (M = 8.31, SD = 5.52, for Read; M = 6.13, SD = 3.54 for Generate; M
= 4.81, SD = 3.50 for Choice).
